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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Article VIII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution states, "The judicial power
of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial court of general
jurisdiction .. ., and in such other courts as the Legislature by statute may
establish."

Utah Code Annotated § 30-8-3(1953) states that "A premarital agreement
must be in writing and signed by both parties. It is enforceable without
consideration."

i

Utah Code Annotated § 30-8-6(1953) states as follows:
Utah Code Annotated § 30-8-6. Enforcement
(1) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against
whom enforcement is sought proves that:
(a) that party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or
(b) the agreement was fraudulent when it was executed and,
before execution of the agreement, that party:
(i) was not provided a reasonable disclosure of the property or
financial obligations of the other party insofar as was possible;
(ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right
to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other
party beyond the disclosure provided; and
(iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate
knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other party.
(2) If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or
elimincttes spousal support and that modification or elimination
causes one party to the agreement to be eligible for support under a
program of public assistance at the time of separation or marital
dissolution, a court, notwithstanding the terms of the agreement,
may require the other party to provide support to the extent
necessary to avoid that eligibility.
(3) An issue of fraud of a premarital agreement shall be decided
by the court as a matter of law.

Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states as follows:
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. New trials;
amendments of judgment
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for
any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for
a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the
judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:

ii

(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse
party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either
party was prevented from having a fair trial.. .
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other
decision, or that it is against law.
(a)(7) Error in law.

Rule 7 of The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states as follows:
(f) Orders.
1.
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court,
including a minute order entered in writing, not included in a
judgment. An order for the payment of money may be enforced in
the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except as otherwise
provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it
with or without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered
upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative.
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with
an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court,
the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's
decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity
with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be
filed within five days after service. The party preparing the order
shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or
upon expiration of the time to object.
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT
KATHRYN C. BROUGH,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Petitioner,
vs.
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,
Respondent,

Civil No.

0540000084

Judge John R. Anderson

The above case came before the Court for trial on July 9,
2008.

The Court has entered an order divorcing the parties and

took the remaining

issues under advisement. The Court has now

entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and based
thereon,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Respondent, if he wants to retain ownership of the home

and Brough Trucking and Crane Service Inc. (Brough Trucking), is
ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $386,500.00 within 90
days of the entry of this decree. He is to notify Petitioner's

U0u3/i
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counsel within 15 days 01 entry of the dt'" '-^
ret a i t J

2.

^ -

•

- .- ,

li the Respondent does not elect to retain ownership ^f

the home ana B:- " • T]"ir:I;.i n:j a;, pi.n Lded above, then the Petitioner
is awarded the Neola home and property, the Respondent is awarded
Brough '"r^c*1-" : ncr ;md the ; Respondent
:

• .

i ,;

i Jere<

to nav "Petitioner

... inj difference in the value within 9C days ^f entry

of the decree.
3.

Respondent is ordered to refinance the $160,000 debt to

remove the home and Petitioner from, liability '»h lli.il liu-iii.
4.

The Pet i. 1: ioner- is awarded the vehicle she drives (subject-

to the remaining debt on it as of the date this decree is signed),
the personal property in hei1 possessic

.-. . ;.::9 property listed on

Exhibit 24.
•-

Respondent is .awarded MM- Tema.i u.i IKJ peisonal property,
.- „railer and the vehicle he drives.
Neither party is awarded alimony.

7.
has

Rer;.:.:,i- :

incurred

in

legal

: A- . ed to pay to Petitioner the amount she
fees

and

$15,391.53 set fore.
hours at $ 17 5

nn

cosis
_

in

: _is matter.

The

i::ea as Exhibit 4,. J"»

pe2 ., _ ^r :;; 1 prepara11 DH and 3 hours at $17 5.00

2

x. U o u o / 0

0f>0002

per hour

for

trial

are awarded

and

ordered

to be paid.

addition, the Petitioner's counsel shall submit a

In

supplemental

affidavit for the time spent on post-trial matters. If Respondent
objects to the reasonableness of that amount, he shall file a
motion with the Court setting forth those objections and the Court
will set for hearing those objections.
8.

Respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the appraisal

performed by Brad Townsend.
9.

Each party is ordered to execute and deliver, without

delay, any titles or other documents which are presented to either
one by the other and whicn are necessary to effectuate the transfer
of property as has been hereinbefore set forth.
DATED this yjj

day of August, 2008.

son
district Court Judge

009013
UuuoBO

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I. Cheree Brotherson, am employed by the office of ALLRED &
' at tor ne;\, rs £ :>:i : I >eti tioi i- 31. herein and hereby certify

McCLELLAI
that

; servea the attached DECREE OF DIV0RC5-

piac

- -. l~

•

- •"

>n Respondent 1: y

--^-•v

.

.

^ ;itssed

;

tO:

RANDALL GAITHER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
159 WEST 300 SOUTH^BROADWAY #105
SALT LAKE CITY, UT '84101

and deposited the same , : seal fi'J, , , j

' •- '»nstage prepaid

thereon, in the United States mail ct riocseve.:, Utah, . .. :.he 7Lh
day of August, 2008.

CHEREE BROTHERSON

U(HM)I)
U u uo b6

DISTRICT

CLARK B ALLRED - 0 0 55
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113
ALLRED 8c McCLELLAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
72 North 300 East (123-14)
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Telephone:
(435)722-3928
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

KATHRYN C. BROUGH,

)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,
Respondent.

)

Civil No.

054000084

)

Judge John R. Anderson

The above case came before the Court for trial on the 9th day of
July, 2008. Petitioner was present with her attorney, Clark B Allred.
Respondent was present with his attorney, Randall Gaither.

Evidence was

received by the Court in the form of testimony and exhibits. Argument
was received by counsel and the Court took the matter under advisement.
The

Court having

reviewed

the evidence

and after

being

fully

advised, makes these findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1,

Petitioner was a resident of Duchesne County, State of Utah,

and had been

for more

than three months

immediately

prior

to the

commencement of this action.

000005

lr

ne Petitioner worhed
• "

*

summer •

'* '

.

\ tr a "~ ?spcndent from 1 rKn t

. :.„\d,

.

1";)95.

-- ' 1 they separated. In the

she again started working for the Respondent at NJ

Trucking.
n

On December ~

*
<8.

l

-_t he *"iT.«.- ,ue parties married

.^id.cri frc-

started living together and

/,r

they married on July
4

* he part.^

he Respondent had two minor

a previous marriage. •.'

II

reasons

I he.- |i.ui K-'S

•u. __ assist the Respondent in obtaining custody of those two
minor children.
5.

I:

majority

age

- .

.

:

7t -*r

c

-xau two older
t'-at fc ne

niidrer. _nsisted

agreemer •

,o^t^

children who were of
Petitioner

sign an

. . jp^r^eht t:;en owned i f the

.

parties ^vjr.-a in the future. The Respondent statet that he thought
t**e i^'n«st was dumu.
called ~:i attorney,

but

prenuptial agreement
w!

n

-

"

^.-^.-r _ie two children,.

wi.cn -.nformea

elected i

*

* -

;:r;te oui

'.c- cl preparing a

- -

II.^.JJJ

tLaternent

i-3p::^e:i signed which :s Respondent's exhibit 1,

There w*s no
testimon

rr.

'

.iscursicn cr disclosure

-:

-•

vhat each ---y— ow:v-t

'^Jtutttu, was

*...-

~'--e
the

statement was only to a;p,-- to assets owned en :te dat-- of marriage and
not tv^ turther acquirer: -,-c.^-

-

2

_ _ - assets.

UUU366
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6.

At the time of the marriage, the Respondent owned a business

called the Glass Shop that no longer exists, family property in Randlett
(to which the Petitioner has made no claim) , a home in Duchesne that had
a large mortgage against it, and a business called NJ Trucking. He was
also purchasing acreage in Bandana Ranches.
7.

At the time of the marriage, NJ Trucking had some vehicles,

trailers, and equipment. NJ Trucking had been valued at $44,000 a few
years earlier in the Respondent's prior divorce. The cost to acquire the
equipment

that

$93,124.00.

remains

Its

present

from NJ Trucking, based on Exhibit
depreciated

value

is

$3,151.00.

27, was
The

1999

financial records and tax return shows that NJ Trucking had gross income
of $188,785.00.
8.

After the parties' marriage, the parties changed and expanded

the NJ Trucking business. They bought a crane for $135,000 and other
heavy equipment
Service Inc.

and changed

the name to Brough

Trucking

and

Crane

Respondent remained the sole shareholder. In 2004, the

year before the parties separated, the gross income had increased to
$785,250.00. Both parties worked in the business.

They seldom took

salaries and paid most of the family and personal expenses from Brough
Trucking.

The parties personally and jointly took out a $160,000.00

loan that was used to pay off the debt on the crane and other equipment.
The marital home was us^d as collateral for the loan.

3

The net value of

000007

Brough Trucking at the time of the trial is $ 4 3 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . See Exhibit 3
Towi isei id appraisal.
9.
i

When the parties started living Together ^: -; at the beginning
i na ri ia ge, tl ie} ] :

. .•-..-..w -

was owned by the

Respondent, That home was subject to a substantial mortgage
n: i c i 11 1 i p a ym e n t s w e r e m a d e

'

: v.h.::

..

payments were made from, earnings from Brough Trucking.
The Petitioner, with her M ^ L lal "JT <II. 1 f lr-

10.

i;;,si o1 cm. '*

t h< i

son, remodeled the Duchesne house, including m a k i n g a room o u : :: zh patio, adding walls and windows, taking out a sliding glass door 10 ope^:
up an area.; painting,

.JVJFJIU

sheet

lock,

carpet

the old shower with <\ new bathtub.

replacing
i

installing

L LI L r S

ell "id

ad:led a vva.l I , ,Aw . \

and siding ; and

She also remode,! ed the

Lucked, painted

and added

carpet

downstairs, put in light fixtures, and did yard work,
f!hr>i't ].y a f.]-<••> r Hie part ies niai r i n J i ii Septenibei ( »1 1 ()i'^<» „ tlie
Respondent's

son, Bryan,

age 1 4 , came

wanted to go to school in Roosevelt.

to live

with

the parties. He

Just prior to t:he j: • a i t:i es stax; ti i Ig

to live together, the Respondent had purchased a shop in Roosevelt from
Drillers
* - e ir

Inc. to use for Brough
-'jpaii s.

Trucking.

That

shop was dir ty and

The pai ties decided to construct living quarters in the

Roosevelt: shop so that they could move •_ - R o o s e v e l t .
.•-. s e ] f

] : i 11

; :i 11 i a s s i s t a i ice o f

her children and the Respondent's children, built a bedroom,

000364

bathroom

0OU008"

and living area upstairs in the Roosevelt shop including sheet rock,
tile work and carpet.

Downstairs, she put in 2 bedrooms, a kitchen,

cleaned the shop and added floor tiles to the shop. Carpets were added
to all living areas and an office was constructed downstairs.
13.

In August of 1999, the Respondent's youngest daughter, Amanda,

age 12, came to live with the parties. The parties and the children
moved from Duchesne and started living in the Roosevelt shop.
14.

The parties then started looking for a more suitable home or

property on which to construct a home. The Petitioner looked at many
properties but did not find anything acceptable to both parties. In the
summer of 2000, the parties were talking to a Clare Duncan who said he
had some acreage for sale.
approximately
$50,000.00.

18

acres

The parties went and looked at the property,
near

Neola,

Utah,

and

made

an

offer

of

That offer was accepted and the transaction closed on

August 3, 2000.

The parties paid $20,000 down and jointly signed a note

for the balance of $30,000.00. The property was deeded jointly to the
parties.

The $20,000.00,down payment was paid from Brough Trucking just

as all other bills were paid from Brough Trucking.
15.

The parties then took plans and hired a general contractor.

Construction on the home started in early 2001. The Petitioner was
responsible for coordinating the work.
site

on

a

daily

basis.

In

She went to the construction

addition

to

coordinating

with

the

contractors, she picked up materials and also worked on the home. The

s

uio'o63

0u0009

home is a log home, and the Petitioner was the person that chinked (put
putty) between the logs.
16.

The

Respondent

then

fired

the

general

Petitioner took over the completion of the home.

contractor

so the

Additionally, in the

summer of 2001, the Respondent broke his leg and was unable to help on
the

home

or

to work

at

Brough

Trucking.

The

Petitioner

did

the

insulating of the home, completed the sheet rock, built a fruit room,
constructed a gun room tor the Respondent, and painted, wallpapered and
carpeted the home.

The parties and the Respondent's two children moved

into the home at Thanksgiving of 2001. The following summer (2002), the
Petitioner did the landscaping, including putting in the yard, trees and
an orchard, sprinkling system, fire pit and painting the fences. Later,
she constructed a deck and swimming pool.
17.

The monies for constructing the home were paid primarily from

Brough Trucking
personal

and

checking

some payments were made

account

and

some

from

the

from

the

Respondent's

Petitioner's

personal

checking account.
18.

The present value of the home is $325,000.00 which is less

than the parties paid to construct the home.

It ;Ls jointly owned by the

parties.
19.

During the marriage, the Respondent worked at Brough Trucking

(except for the year summer of 2 0 01 to the summer of 2 0 02 when his leg
was broken).

The Petitioner was involved in the remodeling and building

e

000010

of the living quarters, the maintaining of the home and family and also
worked at Brough Trucking. The parties seldom took salaries from the
business. W2 records show the Petitioner was only paid $3,360 in 1999,
$10,640.00 in 2000, $8,880 in 2001, $7,680.00 in 2002 and $6,876.00 in
2003.

Both

parties

maintained

separate

checking

accounts.

The

Petitioner deposited her checks in her account and then used those
monies on the home, the family, and expenses for both her children and
the Respondent's children. Respondent deposited his monies in his
account and used those to pay child support and legal fees in the early
part of the marriage and for personal and family expenses during the
marriage.

Since the parties took minimal salaries, almost all living

expenses,

food,

utilities,

transportation,

housing

(including

the

remodeling of the shop and Duchesne house, mortgage payments and
building of the home) wepre paid with checks or credit cards from Brough
Trucking.
20.

The Respondent claimed that he should have credit against the

value of the home for premarital assets that were sold.

However, the

evidence did not support that claim. He was unable to trace those assets
and monies.

The evidence showed that monies from the sale of assets

were used for purposes other than the home including paying operating
expenses of Brough Trucking when the Respondent had a broken leg.
21. Respondent claimed that the money from the sale of the Bandana
Ranch was used for the down payment of the 18 acres in Neola where the

home was built.

First, that property was paid for during the marriage.

Secondly, the 18 acres in Neola closed on August 3, 2000. The Bandana
Ranch was not sold until August 24, 2000 and the account the $18,512
went into was used to pay many different living and personal expenses.
22.

Respondent claimed the money from the sale of the Duchesne

shop should be a credit. He sold that shop on May 3, 1999. The down
payment of $28,983 was two years before the home was constructed and the
monies went into the general account at NJ Trucking and was spent for
expenses

of

NJ

Trucking.

The

balance

of

the

purchase

price

was

apparently received in 2000 (a year before the home was constructed) and
also went into the Brough Trucking general account and was used for
Brough Trucking expenses!.
23.

Respondent also claims a credit of $30,000 for a rig he sold

in June 2000 and other equipment he sold in 2000. Again, those sales
occurred well before the construction of the home, those monies went
I
into the general account at Brough Trucking and they were spent before
the land was bought or the home was constructed,
24.
the sale

Respondent also makes a claim for the $24,702.00 received from
of

substantially

the Duchesne

home

in April

2002.

That

home had been

improved and remodeled by the Petitioner

and marital

monies were used to pay mortgage and taxes on the property.

There was

no showing where that money was deposited and no showing it was used on
the Neola Home.

8

*.. bUluUU

0G0012

25.

On October 9, 2002, the parties borrowed and jointly signed a

promissory note for $160,000.00. The home was used as collateral. The
money was used to pay off the loan on the crane and other equipment.
Respondent testified that, because of his broken leg and his inability
to work

for a year,

the money was needed

to keep Brough Trucking

operating. The money apparently was used to pay off the debt on the
crane and some other vehicles to reduce the monthly obligations of
Brough Trucking.
26.

After completing the home, the parties decided to further

expand Brough Trucking.

In March 2 0 04,

they purchased

Ballard to be used for a gravel pit and fill dirt.
titled in Brough Trucking.

80 acres

in

The 80 acres was

Petitioner remodeled an old trailer house

which was moved to the property to be used as a scale house and office.
That remodeling included framing, insulation, sheet rock, and wiring.
The purchase price for the 8 0 acres was paid by Brough Trucking.
27.

In May

2004,

the

parties

utilities adjacent to the 80 acres.

jointly

acquired

4

acres

with

The 4 acres were titled in the

names of the parties as joint tenants. The purchase price was paid by
Brough

Trucking.

The

parties

then

deeded

that

property

to

Brough

Trucking.
28.

The Petitioner was the primary person involved in raising the

Respondent's two children.

She helped and encouraged them in school,

Uouobj
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did the cooking, cleaning and laundry.

She also paid some of their

expenses from her bank account.
29.
argument.

Shortly after Amanda turned 18, she and the Petitioner had an
The Respondent then told the Petitioner to vacate the home.

The Petitioner vacated the home on August 1, 2005, taking very few
personal items with her. She came back the next day and loaded some
items into a horse trailer.

The Respondent, however, took back the

horse trailer with most of the items.
30.

The personal property is all used property and has minimal

value. The values listejd by the Respondent are either new values or
exaggerated.
31.

After

the

parties

separated,

the

employment as a laborer with Stanco Insulation.
with her mother.
next to her mother.

Petitioner

obtained

She presently resides

She has purchased a used trailer she is setting up
Her present net monthly income is $1,656.00 and her

expenses are $1,695.00 per month.
32.

The Respondent has continued to reside in the home and operate

Brough Trucking and continues to pay his personal expenses thru Brough
Trucking.
33.

Petitioner has incurred legal fees and costs in this matter.

The affidavit of the Petitioner's attorney shows that she had incurred
$15,391.53 in fees thru July 2, 2008.

He testified that he had incurred

an additional 10 hours in preparation prior to trial at $175.00 per

io
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hour.

In addition, there was the time of trial and the post-trial work.

The affidavit sets forth in detail the work that was provided and the
hourly rates charged. In addition, the Petitioner paid $400.00 for the
appraisal of the home.
34.

The Petitioner has made some payments on her legal fees but,

based on her income and expenses, she has not been able to pay those
fees and she does not have the means to pay the additional fees incurred
in preparation for the trial and the trial.
35.

Respondent did not request reimbursement of legal fees in his

pleadings.

At trial, he requested that he be reimbursed for the costs

incurred in providing information to the appraiser of Brough Trucking.
There is also approximately $7,000.00 still owing for that appraisal.
The appraisal of Brough Trucking was based on an order of the Court.
Respondent was ordered tb pay that expense with the Court reserving the
right to reallocate that expense. The appraisal was needed and helpful
to the Court in valuing the assets and deciding the division of the
assets.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes:
1.

The one paragraph prenuptial agreement was not negotiated by

the parties. There

was

no

disclosure

of

assets

in

the

prenuptial

agreement and it was prepared mainly to appease the older children. It
was intended to be limited to what the Respondent owned at the time of
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the marriage as listed on that document. Items listed included the Glass
I
Shop, the family properties in Randlett, and the assets in NJ Trucking
at

the time

of

the marriage.

At

the

time

of

the marriage,

the

Respondent had also purchased the Roosevelt shop, and had the Duchesne
shop and the Duchesne home. Those properties were not listed on the
agreement, were not disclosed and became marital properties because of
the marital funds used 'to pay for and enhance those assets and the
enhancements and improvements made by the Petitioner.1 The facts that the
Petitioner improved the other assets, signed jointly on a $160,000.00
loan and worked in the i business also support the position that the
agreement was limited to assets and debts existing at the time of the
marriage.
2.

The Glass Shop no longer exists and there was no evidence that

any of its value remains. The Petitioner made no claim to the Randlett
properties.

There was little evidence as to the value of NJ Trucking at

the time of the marriage. The best evidence was the $44,000.00 value at
the Respondent's prior divorce.
3.

The monies from the sale of the Duchesne shop were deposited

in the general bank account of Brough Trucking and used for general
expenses of Brough Trucking. Those monies were received prior to the
construction of the home and were not used in the home. Since there is

Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, ^[24-25; arid Pierce v. Pierce, 2000 UT
V 11120, 27.

no showing or tracing of those monies to the home, there should be no
credit given against the value of the marital assets.
4.

The parties changed the nature of NJ Trucking and changed its

name to Brough Trucking. Petitioner was actively involved in Brough
Trucking and in the parties' successful efforts to increase its business
and its value.

She was also actively involved in enhancing the assets

of Brough Trucking.
value.

She remodeled the Roosevelt shop and increased its

She also built the scale house for the 80 acres.

She cosigned

on the $160,000.00 note,to pay for the crane and other vehicles. The
monies to buy the crane,jvehicles and land for Brough Trucking all came
from earnings during the marriage. The parties did not treat Brough
Trucking as a separate entity but paid all marital bills and living
expenses from Brough Trucking. The business and personal expenses were
commingled to make it impossible to determine what was personal and what
Wcis

business.

Even

though

Brough

Trucking's

stock

was

in

the

Respondent's name, it is a marital asset less the $44,000.00 value at
the time of the marriage.
5.

The Roosevelt shop, though titled in the Respondent's name is

used in and is part of Br,ough Trucking. The valuation of Brough Trucking
by Mr. Townsend included the value of the shop. As noted above, the
Petitioner greatly enhanced the value of that shop by cleaning it and
building living quarter^ on the shop. The shop should be included in
Brough Trucking and is a marital asset.

6.

The Duchesne house was subject to a mortgage when the parties

married which mortgage was paid from earnings during the marriage. The
home was also remodeled and improved by the Petitioner during the
marriage. The monies from the sale of the house were deposited in a
general

account which was

spent

for general

living

and business

expenses. There was no tracing or showing that the monies from the sale
of the Duchesne house went into the Neola house. In addition, those
monies became marital assets because of the use of earnings during the
marriage to pay the mortgage and taxes and the remodeling by the
Petitioner.
7.

The Bandana Ranch property was being purchased during the

marriage with earnings from the marriage. The money from the sale of
that property did not go to the down payment on the Neola property, as
claimed by the Respondent, but was spent on general expenses. There
i

should be no credit against marital assets given for those monies.
8.

The Respondent also claimed credit for a rig and other

property he asserted that he sold and used the proceeds to pay on the
Neola house. The Respondent originally denied having any documents to
support his claim of premarital assets. Shortly before trial, he
provided some documents and tried to introduce additional documents at
trial which the Court refused to receive because they had not be timely
disclosed. There was evidence of $3 0,000.00 from a rig. There was no
evidence showing that those monies went into the home, but rather those

"
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funds went into the Brough Trucking account and were spent on Brough
Trucking expenses.2
9.

The Neola home was purchased

jointly by

the parties

and

remains titled in both parties' names. The Petitioner was the primary
person involved in the construction of that home, including doing much
of the construction herself. The monies for the construction of the home
came from earnings in Brough Trucking, from Petitioner's account where
she deposited her salary and from the Respondent's account where he
deposited his salary. It is a marital asset.
10.

The Petitioner was actively involved in the expansion of

Brough Trucking, she remodeled two living quarters and built the Neola
home, she raised the Respondent's two children thru their teenage years
and she was the person doing the cleaning and meals. The Respondent's
position, that all property was premarital and that Petitioner should
get no interest in it, would leave the Petitioner, at age 55, with
nothing. The small wage she was paid results in less social security
when she reaches retirement age than if she had been working for full
wages. Fairness and equity require that she receive one half of the
value of the Neola home and Brough Trucking (less $44,000.00).3 Brough
2

Dunn v Dunn 802 P.2d 1314 (Ut.App. 1990) pre marital assets
that have been consumed, commingled etc loss their separate
status.
3

Hogue v. Hogue, 831 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Burke v.
Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). See also Haumont v. Haumont, 793
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Trucking has a value of $492,000.00 less $44,000.00 and the house has a
value of $325,000.00. Therefore, the Respondent, if he wants to retain
ownership of the home and Brough Trucking, should be ordered to pay to
the

Petitioner

the

sum

of

$386,500.00.

In

the

alternative,

the

Petitioner should be awarded the Neola home and property with a value of
$325,000.00

and

the

Respondent

awarded

Brough

Trucking

and

the

Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner the difference of $61,500.00 and to
refinance the $160,000.00 debt to remove the home and Petitioner from
liability on that loan.
11.

The Petitioner should also be awarded the vehicle she drives,

subject to the remaining debt on it as of the date the decree is signed
and the personal property in her possession and the property listed on
Exhibit

24.

Respondent

should

be

awarded

the

remaining

personal

property, the horse trailer and the vehicle he drives.
12.

Petitioner waived her claim to alimony as her income presently

meets her expenses. However, her income is not sufficient to pay her
legal fees and costs. The financial declaration received by the Court
seems to be accurate and the expenses listed thereon are reasonable.

P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134, 136
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Qliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, ^20; Dunn v.
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1321 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990) (using marital funds to
make installment payments on separate property changes it to marital
property); and Mortensen V. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988) (listing
many factors the court considers).
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The Respondent

has

had

the benefit

of Brough

Trucking

to pay his

expenses and legal fees and he has resided in the home. The Respondent
should be ordered to reimburse the Petitioner for the legal fees she has
incurred.

The

amount

of

legal

fees as set

forth on

the Affidavit

submitted by Petitioner's attorney were necessary and the fees charged
are reasonable.4 In addition, the Petitioner incurred 10 more hours in
preparation and the time incurred for trial and post-trial work. An
additional affidavit

should be submitted as to the additional time

incurred.
13.

The cost for j:he appraisal of Brough Trucking was needed for

the valuation of the business. The Respondent should be required to pay
the balance

owing

on

that

bill.

There

is

no

basis

to

award

the

Respondent for expenses incurred by his secretary to provide information
to the appraiser. The Respondent, having the full control of Brough
Trucking, has the much greater ability to pay the expenses including
appraisal costs and legal fees in this case.
DATED this l^G

day of August, /^Qp"6 .
/*"V B/JTME /COUR'

John K . Anderson
District Court Judge

4

^A

Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I, Cheree Brotherson, am employed by the office of ALLRED &
McCLELLAN, P. C. attorneys for Petitioner herein and hereby certify
that I served the attached FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
on Respondent by

placing a true and correct copy thereon in an

envelope addressed to:
RANDALL GAITHER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
159 WEST 300 SOUTH |BROADWAY #105
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101

and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States mail at Roosevelt, Utah, on the 7th
day of August, 2008.

CHEREE BROTHERSON

,,,un
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t KATHRYN CURFEW BAUM AM IN NO WAY ASSOCIATED WITH AND HOLD NO CLAIM TO
ANY PERSONAL PROPERTIES, ASSETS OR MONEY OF RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, N.J.
TRUCKING INC., THE GLASS STORE, ANY PERSONAL OR FAMILY PROPERTIES. ALSO I WILL
NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DEBTS THAT OCCURE FROM AN Y OF THE ABOVE PROPERTIES.
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DEBTS THAT KATHRYN
CURFEW BAUM HAS ACQUIRED.

A

KATflRYN CURFEW BAUM

RICHARD JAMES BROUGH

+u+m*+m+^>*lmm+m+m+***m*m*m0*i
RONNIE J MIEURS
NotoiyPubOe
STATE OF UtAH
MyComm. Expire JUN 5.1990 .
SSg 100 NroOSEVEtfUT 640*6]

HoTA/LI
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT

Katliiyn C Biough,
Pelitionei,

:
:
*

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
And Decree

t

Case No

vs
Richaicl James Brough,

054000084

1

;

Judge John R Anderson

Respondent

Having come on legulaily loi tual on July 9, 2008, Randall Gaithei appealing foi the
Respondent, and Claik Allied appealing foi the Petitionei Evidence having been adduced, aigument
having been made, and the Court having taken the mattei undei advisement now makes and issues the
following 01 dei, findings of fact, conclusions of law and deciee
The Court heaid testimony abcjmt the ten yeai marnage and the contributions put into the mamage
by both parties Theie was a pienuptial agieement piepared by the Petitionei at the insistence of the
Respondent's adult childien
This was a fifth mamage foi Mrs Biough and a fourth mamage foi Mi Biough
The Petitioner did not ask foi alimony Theie aie no children born as issue oi the mamage
Dining the couise oi the mamage, the parties acquned additional business assets and a home The Court
is of the opinion that Mis Biough would be entitled to the value of the business as it acciued and giew
fiom the date of the mamage The Couit is also of the opinion that the Petitionei is entitled to one-hall of
tin net equih in the home that was built in Neola The paities have stipulated to the ical estate appiaisal
which indicated a value of appioximately $312,000
Theexpeit appraiser Biad To\Vnsend, piescnted documentation and was cioss-examined via
telephone conference and he determined that the piesent existing value of the business was $492,000 An
examination oi the appraisal documents and interpolation of the value of the business beiore oi at the date
of the prenuptial agieement was approximately $
Fiom the foiegomg intioductory obsei vations, the Court now makes and enteis its

0u0024
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Case No. 054000084
FINDINGS OF PACT
1.

The parties were married in July of 1998.

2.

The prenuptial agreement wa& prepared by the Petitioner and was entered into primarily to satisfy
the Respondent's adult children.

3.

During the course of the marriage, the Petitioner contributed to the marital estate by working and
first of all improving the Duchesne home, and secondly assuming the role of Mom to the
Respondent's children. She disciplined them, went to the school functions and was successful in
getting both children to and graduating from high school '

4

As the marital estate grew from the expansion of the business, the Petitioner worked hard in
keeping books, acting as secretary and doing household duties, all of the cooking, all ol the
cleaning, all of the child problems, and single handedly took on constructing an apartment in the
place of business housing the oilfield moving company now known as Brough Trucking and
Crane.

5.

After deciding the Apartment! in the shop owned by Brough Trucking was uncomfortable and
unreasonable, the parties acquired an interest in land in Neola from Mr. Duncan. The land
purchase was in August, 20001 During the construction of the Neola home, the general contractoi
was fired al about its first stage of completion. The evidence adduced that the Petitioner sole
handedly finished the home, chinked all of the logs, refinished the second floor, insulated the
second floor and the roof, hung sheetrock, finished the sheetrock, painted, and by her efforts,
painted the home in total. The evidence adduced also indicated that she built a deck, decking
around the home, and installed a swimming pool. From the evidence, it is apparent that the
earnings from Brough Trucking were used to pay family expenses, mortgage payments on the
home, and for other necessities. The funds from Brough Trucking were co-mingled. The parties
were fairly conservative in their spending.

6.

During the course of the marriage and post prenuptial agreement, the company acquired a crane for
$130,000, two Kenworth trucks in the year 2000, bought another red Kenworth truck, a Chevrolet
Yukon, a Chevrolet pickup, and JLI one-ton truck. The record also indicated they purchased two
vehicles for Amanda, which was^the Respondent's young daughter. Evidence also showed that the
company purchased a $50,000 trailer, a Catepillar tractor, and bought a big loader. The step???
trailer was used in oilfield moving. It's valued on the sheets prepared by the appraiser at the present
depreciated rate.

7

Tiie Couri finds from inspection of financial statements and interpreting the appraisal that the
business then known as N.L. Trucking was worth $200,000 at the date of the marriage. At the date
ol the separation, the Respondent ordered the Petitioner out of the family home She packed up a
few items m a horse trailer and left without an argument.

8.

(Itemize here the personal property in dispute....which ] don't know since I wasn't there)

The Couri would observe that the only thing hardei than raising teenagers is raising someone else's.

0u0Q25
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Case No. 054000084
1

9.

The evidence adduced that the Respondent had an accident and broke his foot m July 2001 and was
out of heavy duty work for approximately one year. In order to keep funding the company and to
make some purchases, to wit thje crane, the Respondent borrowed $160,000 against the real estate to
cover that.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes and utters it
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I

The prcnuptial agreement, white valid as such, only protected the property of the Respondent up to
the date of marriage. Anything 'acquired or any increases irom that date become marital property

2.

The log house in Neola is marital property.

3.

Because there is such a disparity in income of the parties, the Petitioner will be awarded her
attorney's fees and costs.

DATED this

day of July, 2008
BY THE COURT;

Judge John R. Anderson
Eighth District Court Judge
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PLAINTIFF')
EXHIBIT NO.

JHIB/T

Sunrise
a unnse Title
11 ue Company
company
• ,7,» *• " ^ u -7 r\
550 East 200 North 118-3 I
^^OBNCB^T^^^
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
fOL£f?K

Re;

Misc.

S/N

14:019:0029

e n t r y jLKjpwvn ao
Book- 921j
Page 671

$10.00

15-APR-0p
12:00
RANDY SIMMONS
RECORDER!, UINTAH COUNTY. UTAH
SUNRISE JTITLE COMPANY
550 E 200 N (11ft-3)ROOSEVELT. UT 3*066
Rec By: CONNIE SIMPER
. DEPUTY

Mail Tax Notice To:

E n t r y 2005002793
B<Brbu|3arucldB^ge 671
& Crane Service, Inc.
P.O. Box 367
Roosevelt, UT 84066

WARRANTY DEED
RICHARD J. BROUGH AND KATH Y BROUGIJgrantors ofRoosevelt, County ofDuchesne, State of Utah, hereby
CONVEY and WARRANT to
BROUGH TRUCKING AND CRANE SERVICE, INC.
grantees of Roosevelt, County ofDuchesne, State of Utah, for the sum of TEN AND NO/100 DOLLARS, and other
good and valuable considerations, the following described tract of land in Uintah) County, State of Utah:

!
Commencing at the Southeast Corner of SECTION 18, TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, UINTAH
SPECIAL MERIDIAN; thence North 89°11'19" West a distance of 18*5.64 (feet along the South line of said
Section and North 1°19'27M East a distance of 451.22 feet to the TRUE POINT, OF BEGINNING; thence North
89°ll f 19" West 259.65 feet; thence North ^WIV1 East 470.00 feet; thence East 620.00 feet, more or less; thence
Southerly 140.00 feet, more or less; thence North 89°11 , I9" West 350.00 feet; thence South l°19'27 n Wert 333.00
feet to beginning.
I
(Parcel 1)
Easement for Right-of-way: Commencing at the Southeast Corner of SECTION 18, TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH,
RANGE 1 EAST, UINTAH SPECIAL MERIDIAN; thence North BSPll'lP" West 1545.64 feet along the South
line of said Section and North 1°19'27" East 924.22 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence East 40
feet; thence South 924.22 feet; thence West 40 feet; thence North 92422 feet to beginning, as created in Corrected
Easement for Right-of-way recorded May 4,2004 as Entry No. 2004003326 in Book 881, at Page 142, records of
Uintah County, Utah.
(Parcel 2)
INCLUDING all improvements and appurtenances thereto belonging.
SUBJECT TO rights-of-way and easements of record and/or enforceable in law and equity.
EXCEPTING AND RESERVING all gas, oil and other mineral*.
WITNESS, the hand of said grantors, this

£5L^«/^C

*vf-

STATE OF UTAH
)ss,

County ofDuchesne

1
5
1^ ^ I ^ ^ A p p ' ' ^
y
day of August, 2004^ before me, the undersigned Notary Public in and for said County and

On this <?'"^
State, personally appeared RICHARD J. 00*be
BROUGH AND KATHY BROUGH [ M) personally known to me] [ (
) proved tome on the basis of satisfactory evidence] to be the persons whose names Have subscribed to this instrument
and acknowledged to me that they executed it.

"DEBORAH
550 E. 200 N.II
ROOSEVELT, UT 6

w

hand and official scaly

MM'

Notary Public in and

ity and State
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PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT
I EXHIBIT NO.

N O R M A N , TOWNSEND & J O H N S O N
LLC

I '%!

1

.. f

CERTIFIED PUBLIC A C C O U N T A N T S

£

CASE NO. 0 6 ^ - 0 VM
I D A T E R E C ' D ^ ^
IN EVIDENCE'

CLERK

Forensic Accounting, Valuation, and Economic Loss Consultants

>r

July 8, 2008

Clark Allred
Allred & McClellan, P.C.
148 South Vernal Ave., Suite 101
Vernal, Utah 84078
Re:

Fair market value of 100 percent of the common stock of Brough Trucking and
Crane Service, Inc. on a control, nonmarketable basis as of December 31,2007

Dear Mr. Allred:
Norman, Townsend & Johnson, LLC (NTJ) has been retained to estimate the fair market value of
100 percent of the common stock of Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. (Brough Trucking
or the Company) on a control, nonmarketable basis as of December 31, 2007. We have also been
asked to value NJ Trucking, Inc. as of the time of marriage of Richard Brough and Kathy
Brough. We were unable to determine a value for NJ Trucking, Inc. at the time of marriage due
to the lack of sufficient documentation and the inability to retroactively inspect the business'
assets to compensate for the lack of documentation. Attached is our summary valuation report
for Brough Trucking.
We have performed a valuation engagement and present our summary report in conformity with
the "Statement of Standards for Valuation Services No. 1" (SSVS) of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants. Our study was undertaken using widely accepted principles of
financial analysis and valuation. The standard of value is fair market value.
The International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms defines fair market value as:
"The price, expressed in terms of cash equivalents, at which property would change hands
between a hypothetical willing and able buyer and a hypothetical willing and able seller,
acting at arras length in an open an unrestricted market, when neither is under compulsion
to buy or sell and when both have reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts."
In preparing this valuation we have relied upon historical financial information which Brough
Trucking provided. We did not make independent examinations of any financial statements or
other information provided by management which was relied upon and, accordingly, we make no
representations or warranties nor do we express any opinion regarding the accuracy or
reasonableness of such.

0G0028
touth 500 East, Suite 590

Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 Phone: (801) 539-1600 Fax: (801) 539-1642 www.ntjexperts.com

Clark Allred
Alfred &Mclellan,P.C.
July 8, 2008
Page 2
Since valuation is an imprecise science, NTJ does not purport to be a guarantor of value. Value
is a question of informed judgement, and reasonable persons can differ in their estimates of
value. NTJ does certify that this valuation study was conducted using conceptually sound and
commonly accepted valuation methods.
In the opinion of the undersigned appraiser, using the valuation methods described in the
attached summary report, and subject to the assumptions and limiting conditions incorporated
herein, the fair market value of 100 percent of the common stock of Brough Trucking on a
control, nonmarketable basis as of December 31, 2007, is:

$492,000
Four Hundred Ninety-Two Thousand Dollars

Brad Towiisend, MBA, CPA/ABV, DABFA
Norman, Townsend & Johnson, LLC

INTRODUCTION
IDENTITY OF CLIENT
Norman Townsend & Johnson, LLC (NTJ) has been retained by Kathy Brough in the divorce
proceedings of Kathy Brough v. Richard Brough to provide valuation services. This valuation
report shall not be provided to any party other than the Court, the parties to this action, and their
respective legal counsel without the written consent of NTJ.

PURPOSE AND INTENDED USE OF THE VALUATION
We understand that the results of our analysis will be used for establishing the fair market value
of 100 percent of the common stock of Brough Trucking as of December 31, 2007 (the valuation
date). The purpose of this valuation is to determine the value of Brough Trucking for use in the
divorce proceedings of Kathy Brough v. Richard Brough.

IDENTITY OF THE SUBJECT ENTITY AND SUBJECT INTEREST
We have been asked to provide an estimate of the fair market value of 100 percent of the
common stock in Brough Trucking on a control, nonmarketable basis as of December 31, 2007.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE APPRAISAL AND THE DATE OF THE REPORT
In this summary report we have determined the fair market value of 100 percent of the common
stock of Brough Trucking on a control, nonmarketable basis as of December 31, 2007. The date
of the report is July 8, 2008.

PREMISE OF VALUE
The premise of value is going concern. The International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms
defines "Going Concern" as uan ongoing operating business enterprise," and "Going Concern
Value" as "the value of a business enterprise that is expected to continue to operate into the
future. The intangible elements of going concern value result from factors such as having a
trained work force, an operational plant, and the necessary licenses, systems, and procedures in
place."
STANDARD OF VALUE
The standard of value used in this report is fair market value. Fair market value is defined in the
International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms as "the price, expressed in terms of cash
Page 1
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equivalents, at which property would change hands between a hypothetical willing and able
buyer and a hypothetical willing and able seller, acting at arms length in an open and unrestricted
market, when neither is under compulsion to buy or sell and when both have reasonable
knowledge of the relevant facts."

DUE DILIGENCE SUMMARY
In connection with our analysis, we have made such reviews, analyses and inquiries as we have
deemed necessary and appropriate under the circumstances.
•

We analyzed the Company's historical income statements for the periods ending
December 31, 2001 through 2007.

•

We analyzed the Company's historical balance sheets as of December 31,2001 through
2007.

•

We analyzed certain other publicly available financial data relevant to the analysis
including: Federal Reserve statistical releases; Morning Star SBBI Valuation Edition
2007 Yearbook; Duff & Phelps, Risk Premium Report; financial data and SEC reports for
the selected guideline companies; and other miscellaneous information.

•

We conducted such other studies, analyses and inquiries, as we have deemed appropriate.

We have not independently verified the accuracy and completeness of the information supplied
to us with respect to the Company and do not assume any responsibility with respect to it. We
have made physical inspection of the assets of the Company.
RESTRICTIONS OR LIMITATIONS IN THE SCOPE OF WORK OR DATA
AVAILABLE
None

ADDITIONAL THIRD PARTY SPECIALISTS RELIED UPON IN THIS VALUATION

ENGAGEMENT
The parties to this divorce agreed to engage Ron Liese to appraise the business equipment. We
have relied upon his appraisal to determine value of the equipment owned by Brough Trucking.

Page 2
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VALUATION APPROACHES AND METHODS USED
As part of the valuation of Brough Trucking we have analyzed the value of the company using
the income approach and the asset approach. Within the income approach we have used the
capitalized net income and capitalized cash flow methods.
We have applied a weighting of 100 percent to the value determined using the asset approach.
The asset approach acts as a floor, or minimum, value for a business entity.

DISCLOSURE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS
None
CONCLUSIONS REACHED IN THE VALUATION ASSIGNMENT
We have performed a valuation engagement, as that term is defined in the Statement of Standards
for Valuation Services No. 1 (SSVS) of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
of 100 percent of the common stock of Brough Trucking on a control, nonmarketable basis as of
December 31, 2007. Subject to the Statement of Assumptions and Limiting Conditions, based
upon our analysis as described in this summary valuation report, and the facts and circumstances
as of the valuation date, the fair market value of 100 percent of the common stock of Brough
Trucking as of December 31, 2007, on a control, nonmarketable basis is (See Schedule A):

$492,000
Four Hundred Ninety-Two Thousand Dollars
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ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITING CONDITIONS
This valuation is subject to the following assumptions and limiting conditions:
1.

Information, estimates, and opinions contained in this report are obtained from
sources considered to be reliable. However, we assume no responsibility for such
sources.

2.

The company and its representatives warranted to us that the information they
supplied was complete and accurate to the best of their knowledge and that the
financial statement information reflects the company's results of operations and
financial condition. Norman Townsend & Johnson, LLC has not independently
verified such information, and we express no opinion regarding such information.

3.'

Possession of this report, or a copy thereof, does not carry with it the right to
publish all or part of it, nor may the report be used for any other purpose without
the previous written consent of the appraiser, and, in any event, only with proper
authorization. This valuation report shall not be provided to any third party
without the written consent of Norman Townsend & Johnson, LLC.

4.

No investigation of titles to property or of any ownership claims to the property by
any individuals or company has been undertaken. Unless otherwise stated in our
report:, title is assumed to be free and clear of encumbrances and as provided to
the appraiser.

5.

The terms of our engagement are such that we have no obligation to update this
report or to revise the valuation because of events and transactions occurring
subsequent to the date of the report.

6.

We are not required to give testimony in court, or be in attendance during any
hearings or depositions, with reference to the company being valued, unless
previous arrangements have been made.

7.

Unless otherwise provided for in writing and agreed to by both parties in advance,
the extent of the liability for the completeness or accuracy of the data, opinions,
comments, recommendations and conclusions shall not exceed the amount paid to
the appraisers for professional fees, and then only to the party(s) for whom this
report was originally prepared.

8.

The valuation of a business enterprise is a matter of informed judgment. The
accompanying valuation has been prepared on the basis of information and
assumptions set forth in this report and the attached exhibits. An actual
transaction in the shares may be concluded at a higher value or lower value,
depending on the circumstances surrounding the company, the appraised business
interest, and the motivations and knowledge of both the buyers and sellers at that
time. Norman Townsend & Johnson, LLC does not guarantee the values
individual buyers and sellers may reach in an actual transaction.
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The conclusions of value in this report are effective as of December 31, 2007,
only and are to be used in the legal proceedings of Brough v. Brough.
Valuation reports may contain prospective financial information, estimates, or
opinions that represent the view of the appraiser about reasonable expectations at
a particular point in time, but such information, estimates, or opinions are not
offered as predictions or as assurances that a particular level of income or profit
will be achieved or that specific events will occur.
We assume that there are no hidden or unexpected conditions of the business or
liabilities that would adversely affect value, other than as indicated in this report.

CERTIFICATION
We certify that, to the best of our knowledge and belief:
1.

The statements of fact in this report are, to the best of our knowledge, true and
correct.

2.

The reported analyses, opinions, and conclusions are limited only by the reported
assumptions and limiting conditions, and are our personal, impartial, and unbiased
professional analyses, opinions, and conclusions.

3.

Neither the consultant nor any officer, agent, or employee of Norman Townsend
& Johnson, LLC has any present or prospective interest in the property that is the
subject of this report, and we have no personal interest with respect to the parties
involved.

4.

We have no bias with respect to the property that is the subject of this report or to
the parties involved with this engagement.

5.

Our engagement in this assignment was not contingent upon developing or
reporting predetermined results.

6.

Compensation paid to Norman Townsend & Johnson, LLC for completing this
assignment is not contingent upon the development or reporting of a
predetermined value or direction in value that favors the cause of the client, the
amount of the value opinion, the attainment of a stipulated result, or the
occurrence of a subsequent event directly related to the intended use of this
appraisal.

7.

Our analyses, opinions, and conclusions were developed, and this report has been
prepared in conformity with the Statement on Standards for Valuation Services as
established by the American Institute for Certified Public Accountants for
conducting and reporting on business valuations.

8.

This report was prepared under the direction of R. Brad Townsend, MBA, CPA/
ABV, DABFA. No one provided significant professional assistance other than
professional staff of Norman Townsend & Johnson, LLC.

R. Brad Townsend, MBA, CPA/ABV, DABFA
NORMAN TOWNSEND & JOHNSON, LLC
July 8, 2008
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Schedule A
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc.
Summary of Value

Schedule

Value

Weighted
Value

Weight

Income Approach to Value
Capitalized Net Income

B

Capitalized Cash Flow

$

118,432

0 0%

C

123,644

0.0%

E

492,453

100.0%

$

Asset Approach to Value
Adjusted Book value

492,453

100.0%
Control, Marketable Value

$

492,453

Rounded

$

492,000

Schedule B
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc.
Capitalization of Adjusted Net Income

Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

Schedule
D
D
D
D
D
D
D

Adjusted
Net Income
$
4,400
6,798
(3,401)
31,481
12,918
8,290
47,972

Total

Weight
Factor
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

Weighted
Net Income
$

$

Weighted Average Net Income
Divide by: Capitalization Rate
Control/Marketable Operating Value of Company

31,481
12,918
8,290
47,972
100,660
25,165
19.12%
131,591

Indicated Value of Company on a Control, Marketable Basis

$

131,591

Marketability discount at
Estimated Value on a Control, Nonmarketable Basis

$

(13,159)
118,432,

10.0%

0uU037

Schedule C
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc.
Capitalization of Projected Cash Flow

Projected Net income

$

Depreciation

25,165
25,150

Capital Expenditures

(25,795)

Debt Repayments
Working Capital Needs

1,089

Cash Flow

$

25,609

$

25,609

Calculation of Value
Cash Flow

18.64%
Divide by: Capitalization Rate
137,382
Indicated Operating Value of Company on Control, Marketable Basis
$

Indicated Value of Company on a Control, Marketable Basis
Less Discount for Lack of Marketability at
Estimated Operating Value on a Control, Nonmarketable Basis

137,382
(13,738)

10%
$

123,644
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Schedule D
Brouuh Trucldng aad Crane Service, Inc.
Adjusted Income Statements
For Years Endiag December 31,2001-2007 from Tax Returns

Adjustment*
S643.Q92

l,K«„* (S-lo.)

Accounting & Legal
Advertising
Dank Clui/gc.%
CunipcuxuiioD ufOflii.cn
GmlribtflioiK
Delivciy UIIJ I'fcitKt
OUCA ucxl Suli*cri|>tH>n<i
Fuel Jt Oil
GilU
In-ufiince
Interest
M u U A tiilciluiuMKnt
MisKollajlCilUN
Oflite Kxpcnse
Oul>ide Service.

3 J. 526
19.228

Adj«>tcd
1003

Nutw

Adjusted
1004

AJJmtmtwto
SBJ3.366

2.740

2.740

1.436

1.436

1.S00
1.946

I.S0Q

2,157
1.985

1.946

S 431.795

Nolo

AJjiafcn!
1006
$431,795

ZB88
1.086

51.833
972
32.270

51.221
1.319
12.162

51.221
1.319
12.162

41.254
1.009
9.769

41.2S4
1,009

50.397
1.409

9.769

32.251

50.397
1.409
32.251

34.526
19.221

$9,912
27.133
2ft

59.912
27.133
2B

48,295
12.836
30

48,295
12.836
30

56.263
4.603
185

56.263
4.603
185

593
46.388
1.2K5
56.158
9.045
52

937
114.124

(10.938)
937
114.824

U77
161.159

(17.883)
1.377
161.159

2.170

(17.959)
2.170
247.751

284.227

284.227

2.014
17.076
28.629
117.868
132.807
30.693
5490
23.067

Z0N
17.07G
28.629

(M.442)
1461
176.336

137
1.261
176.336

Nolo

S43S.813

247.751

66.670

56.158
9.045

41.325
50

52

252

807
1.191

S07
1.191
3H.357
KSACA
J 30.741
23.452
4.297
7.53J

38.357
85.400
130.748
23.452
4.297
7.533

550

550

675

693
20.549
32.049
60.981

693
20.549
32.049

5459
38.026
55,304

5459
38.026
55.304

60.981

20.019
4.081
2.234

20.019
4.061
2.234

90J39
17.469
4.196
11.231

90.339
17,469
4.196
11,231

675

525

525

14.413
36.710
95.451
97.561
20.962
4.622
16.621

14.413
36.710
95.451
97.561
20.962

.

2.561

2.016

I5.S20

20.153
729
66.670

11.097

-

41,325

(19.978)
7.356

7.356
2.895

153420

15.644
24.450

15.644
24.450

111.718

1 M.7I8
70.693
23.846
4.734
5.414

17.128
40.178
90.897

2.895
rtumolioo*
llcnUi
Repair* and Muintcnaocc
Suluric. und Wayes
So|.,.lic.i
Tuxe> u.iJ liccnxa.
Tulephon.

2.561

16.372
1.100
10

6.151
1.28*

46.388
1.285

_A£i
$403,977

4.622
16.621
19
8.H6

117.868
132.807
30.693
5490
23.067

70.693
23.846
4.734
5.414

10.361

17.128
40.178
90.897

24.554

.
-

10.930

.-1 AJJiutnicab
Scoit'io 179 Dcfvccluiion
t<on£-Turi>i Cupilul Cuin
..I.I K-l Adju.tn.niU
M-l Ailju>lmcnb
OcpiucisliOH
Travel and Enterinmmcn
Tciicltlci
I'uUl M-l AdjiulaiciuiU
lb«h Nee t.H...mc
tocianc Tax Adjustment «l
Nd IiKvtnr After Tucw

A) Adjusted lut fuiroui>cn cninpcnution.
U) Adjusted lur pcruinal expense*.
C)Adjunei)loru\M.

CD
O
CD
CD
CO

co

(28)

(28)

(350)

(350)
(30)

13.525
(83B)

13.733

(3.280)

(30)
(769)
648

(1.295)
$ (3.280) S

(121)

(4.049)
C
S (3.401)

$

34.078

S

3.399

(1.963)

(3.890)

(5.996)

(2.461)

(1.579)

(Z597)

S

17,341

fM23)

(2445)
(9.137)
$

8490

S 59354

$

(U.382)

Schedule E
Brough Trucking and Crane Service
Adjusted Balance Sheets
As December 31, 2007
2007
Assets
Current Assets
Cash
P/R Advances
Total Current Assets

$

Adjusted
2007

$ 2,566
-

2,566

1,938

1,938

-

1,938

Fixed Assets
Land
Machinery & Equipment
Accumulated Depreciation
Total Fixed Assets

50,000
493,342
(442,661)
100,681

Total Assets

$

Liabilities
Current Liabilities
Current Portion of Long-Term Debt
Other Current Liabilities
Total Current Liabilities

$

Long-Term Liabilities
Notes Payable
Loans from Shareholders
Total Long-Term Liabilities

105,185

$

5,337
7,522
12,858 $

10,000
40,438
13,758

105,185

A
B
B

$592,680

487,495

$

-

5,337
7,522
12,858

-

10,879
21,773
32,651

C

10,000
527,933
13,758

(4,521)
547,170

487,495
$

229,126
359,050
588,176

487,495

(4,521)
59,675
$

1,938

179,126
(134,292)
442,661
487,495

10,879
21,773
32,651

Shareholders' Equity
Capital Stock
Beginning Balance
Ordinary Income (Loss)
K-l andM-1 Additions
K-l and M-l Deductions
Distributions
Total Shareholders" Equity

Control, Marketable Value
Less: Discount for Lack of Marketability
Noncontrol, Nonmarketable Value

2,566
2,566

Other Assets
Deposit (Progressive/ WCF)
Loans to Shareholders
Total Other Assets

Total Liabilities and Shareholders' Equity

Adjustments Notes

487,495

$592,680

10%

Notes:
A) Adjusted land and building for appreciation, added value 7/8ths of the 81.03 acre
property and the value of the 4 acre property.
B) Adjusted equipment values to appraisal done by Ron Liese.
C) Adjusted retained earnings to reflect prior adjustments.

$547,170
(54,717)
$492,453

Schedule F
Brough Trucking and Crane Service
Summary of Equipment and Apprasicd Vaiue
Apprasial Done by Ron Liese
ITEM

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

n

12
13
14
15
16

UNIT U

YEAR

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
2007

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

17
18

N/A
N/A

19
20

N/A
2004

21
22
23
24

2003
1998
1991
1978

25

1979

26
27

1980
2000

28

1982

29
30
31
32

1984
1998
1998

33
34

2001
1989

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

1981
1980
1981
1981
1995
1980
1981

44

N/A

DESCRIPTION
Pressure Washer
Tool Box with Tools
A.O. Smith DC Welder
Metal Chop Saw
Air Compressor
Cutting Torch w/Valves, hose and cart
Hobart Welder
Transmission Jack and Engine Hoist
Clean Bum Waste Oil Shop Heater
Clean Bum Waste Oil Shop Heater
Pneaumatic Jack
Dell Dimensions E520 Computer
Dell 966
Skill 8 Inch Drill Press
1 Inch Air Impact Wrench
Heavy Duty Electric Grinder

COMMENTS
APPRAISED VALUE
$200 Fair Condition
400 Fair Condition
100 Poor Condition
200 Good Condition
300 Fair Condition
100 Fair Condition
500 Good Condition
700 Good Condition
800 Good Condition
800 Good Condition
300 Fair Condition
400 Good Condition
100 Good Condition
300 Good Condition
250 Fair Condition
100 Fair Condition

966D Wheel Loader w/GP Bucket, Teeth, EROPS, 26.5 X 25 Tires, NOTE:
No Serial Number available for this asset and not able to determine year of
MFG. Value based upon photo as provided by owner.
Portable Welder Trailer w/Vise, Torch, work area
4 Bay Steel Framed and Sided Shop and Office, NOTE: No square footage
and no land size provided by owner.
Chevrolet 2500 4X4 Crew Cab Pickup VINI GCGK13U73F166854
GMC 3500 4X4 Dually Flatbed Rig Up Truck w/Gin Poles, Winch,
VIN1GDJK34284E395030
GMC Yukon 4X4 SUV VIN1GKEK13R8WJ33114 w/V8, Auto Trans.
GMC Top Kick S/A Winch Rig Up Truck VIN1GDM7H1J7MJ507072
Kenworth W900 T/A Winch Tractor VIN not provided
Kenworth W900 T/A Boom Truck VINI79627S W/National Hyd. Crane
Capacity Unknown
Kenworth W900 T/A Winch Tractor VIN161965S
Kenworth W900 T/A Winch Tractor VIN1NKWGGGGX07883843
Grove 35 Ton Hydraulic Truck Crane No Crane SN available NOTE: Unable
to determine boom legnth and diesel power unit MFG. Valued as average
condition
Caterpillar 930 Wheel Loader No SN w/ Gp Bucket, Enclosed Cab, 17.5 X 25
Tires
See Item # 17 Cat 966D already valued
N/A
Lufkin T/A Spread Axle Step Deck Trailer 1L01B4823W1130788
SPCN T/A Single Srop Lowboy Trailer VINUTTT17965
XL110HD 50 Ton 3Axle Double Drop Detachable Gooseneck Trailer
VIN4U3J053371L003085
Commercial 40 ft. T/A Flatbed Trailer VINILOB4525K1084640
Traileze 3 Axle Lowboy Trailer w/Mechanical Folding Gooseneck Trailer
VIN1DA73E398BM006692
Lufkin T/A Flatbed Trailer VINIL01B3627B1059246
Lufkin T/A Flatbed Trailer VINI L01B321XB159058
Fufkin T/A Flatbed Float Trailer VIN not available
Ranco T/A Single Gate Belly Dump Trailer VIN1R9BSE507SL008490
Load King T/A Single Gate Belly Dump Trailer VIN8907
Blue and Red Skid Mount Fuel Tank w/Pump
2 Each Silver Fuel Tanks w/pumps
Parts Not Able to Value without Inspection
N/A
80 Acres In Ballard NOTE: Not able to value with limitedinfonnation and no
ability to establish comparable sale data
N/A
Total Appraised Value Fair Market Value

40,000 Good Condition
1,000 Fair Condition
Unable to Vaiue with limited data
12,000 Good Condition
20,000
3,000
16,000
8,000

Good Condition
Fair Condition
Good Condition
Fair Condition

32,000 Good Condition
14,000 Fair Condition
50,000 Good Condition

35,000 Fair Condition
12,000 Fair Condition
9,000 Good Condition
3,000 Fair Condition
32,000 Good Condition
2,500 Fair Condition
12,000
4,500
4,500
4,500
12,000
4,500
10,000
12,000

$359,050

Fair Condition
Good Condition
Good Condition
Good Condition
Good Condition
Fair Condition
Fair Condition
Good Condition

Schedule G
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc.
Calculation of Capitalization Rate
For
Net Income

Risk-free Rate at December 31, 2007
Average Equity Risk Premium
Micro-Cap Size Premium
Company Specific Risk Premium
Composite Cash Flow Discount Rate
Additional Increment for Earnings Discount Rate
Net Earnings/Cash Flow Discount Rate
Less: Expected Earnings Growth Rate
Net Earnings/Cash Flow Capitalization Rate
Adjustment for Current Year Net Income/Net Cash Flow Capitalization Rate
Current Year Net Jncome/Net Cash Flow Capitalization Rate

For
Cash Flow

4.50%
7.10%
6.27%
5.00%
22.87%
0.50%
23.37%
3.56%
19.81%

4.50%
7 10%
6.27%
5.00%
22.87%
0.00%
22.87%
3.56%
19.31%

103.56%

103.56%

19.12%

18.64%

OuO

Schedule H
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc.
Consumer Price Index
1996 - 2007

Year
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

Index
156.9
160.5
163.0
166.6
172.2
177.1
179.9
184.0
188.9
195.3
201.6
207.3

Average
Annual
Growth
2.95%
2.29%
1.56%
2.21%
3.36%
2.85%
1.58%
2.28%
2.66%
3.39%
3.23%
2.83%

Average Compounded Growth Rate
2.56%

Sources:
www.bis.gov

Schedule I
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc.
Income Statements
For Years Ending December 31,2001-2007 from Tax Returns

Income (Sales)

2001
$ 643,092

2002

2003

2004

$438,813

$508,006

$785,250

2005
$843,366

2006
$431,795

$403,977

1,800
2,069
48
24,480

2,740
1,436
125
19,380

1,800
1,946

2,157
1,985
25
11,888

2,888
1,086
25
6,066

6,151
1,288

2,561

26
51,833
972
32,270

51,221
1,319
12,162

155
41,254
1,009
9,769

50,397
1,409
32,251

59,912
27,133
28

48,295
12,836
30

56,263
4,603
185

206
32,150
593
46,388
1,285
56,158
9,045
52

137
1,261
176,336

937
114,824

1,377
161,159

2,170
247,751

284,227

Deductions
Accounting & Legal
Advertising
Bank Charges
Compensation of Officers
Contributions
Delivery and Freight
Depreciation
Dues and Subscriptions
Fuel & Oil
Gifts
Insurance
Interest
Meals & Entertainment
Miscellaneous
Office Expense
Outside Services
Postage
Promotions
Rents
Repairs and Maintenance
Salaries and Wages
Supplies
Taxes and Licenses
Telephone
Tires
Travel
Utilities
Total Deductions

807
1,191
38,357
85,460
130,748
23,452
4,297
7,533

550
693
20,549
32,049
60,981
20,019
4,081
2,234

675
5,259
38,026
55,304
90,339
17,469
4,196
11,231

16,298
653,129

11,702
444,075

9,127
511,256

525
14,413
36,710
95,451
97,561
20,962
4,622
16,621
19
8,846
706,814

Ordinary Income

(10,037)

(5,262)

(3,250)

K-l Adjustments
Sections 179 Depreciation
Capital Gain/Investment Income
Total K-l Adjustments

34,526
19,228

Book Net Income

41,325
50
252

2,016

11,097

632

7,356
2,895

153,220

2,014
17,076
28,629
117,868
132,807
30,693
5,290
23,067

15,644
24,450
111,718
70,693
23,846
4,734
5,414

17,128
40,178
90,897

10,361
807,974

10,930
418,037

342,283

78,436

35,392

13,758

61,694

(44,173)

(18,000)

(44,173)

(18,000)

(30)

(185)

(51)

(30)* "

(185)

(50

$ 34,078

$ 17,341

1,750
1,750

M-l Adjustments
Depreciation
Travel and Entertainment
Penalties
Total M-l Adjustmennts

2,631
1,100
10
20,153
729
66,670

2007

24,554

(2,500)
160
(2,340)

(28)
(350)
(378)
$ (8,287)

$ (5,640)

$ (3,280)

$ 13,758

59,354
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Schedule J
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc.
Common-Size Income Statements
For Years Ending December 31,2001-2007 from Tax Returns

2001
100.0%

2002
100.0%

2003
100.0%

2004
100.0%

2005
100.0%

0.3%
0.3%
0.0%
3.8%
0.0%
0.0%
8.1%
0.2%
5.0%
0.0%
5.4%
3.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.2%
27.4%
0.0%
0.1%
0.2%
6.0%
13.3%
20.3%
3.6%
0.7%
1.2%
0.0%
2.5%
101.6%

0.6%
0.3%
0.0%
4.4%
0.0%
0.0%
11.7%
0.3%
2.8%
0.0%
13.7%
6.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0.2%
26.2%
0.0%
0.1%
0.2%
4.7%
7.3%
13.9%
4.6%
0.9%
0.5%
0.0%
2.7%
101.2%

0.4%
0.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
8.1%
0.2%
1.9%
0.0%
9.5%
2.5%
0.0%
0.0%
0.3%
31.7%
0.0%
0.1%
1.0%
7.5%
10.9%
17.8%
3.4%
0.8%
2.2%
0.0%
1.8%
100.6%

0.3%
0.3%
0.0%
1.5%
. 0.0%
0.0%
6.4%
0.2%
4.1%
0.0%
72%
0.6%
0.0%
0.0%
0.3%
31.6%
0.0%
0.1%
1.8%
4.7%
12.2%
12.4%
2.7%
0.6%
2.1%
0.0%
1.1%
90.0%

0.3%
0.1%
0.0%
0.7%
0.0%
0.0%
3.8%
0.1%
5.5%
0.2%
6.7%
1.1%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
33.7%
0.0%
0.2%
2.0%
3.4%
14.0%
15.7%
3.6%
0.6%
2.7%
0.0%
1.2%
95.8%

1.4%
0.3%
0.0%
0.6%
0.3%
0.0%
4.7%
0.2%
15.4%
0.0%
9.6%
0.0%
0.1%
0.0%
0.0%
1.7%
0.7%
0.0%
3.6%
5.7%
25.9%
16 A%
5.5%
1.1%
1.3%
0.0%
2.5%
96.8%

0.0%
0.6%
0.0%
0.5%
0.0%
0.0%
2.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
37.9%
0.0%
0.0%
4.2%
9.9%
22.5%
0.0%
6.1%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
84.7%

Ordinarj' Income

A.6%

-1..2%

-0.6%

10.0%

4.2%

3.2%

15.3%

K-l Adjustments
Sections 179 Depreciation
Long-Term Capital Gain
Total K-l Adjustments

0.0%
0.3%
0.3%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

-5.6%
0.0%
-5.6%

-2.1%
0.0%
-2.1%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

-0.6%
0.0%
-0.6%

M-l Adjustments
Depreciation
Travel and Entertainment
Penelties
Total M-l Adjustments

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
-0.1%
-0.1%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

-1.3%

-1.3%

-0.6%

4.3%

2.1%

3.2%

14.7%

Income (Sales)
Deductions
Accounting & Legal
Advertising
Bank Charges
Compensation of Officers
Contributions
Delivery and Freight
Depreciation
Dues and Subscriptions
Fuel & Oil
Gifts
Insurance
Interest
Meals & Entertainment
Miscellaneous
Office Expense
Outside Services
Postage
Promotions
Rents
Repairs and Maintenance
Salaries and Wages
Supplies
Taxes and Licenses
Telephone
Tires
Travel
Utilities
Total Deductions

Book Net Income

2006
100.0% ""

2007
100.0%

Schedule K
Brough Trucking and Crane Service
Balance Sheets
As of Year End December 31,2001-2007 from Tax Returns

2001

2002

2003

2004

2006

2005

2007

Assets
Current Assets
Cash
P/R Advances
Totnl Current Assets

(6,107)

Other Assets
Other Assets
Loans to Shareholders
Total Other Assets

1,941
67,601
69,542

50,000
323,650
(185,313)
188,337

50,000
386,744
(236,534)
200,210

(6,107)

Fixed Assets
Land
Machinery & Equipment
Accumulated Depreciation
Total Fixed Assets
Total Assets
Liabilities
Current Liabilities
Current Portion of Long-Term Debt
Other Current Liabilities
Total Current Liabilities
Long-Term Liabilities
Notes Payable
Loans from Shareholders
Total Long-Term Liabilities
Shareholders'Equity
Capital Stock
Beginning Balance
Ordinary Income (Loss)
K-l andM-1 Additions
K-l andM-1 Deductions
Distributions
Total Shareholders' Equity
Total Liabilities and Shareholders' Equity

$

795

2,081

2,566

795

2,081

2,566

210

1,940
54,078
56,018

1,941
54,078
56,019

1,938

10,431

1,938

10,431

50,000
386,744
(277,788)
158,956

50,000
495,525
(372,358)
173,167

50,000
493,342
(422,508)
120,834

50,000
493,342
(442,661)
100,681

203,447

164,838

229,980

178,934

105,185

42,441
5,779
48,220

42,441
2,409
44,850

42,441
1,805
44,246

62,624
4,921
67,545

42,441
4,816
47,257

201,839

162,524

201,839

162,524

113,976
13,823
127,799

111,741
23,823
135,564

87,363
23,823
111,186

10,879
21,773
32,651

4,845
21,773
26,618

10,000
(8,287)
(5,262)

10,000
(13,927)
(3,250)

10,000
(17,207)
78,436

10,000
16,871
35,392

10,000
40,438
13,758

(378)

(30)

(44,358)

(3,927)

(7,207)

(18,051)
(23,721)
20,491

(4,521)
59,675

10,000
49,677
61,694
160
(2,500)
(60,462)
58,569

251,772

10,000

33,192
(10,037)
1,750

$

893
406
1,299

3,852
90
3,942

1,938

1,940

1,938

1,940

(33,192)
1,713

203,447

164.838

26,871
229,980

178,934

$

5,337
7,522
12,858

105,185

$

210

50,000
495,842
(456,258)
89,584
$100,225

$

5,567
9,471
15,038

$100,225
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Schedule L
Brough Trucking and Crane Service
Common-Size Balance Sheets
As of Year End December 31, 2001-2007 from Tax Returns

2003

2002

2001

2004

2005

2007

2006

Assets
Current Assets
Cash
P/"R Advances
Total Current Assets

-2.4%
0.0%
-2.4%

0.4%
0.2%
0.6%

2.3%
0.1%
2.4%

0.3%
0.0%
0.3%

1.2%
0.0%
1.2%

2.4%
0.0%
2.4%

0.2%
0.0%
0.2%

0.8%
26.9%
27.6%

1.0%
0.0%
1.0%

1.2%
0.0%
1.2%

0.8%
23.5%
24.4%

1.1%
30.2%
31.3%

1.8%
0.0%
1.8%

10.4%
0.0%
10.4%

Fixed Assets
Land
Machinery & Equipment
Accumulated Depreciation
Total Fixed Assets

19.9%
128.5%
-73.6%
74.8%

24.6%
190.1%
-116.3%
98.4%

30.3%
234.6%
-168.5%
96.4%

21.7%
215.5%
-161.9%
75.3%

27.9%
275.7%
-236.1%
67.5%

47.5%
469.0%
-420.8%
95.7%

49.9%
494.7%
-455.2%
89.4%

Total Assets

J00 0%

100.0%

100.0%

100J)%

100.0%

100.0%

25.7%
1.1%
26.8%

27.2%
2.1%
29.4%

23.7%
2.7%
26.4%

5.1%
7.2%
12.2%

5.6%
9 4%
15.0%

Other Assets
Deposit (Progressive/ WCF)
Loans to Shareholders
Total Other Assets

Liabilities
Current Liabilities
Current Portion of Long-Term Debt
Other Current Liabilities
Total Current Liabilities

16.9%
2.3%
19.2%

Long-Term Liabilities
Notes Payable
Loans from Shareholders
Total Long-Term Liabilities

80.2%
O0%_
80.2%

Shareholders* Equity
Capital Stock
Beginning Balance
Ordinary Income (Loss)
K-l andM-1 Additions
K-l andM-1 Deductions
Distributions
Total Shareholders' Equity
Total Liabilities and Shareholders' Equity

_

__

20.9%
1.2%
22.0%

_

4.0%
13.2%
-4.0%
0.7%
0.0%
-13.2%
0.7%
100.0%

100.0%

79.9%
0.0%
79.9%

_

J00.0%

___

100.0%

58.9%

48.8%
13.3%
62.1%

4.3%
-7.5%
34.1%
0.0%
-19.3%
0.0%
11.7%

5.6%
9.4%
19.8%
0.0%
-10.1%
-13.3%
11.5%

48.6%
___

6.1%
-8.4%
-2.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
-4.4%

4.9%
-4.1%
-2.6%
0.0%
-0.2%
0.0%
-1.9%
__

69.1%
8,4%
77.5%

__

J04%

100,0%

_

__

'

_

__

10.3%
20.7%
31.0%

_

10.0%
49.6%
61.6%
0.2%
-2.5%
-60.3%
58.4%

9.5%
38.4%
13.1%
0.0%
0.0%
-4.3%
56.7%

_ipo,o%_ ___ _ .100.0%

4.8%
21,7%
26.6%

_

1000%^
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Schedule M
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc.
Statement of Cash Flows
For the Years Ending December 31, 2002 - 2007
2002

Ntt Income

$

Cash Flow from Operating Activities
Depreciation
Change in P/R Advances
Change in Deposits
Change in Current Liabilities
Net Cash Flow from Operating Activities
Cash Flows from Investing Activities
Change in Machinery & Equipment
Change in Loans to Shareholders
Net Cash Flow from Investing Activities
Cash Flow from Financing Activities
Change in Current Long-Term Debt
Change in Notes Payable
Change in LoansfromShareholders
ChangefromTax to Internal R/E
Section 179 Depreciation
Distributions
Net Cash Flow from Financing Activities

Beginning Cash
__$

2004

2003

$

(3,280)

51,221
(406)
3
(3,370)
41,808

41,254
316
(2)
(604)
37,684

(63,094)
67,601
4,507

-

$

34,078

2005

$

50,397
90
3,116
87,681

(108,781)
(54,078)
(162,859)

-

(48,548)
13,823

(39,315)

Net Increase (Decrease) in Cash

Ending Cash

(5,640)

$ 59,354

32,150

20,153

11,097

(1)
(105)
49,385

3
2,706
36,620

(8,493)
1,949
63,907

2,183

0
54,078
54,078

(2,500)

$

2,183

20,183
(2,235)
10,000

(20,183)
(24,378)

44,173
(39,315)

(34,725)

72,121

7,000

2,959

(3,057)

1,286

485

(6,107)

893

3,852

795

2,081

$

3,85_2_

$

795

$

2,081

(2,500)

(37,104)
(76,484)
(2,050)
29,947

18,000
(23,721)
(50,282)

893

2007

2006
13,758

17,341

230
(6,034)
0
2,500
(60,462)
(63,765)

(4,521)
(90,213)

_$

2,566

(2,357)
2,566
J
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Schedule N
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc.
Calculation of Marketability Discount

Restricted Stock Studies
SEC, Overall Average
Milton Gelman
Management Planning Study
Robert Trout
Robert Moroney
Michael Maher
Standard Research Associated, Inc.
Silber Study
Average Marketability Discount

Average
Discount
25.80%
33.00%
27.10%
33.50%
35.60%
35.40%
45.00%
33.80%
33.65%

Schedule O
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc.
Pre-IPO Studies
Robert W. Baird & Co. Studies
Calculation of Value of Marketability as Illustrated in Initial Public Offerings
of Common Stock

Study

Number of IPO
Prospectuses
Reviewed

Number of
Qualifying
Transactions

Discount
Mean
Median

732
318
443
266
157
98
130
97

91
46
54
35
23
27
21
13

43%
45%
45%
42%
45%
45%
43%
60%

42%
45%
44%
40%
40%
45%
43%
66%

2241

310

44%

43%

1995-1997
1994-1995
1991-1993
1990-1992
1989-1990
1987-1989
1985-1986
1980-1981

Willamette Manajgement Associates Studies
Summary of Discounts for Private Transaction P/E Multiples
Compared to Public Offering P/E Multiples Adjusted for
Changes in Industry P/E Multiples

Time Period
1975-78
1979
1980-82
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

Number of
Companies
Analyzed

Number of
Transactions
Analyzed

17
9
58
85
20
18
47
25
13
9
17
27
36
51
31
42
17
34
14
22
13

31
17
113
214
33
25
74
40
19
19
23
34
75
110
48
66
22
44
21
28
15_

Median
Discount
54.7%
62.9%
55,5%
60.7%
73.1%
42.6%
47.4%
43.8%
51.8%
50.3%
48.5%
31.8%
51.7%
53.3%
42.0%
58.7%
44.3%
35.2%
49.4%
27.7%
31.9%
48.4%
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Schedule P
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc.
Analysis of Factors Impacting Discount for Lack of Marketability

Factor
Baseline Marketability Discount Based on Results of Restricted Stock and
Pre-IPO Studies

Impact on Lack of
Marketability
Discount
Notes:
33%

Baseline indicator of discount derived from Restricted Stock and Pre-IPO Studies (See
Schedules N and O)

Factors Impacting Marketability
Financial Statement Analysis

Capital Structure (Debt v. Equity)

Neutral

Decreases
Discount

The Company has experiences both losses and net income. Recent years have generated
positive income.
The Company has a low level of debt compared to fair market value of equity.

Dividend/Distribution Policy

Neutral

The Company has made distributions in the past.

Nature of the Company

Increases
Discount

The Company operates in an industry that experiences frequent cycles in growth and
retraction.

Management
Amount of Control in Subject Shares

Neutral
Decreases
Discount

Strength of management is reasonable.
Control position has the ability to operate the company and dispose of assets. This
control position results in a downward influence on the marketability discount

Restrictions on Transferability

Neutral

No restrictions on transferability of ownership interests.

Holding Period for the Stock

Neutral

No intentions to liquidate assets.

Company Redemption Policy

Neutral

No mandatory policy to redeem ownership interests.

Costs of Public Offering

Neutral

No intentions of ownership to pursue a public offering.

Overall Recommendation

10%
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N O R M A N , TOWNSEND & J O H N S O N
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

Forensic Accounting, Valuation, and Economic Loss Consultants

R. BRAD TOWNSEND, MBA, CPA/ABV, DABFA
Curriculum Vitae
R. Brad Townsend is a Managing Member of the firm of Norman, Townsend & Johnson, a Salt Lake
City-based accounting firm which specializes in business valuation, forensic accounting and economic
loss consulting. He was previously with the Financial Analysis Group of the international accounting
firm of KPMG Peat Marwick and the consulting firm of Norman Loebbecke Associates prior to forming
Norman, Townsend & Johnson. Mr. Townsend has 21 years of experience providing business valuation,
investigative accounting, and economic loss services to the business community.
Professional

Experience

Mr. Townsend's professional experience includes substantial involvement in over 800 engagements in a
wide variety of business settings. He has provided services in both general business as well as litigation
settings. His experience includes providing diverse consulting services in the following areas:
Business/Intellectual Property Valuation - Valuation of businesses and intellectual property in a variety
of industries
Investigative Accounting/Fraud Analysis - Determination offlow,possession and ownership of business
and personal assets and liabilities
Business Interruption - Determination of total and insured losses resultingfromvarious types of business
interruptions
Economic Loss/Damage Calculation - Calculation of monetary damages incurred in a variety of business
and personal settings
Contract Evaluation - Evaluation of economic effects of compliance/non-compliance with contract terms
in connection with contract disputes and litigation
Feasibility Studies - Projection of operating results and debt service coverages and preparation of
projected financial statements
Market Studies - Evaluation of economic and competitive environment affecting subject company
Asset Search/Identification - Identification and valuation of assets through analysis of accounting records
Statistical Analysis - Projection of population characteristics using statistical sampling methods
Troubled Loan Analysis - Evaluation of debtor ability to service debt through financial analysis
Mr. Townsend has provided expert witness testimony on 128 occasions in State and Federal court
proceedings as well as Arbitration and Governmental Agency hearings. He has appeared as an expert
witness in the states of Utah and Idaho. He has provided testimony on a wide variety of business
valuation, investigative accounting and economic loss matters.

0G0053
230 South 500 East, Suite 590

Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Phone: (801) 539-1600

Fax: (801) 539-1642

www.ntjexperts.com

Mr. Townsend has provided consulting services in a variety of business settings including general
consulting as well as litigation consulting services. He has been retained to provide services in the
following business arenas:
General Corporate Litigation
Accountant Liability Actions
Personal Injury/Wrongful Death Actions
Insurance Claim Adjusting and Litigation
Troubled Loan Monitoring
Business and Personal Financial Planning
Wrongful Termination Litigation

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Dissenting Shareholder Actions
Marital Dissolutions
Business Mergers and Acquisitions
Offerings of Registered Securities .
Bankruptcy
Utility Rate Setting
Income Tax Reporting

Mr. Townsend has experience in financial matters related to a number of different industries. He has
provided services and performed analysis in the following general industries:
Health Care
Industrial Wholesale
Commercial Retail
Real Estate
Insurance

•
•
•
•
•

Financial Institution
Manufacturing
Agriculture
Utilities
Professional Services

•
•
•
•
•

Hotel
Professional Sports
Local Government
Steel Milling
Construction

•
•
•
•
•

Automobile
Leasing
Oil Refining
Car Rental
Mining

Mr. Townsend has served as an instructor in a number of seminars and workshops for various
professional groups. He has taught courses for financial planning, professional accountant and legal
practitioner organizations. Mr. Townsend has lectured on such topics as business valuation, asset
identification and tracing, income assessment and aspects of financial planning.
Professional Licenses and

Affiliations

Mr. Townsend is a Certified Public Accountant, a member of various professional organizations and has
served in volunteer business-related positions as follows:
Certified Public Accountant, licensed in the State of Utah
Accredited in Business Valuation, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Member, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Member, Utah Association of Certified Public Accountants
Member, American College of Forensic Examiners
Diplomate, American Board of Forensic Accounting
Member, Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
Member, International Association of Collaborative Professionals
Former Board Member, Finance Committee Chairman and Treasurer, HawkWatch International
Former Vice-Chairman, UACPA Litigation Services Committee
Educational

Background

Mr. Townsend graduated from the University of Utah, with honors, with a Bachelor of Science degree in
Accounting. He also earned a Master in Business Administration from the University of Utah. He has
participated in various continuing education programs during the last 21 years with emphasis in business
valuation, economic loss theory, taxation and fraud investigation.
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Brough v. Brough
Documents Available to NTJ
|No.

Document Discription
1. Equipment appraisal done by Ron Lease
2. HUD Settlement Statement for 81 acre property
3. Tax assessment on 4369 East Main Street property
4. Tax assessment on 6.6 acre property
5. Warranty Deed on 81 acre property
6. Lease agreement between Brough Trucking and Cardwell Distributing
7. Warranty Deed between Pine Tech Industries and Richard and Kathy Brough
8 Tax assessment on 151 North 4217 East property
9. Brough Trucking & Crane Service tax returns 2001 - 2007
10. Credit card statements for Brough Trucking
11. Appraisal of personal residence at 3091 W. 7875 N
12. 2001 - 2002 check registers for Brough Trucking
13. N J Trucking Inc. Tax Returns 1993, 1995-1997,1999
14. Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. Tax Returns 2001-2005
15. Brough Trucking & Crane Service, Inc. Financial Statements for December 31,2001 -2006
16. Brough Trucking & Crane Service, Inc. Financial Statements for March 31, 2005
17. CC Statements 0031 11/12/03 - 03/12/03 04/12/03 - 05/13/03
18. CC Statements 1688 12/22/03 -10/19/03
19. CC Statements 2760 05/12/06 - 07/27/06 09/03/06 - 09/13/06
20. CC Statements 3052 07/13/03 - 05/01/06
21. CC Statements 3383 01/05/02 - 03/18/02
22. CC Statements 3455 09/05/06 - 09/05/06
23. CC Statements 4682 11/18/04 03/03/04 - 03/19/04
24. CC Statements 7518 05/30/02 - 06/14/02 08/29/02 - 09/11/02 10/28/02 - 12/16/02 01/26/03 - 09/07/03
25.
10/22/03 - 12/05/03 01/24/05 - 04/13/05
26. CC Statements 7624 12/09/99 - 04/03/00 05/07/03 -11/27/03 02/10/05 - 07/08/05
27. CC Statements 5846 04/29/04 - 07/14/04 08/20/04 - 10/11/04
28. Respondent's Response to Petitioner's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Doc.
29. October 7, 2007 letter to NTJ regarding financial statements and other documents requested
30. Asset holdings sent by Mr. Brough
31. Warranty Deeds on land
32. Property tax notices
33. Documentation on company fraud against Brough Trucking
34. Deposition of Richard James Brough
35. Average annual expenditure and characteristics, Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2005-2006
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R O E A L 1 GAITHER #1141
Attorney for the Respondent
1 59» West 300 South Broadway #105
SaltLalce City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)531-1990

IN THE EIGHT DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

KATHR.™ C. BROUGH,
Petitioner,

J

vs.

>
)
)

RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,

j

M O T ION

^

FOR NEW TRIAL

J 0 H N

*"

ANDER

SON

)

Respondent.

)

Case No. 054000084

The Respondent, by and through his attorney of record, hereby moves the Court to
grant a new trial in these proceedings on all or part of the issues; or in the alternative
pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of CM Procedure and that the Court amend the
Findings ofFact & Conclusions ofLaw, entered September 4, 2008 without Notice, or to
alio* for oral argument. In the next alternative the Respondent requests the Court issue
a Memorandum Decision as required by Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of CM, Procedure and
a „eW Decree ofDivorce. This Motion is based upon the following grounds and reasons:
1. Irregularity in the procedure of the Court exist in these proceedings
because the Minute Entry and the ruling issued by the Court from the bench after the trial
1

ULu4/3
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indicates that the Court would prepare a written ruling. No findings were announced in
open court. No ruling was issued by Memorandum Decision or otherwise. The Court has
never explained the adoption by the Court of the documents prepared by the Attorney for
the Petitioner.
2. Under the facts and circumstances, the Respondent requests either a new
trial, a written ruling of the Court, and/or an opportunity to present final oral argument.
3. The current procedure followed by the Court has denied the Respondent
a fair and equitable divorce trial.
4. Counsel for the Respondent complied with the court ordered procedure
in submitting a "proposed" findings to the Court.
5. The Judgment awarded against the Respondent is excessive under Rule
59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in any of the following aspects and should
be reconsidered on any of the following grounds:
a. The Decree of Divorce awards to the Petitioner substantial premarital business property and pre-marital property owned by the Respondent without
required findings as to separate property.
b. The award of $386,500.00 grants to the Petitioner an award of the
value of the business which does not fairly allocate liabilities of the business and
therefore the award is unfair and inequitable.
c. If the Court did not rule that the pre-nuptial agreement was void

0 ouh It

ox non-effective, then the evidence and exhibits have shown that Mr. Brough owned
ouch of the equipment which was used for value of the business prior to the marriage.
d. The Decree of Divorce awards the Petitioner in excess of
$20,000.00 in legal fees and costs. This award is inequitable and excessive in that it
requires the Respondent to pay that amount to the Petitioner in light of the fact that she
has been awarded a substantial cash settlement from which she can pay her promissory
note for legal fees.
6. Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the manner in
which the Judgment was entered appears to have been given under the influence of
prejudice against the Respondent in that the Court adopted 100% of the proposed finding
submitted by the Petitioner and failed to include any proposed findings, rulings or
language submitted by the Respondent even if based on objective, undisputed evidence
introduced by the Respondent at trial.
7. The Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce is an
error of law in this divorce case in that best practice in divorce matters require
consideration by the Court of separate property owned prior to the marriage and an
equitable balancing of issues and awards.
8. The ruling concerning the pre-nuptial agreement constitutes and error in
law and is contrary to the evidence introduced at trial, including the closing argument of
the Attorney for the Petitioner who indicated that the pre-nuptial agreement was effective.

0U0Q59
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rieie foire the Court should determine the scope of the pre-nuptial agreement.
9. The manner of entry, lack of notice and error in law has denied the
Respondent the opportunity to object to the Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Mvorce or to receive a copy of the proposed Judgement.
10. An Affidavit of Randall Gaither, Attorney for the Respondent, is
submitted in support of this Motion.
11. A Memorandum is submitted in support of this Motion.

DA.TED this

day of September, 2008.

RA ALL G A I N E R
Attorney for the Respondent
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL was delivered to:
CLARK B.ALLRED
Alired & McClellan, P.C.
72 North 300 East
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Fax: (435)722-3928

DATED this

day of September, 2008.
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FILED
DISTRiCT COURT
DUCHEC^L COUNTY, UTAH

SEP 12 2008

RANDALL GAITHER #1141;
Attorney for the Respondent
159 West 300 South Broadway #105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)531-1990

^•~ J'- . .2A
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BY_

/IcKEE, CLERK
DLPUTY
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IN THE EIGHT DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

KATFIRYN C. BROUGH,
Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PENDING MOTIONS

vs.

RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,
Respondent.

Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON
Case No. 054000084

POINT I
BASED UPON IRREGULARITIES THAT EXIST THE COURT SHOULD
GRANT A NEW TRIAL OR RELIEF WHICH AFFORDS THE RESPONDENT A
FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ARGUMENT AND OBJECTIONS TO THE
COURT AS TO THE ADOPTION OF PROPOSED FINDINGS DRAFTED BY
PETITIONER'S COUNSEL.
As set forth in the Affidavit of Randall Gaither, Attorney for the Respondent, the
Court signed without modification the set of proposed Findings of Fact and a Decree
which was submitted to the Court by the Petitioner. No Memorandum of Decision of the
Court wasfiledor any ruling issued by the Court.
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The Respondent submits that it is highly unusually to .allow the Attorney for one
party in a divorce action to unilaterally draft 100% of the findings and a Decree to be
adopted in totality by the Court after a contested trial. This procedure is not consistent
with the rules and gives an impression of unfairness and prejudice.
Counsel for the Respondent has tried cases before the Roosevelt Department of the
Duchesne District Court and never encountered this procedure. The Court's apparent
procedure in ruling on a contested divorce by either accepting or rejecting proposed
findings in totality and adopt one or the other findings is unique. The procedure raises
issues of an inappropriate abdication or delegations 5of judicial function.
i

UMoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213 (Utah 1990) the Court stated:
As to appellants' strange assertion that the court should not draft its own findings, rule
52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure gives the court the responsibility of finding
the facts and stating its Conclusions of law and judgment. See Boyer Co. v. Lignell,
567 P.2d 1112, 1113-4 (Utah 1977). The court may ask the prevailing counsel to
submit findings to aid the court in making these necessary findings. Id. at 1113.
However, the court should not "mechanically adopt" these findings. Id. The trial
court thus has the ultimate discretion in determining the findings of fact and Conclusions
of law.

In Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112, 1113-4 (Utah 1977), the Court heard
objections from counsel before adopting findings of opposing counsel that the court ruled
had prevailed. The finding of facts "is an important part of the judicial function," one that
is designed to flesh out the rationale for the decision and one that "the Judge cannot
surrender... to counsel." Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2578
(1971) Pursuant to article VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, "the judicial power of
2
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the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction . . .,
and in such other courts as the Legislature by statute may establish." Utah Const, art. VIII,
§1
\r\Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476, 2008 UT App 11 (Utah App.
01/10/2008), the Court noted the importance of the findings in a divorce matter stating:
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs findings of fact,
states that "[i]t will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are
stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or
appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court." Utah R. Civ.
P. 52(a); see also Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("In
assessing the sufficiency of the findings . . . we are not confined to the contents of
a particular document entitled 'Findings', rather, the findings may be expressed
orally from the bench or contained in other documents . . . . " ) . Furthermore,
ff
[a]dequate findings are . . . necessary for [appellate courts] to perform [their]
assigned review function." Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). Here,
the trial court entered two documents summarizing its findings the July 5, 2005
Memorandum Decision and the January 3, 2006 Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law. The trial court also made oral findings at the Clarification Hearing. Below,
we consider the challenge to the findings of fact as we address each substantive
issue. In doing so, we review the written and oral findings of fact together to
determine if they are sufficient to support the trial court's rulings. We note,
however, that for purposes of appellate review, written findings are the better
practice because they reduce the likelihood of ambiguity created by an incomplete
or unclear record. We can find no indication, either in the oral and written
findings or elsewhere in the record, of the classification of the relevant items as
marital or separate property. Furthermore, despite careful review of the trial
transcript and the written and oral findings, we can find no place where the trial
court assigned values to the various items of property.

The procedure in this matter is even more prejudicial because Mr. Brough and his
attorney were awaiting a ruling by Memorandum and were never given notice of findings

3
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tkat the Court adopted and filed without an order to have the de facto ruling served on the
parties. Further, the final Decree should have been submitted to counsel for the
Respondent with an opportunity to object to the Decree and Judgements. Rule 7 of The
lltdih Rules of Civil Procedure states as follows:
(f) Orders.
1. (f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute
order entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the
payment of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a
judgment. Except as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made
without notice to the adverse party may be vacated or modified by the
judge who made it with or without notice. Orders shall state whether
they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative.
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing
party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon
the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's
decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days
after service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order
upon being served with an objection or upon expiration of the time to
object.

The Petitioner was not the prevailing party until the Court adopted the findings
drafted by the Petitioner. Any Decree should have been submitted to allow objections to
be filed. The Petitioner's attorney was never requested in open court or by any written
order to prepare a final judgement to be submitted without notice to the Respondent.
POINT II
NO DIVORCE DECREE HAS mm

ENTERED IN THESE PROCEEDINGS.
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A clerical error has occurred because Counsel for the Respondent was asked by the
Court to prepare a Decree of Divorce dissolving the marriage relationship and ruled in
open Court that a Decree would be signed when submitted. Counsel prepared and
submitted the Decree and no objection was filed as of the date by Memorandum of
opposing counsel. The Decree actually divorcing the parties has not been entered by the
Court even though this is the only ruling from the bench made in the presence of both
parties.
POINT HI
THE DIVORCE DECREE PREPARED AND AUTHORIZED BY THE
ATTORNEY FOR THE PETITIONER AWARDS EXCESSIVE DAMAGES AND
SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED.
The Respondent requests and opportunity to file objections and have a hearing as
to the Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law and to present evidence or arguments
concerning the Judgment and the terms of the Decree. Further the Decree should be set
aside and vacated because of the procedural irregularities. This is not a default
proceeding but a contested trial.
The following excessive Judgments in the Decree and any findings should be
amended or vacated because:
1. The Decree of Divorce awards to the Petitioner substantial premarital property owned by the Respondent based upon findings drafted to suggest joint

5

marital interest which is contrary to the evidence.
2. The award of $386,500.00 grants to the Petitioner an award of the
value of the business which docs not take into account the liabilities of the business and
the award is unfair and inequitable.
3. The evidence has shown that Mr. Brough owned most of the
equipment which was used for value of the business prior to the marriage. The
Respondent's pre-marital property has been unfairly awarded by adopting and entering
tie findings and Decree unilaterally prepared by Counsel for the Petitioner.
4. The Decree of Divorce awards the Petitioner in excess of
$20,000.00 in legal fees and costs. This award is inequitable and excessive in that it
requires the Respondent to pay that amount to the Petitioner in light of the fact that the
Petitioner has been awarded a substantial cash settlement and can afford to pay for her
own attorney fees and costs. Anyfindingsas to legal fees must take into account the
judgements in the action.
5. The Petitioner should be required to pay for at least one-half, if
not all, of the Petitioner's expert witness fees for which Mr. Brough was required to
advance funds prior to the trial. This award is excessive in light of the ruling of the Court
granting her one half of the business and a cash award.
It is inequitable and unfair to shift the costs of the Petitioner'

s expert witnesses and

the Petitioner's attorney fees to the Respondent if the Petitioner is obtaining over
$300^000.00 as a result of the divorce proceedings. The Petitioner testified that she had
been making payments to her attorney and can clearly pay off any promissory note of
legal fees from the Judgement. Further, the only reason Mr. Brough had to pay one-half
of her expert witness fees was because she could not afford them during the proceedings
and common sense dictates that if she is given any kind of substantial award she can
afford to pay at least one-half of the costs.
Further, the Petitioner stated that she was not interested in the equipment and
property Mr. Brough owned prior to the marriage and the ruling awarding her one-half of
the business which the value was based substantially on equipment has resulted in her
receiving a wind-fall of property. Therefore good cause exists to set aside the Judgemtn
and order a new trial.

POINT IV
THE RELIEF REQUESTED IS SUPPORTED BY THE FOLLOWING
RULES OF PROCEDURE.

Rule 52 of Civil Procedure . Findings by the court
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to
Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall
similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which
7
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constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary
for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally
and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear
in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court The trial
court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a
brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on
more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days
after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make
additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The
motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.
When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury,
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in
the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to
amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.

Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. New trials; amendments of
judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has
been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the
entry of a new judgment:
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party
was prevented from having a fair trial.
8
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(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding
on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination
by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the
affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the
application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other
decision, or that it is against law.
(a)(7) Error in law.

Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment.
(a) Delay in execution. No execution or other writ to enforce a judgment
may issue until the expiration often days after entry of judgment, unless the
court in its discretion otherwise directs.
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment. In its discretion and on
such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, the
court may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to enforce, a
judgment pending the disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter
or amend a judgment made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for
relief from a judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a
motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed verdict
made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a motion for amendment to the findings
or for additional findings made pursuant to Rule 52(b).

9
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(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken, the appellant by giving a
supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such a stay is othenvf I
prohibited by law or these rules. The bond may be given at or after the time
of filing the notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the superseded
P
bond is approved by the court.

DATED this

day of September, 2008.

^ uC^uc
RANDALL GAITiJgR v
Attorney for the Respondent
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF FENDING MOTIONS was delivered to:

CLARK B.ALLRED
Allred & McClellan, P.C.
72 North 300 East
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Fax: (435)722-3928

DATED this

\ 0 ^ day of September, 2008.
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DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESWF. COUNTY, UTAH

SEP 12 2008

RANDALL GAITHER #1141
Attorney for the Respondent
159 West 300 South Broadway #105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)531-1990

JOANNE MCKBE, CLERK
DEPUTY

IN THE EIGHT DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

KATHRYN C. BROUGH,

AFFIDAVIT OF
RANDALL GAITHER,
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT
IN SUPPORT OF NEW TRIAL

Petitioner,

Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON

vs.

RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,

Case No. 054000084

Respondent.
State of Utah

)

: ss.
County of Salt Lake )
I, Randall T. Gaither, being first duly sworn upon oath hereby deposes

and

states as follows:
1. In the above entitled case, as the trial attorney for the Respondent, it was
my understanding that the Court would issue a written ruling which would be mailed to
each party. (See Minute Entry of July 9, 2008.)

0uu4/c

2. Having tried divorce cases for over thirty years in proceedings
throughout the State of Utah each party may submit "proposed" findings which usually
fu.notion as each parties' argument of legal position to the Court when the Court has not
yet made a ruling. In this case I submitted "proposed" findings and not final Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law authorized by any ruling of the Court. Even if a prevailing
party is directed to prepare findings based on an oral ruling, the opposing party is given
an opportunity to object.
3. As of the date of this Affidavit, I have not received any notice of ruling
or Memorandum Decision from the Court. The first document that I received was a twopage Notice of Entry of Divorce Decree signed by the Attorney for the Petitioner on
September 4, 2008. This document was received on the late afternoon of Friday,
September 5, 2008.
4. As of Friday the 5th of September, I had not received any notice that the
Court signed or entered the proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Lawt which
submitted by the Attorney for the Petitioner.
5. I had prepared a Decree of Divorce and submitted it to the Court prior to
August 8, 2008 after the Court bifurcated the proceedings and granted the divorce from
the bench at the end of the divorce trial.
6. On Monday, September 8, 2008,1 requested that the secretary from the
Respondent's business go to the Court to retrieve a copy of the Findings of Fact &

2
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Conclusions of Law and Decree which had been entered but never served by the Clerks or
counsel, PsX that time the agent for Mr. Brough was only given a copy of a signed Decree
of Divorce in this matter which corresponds identically to the proposed findings
submitted by the Attorney for the Petitioner in August of 2008 even though not requested
by the Couit at the conclusions of the trial.
7. I contacted the Clerk of the Court on Monday, September 8th, 2008 to
attempt to obtain a copy of the Findings of Fact. The Clerk indicated that the proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Memorandum prepared and submitted by my
office ^were at the Courthouse. I was also told that there was no ruling or Memorandum
Decision on file.
8. During my conversation with the Clerk of the Court, the Clerk indicated
that there were undisclosed reasons why she needed to speak with Judge Anderson, but
could not talk with him regarding this issue until Monday, September 15, 2008. At that
time I inquired as to the first available date to have this matter scheduled before the Court
was on the Court's calendar and the Clerk indicated the date of September 25, 2008 in the
afternoon. Later, I checked the docket sheet and saw that a hearing was set. I again
called the court desk and I was again told that Judge Anderson has ordered this hearing
set.
9. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce
signed by the Court are identical to those prepared and mailed to my office by Clark

3

000

Mired on Aigust 7 2008, Attorney for the Petitioner. I have compared the two
documents which appear to be a word for word verbatim copy or the original proposed
findings from the Petitioner's Attorney's office. The only change is the deletion of the
mailing certificate page on the findings of fact on the copy that I received. The final
findings include footnotes which were discussed by counsel at the divorce trial as a means
to make legal argument. The cover letter from Attorney Allred describes the findings and
decree as "proposed" .
10. I did not receive actual notice of the findings which were entered by the
Court in August of 2008 until September 8, 2008 by a fax received from my client's
secretary after she went to the Clerk's office and purchased a copy from the Clerk of the
Findings at my request to check the status of this matter. While I have received actual
notice as of September 8, 2008,1 have never been served with a signed copy by the clerk
or any attorney.
11. As Attorney for the Respondent, my assumption was that the Court
would collaboratively use the proposed findings from either party, as well as make its
own proposed findings and ruling on evidence and the various issues, then issue a Ruling
or Memorandum Decision. In that regard, I submitted a cover letter with a disk with my
proposed findings to assist the Court in drafting its own findings, a procedure used in
other cases within the State of Utah.
12. If I had known that the Court was using a procedure in which the Court

4
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would cdoose between two sets of competing proposed Findings of Fact and then to enter
one oi*tie other in its totality, then I would have framed the Respondent's proposed
SLndirLgs; in a different fashion. Further, I would have requested oral argument in order to
respond and object to any final findings in light of the evidence.
13. In light of my practice and litigation of divorce matters, I have been
surprised by the procedures and lack of notice of the trial court and request that relief be
granted on relevant Motions filed with this Affidavit.
14. This Affidavit is being submitted to set forth to supplement the record
concerning procedures and notice in the above entitled proceedings. The docket sheet
does not reflect that the proposed findings submitted by the Respondent's Attorney have
been made part of the record. Attached hereto is as Exhibit One is the cover letter and
documents received from the Petitioner's Attorney. Attached hereto as Exhibit Two is
the cover letter and documents submitted by the Respondent's Attorney.

DATED this

/L
/ (

day of September, 2008.

RANI
Attorney foiAiie Respondent
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0 i u 4 b 'o

State of Utah

)
:ss

County of Salt Lake

)

On the \\ fj-4 day of September, 2008 , personally appeared before me Randall
Gaither who having read the foregoing Affidavit, swears that the contents thereof are true
according to the best of his information and belief and has executed the same

Notary Seal:
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
RANDALL T. GAITHER was delivered to:

CLARK B. ALLRED
ALLRED & MCCLELLAN, P.C.
72 NORTH 300 EAST
ROOSEVELT, UTAH 84066
FAX: (435) 722-3928

DATED this I %,

day of September, 2008.
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148 South Vernal Avenue Suite 101
Vernal, Utah 84078
Phone (435) 789-7800
Fax (4)5)789-7820
E-mail allredmcclellanfyubtanet com

Allred & McClellan, P.C.
Law Offices
72 North 300 East (123-14)
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Phone (435) 722-3928
Fax (435) 722-3920
E-mail clarka(a),ubtanet com

Clark B Allred
Clark A McClellan
Brad D. Brotherson

August

7,

2008

The Honorable Judge Anderson
Eighth District Court
255 South State
Roosevelt, UT
84066

RE: Brough v. Brough
Civil No. 054000084 DA
Dear Judge Anderson:

Pursuant to the Court « q 7-<=>rmoo+- +-v^ ^ *. • x. .
herewith s u i t i n g h e r ^ o f e ^ ^ If l l T ^ L ^ l i " *
and Decree o£ Divorce, on the above r e f e r e n c e d " a t t e r
°

T

''

LaW

yours,
CCLELLAN, P.C.

B Al
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CBA/cb
enclosures
pc:

K. B r o u g h
R. Gaither
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CLSR.K B A.LLRED - 0 05 5
CL^R-K k . McCLELLAN - 6113
AIXJR ED & McCLELLAN, P . C .
Attorneys for Petitioner
72 Ufortti 300 East (123-14)
Roosevelt, Utah 84 066
TeLeph-one:
(435)722-3928
TN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
KATHRYW C. BROUGH,

)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,

)

YS.

RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,
Respondent.

)

Civil No.

054000084

)

Judge John R. Anderson

The above case came before the Court for trial on the 9th day of
July, 20O8, Petitioner was present with her attorney, Clark B Allred.
Respondent was present with his attorney, Randall Gaither,

Evidence was

received by the Court in the form of testimony and exhibits. Argument
was received by counsel and the Court took the matter under advisement.
The

Court

having

reviewed

the

evidence

and

after

being

fully

advised, makes these findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner was a resident of Duchesne County, State of Utah,

and had been

for more

than

three months

commencement of this action,

0vi0081

immediately

prior

to the
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rciitioner worked for the Respondent from 1993 to 1995.

She then worked for her husband, Mr. Baum, until they separated. In the
summer of 1997, she again started working

for the Respondent at NJ

Trucking.
3.

On December 1, 1997, the parties started living together and

they married on July 14, 1998.
4.
children

At the time the parties married, the Respondent had two minor
from

a previous

marriage. One

of

the

reasons

the

parties

married was to assist the Respondent in obtaining custody of those two
minor children.
5.
majority

The
age.

Respondent
Those

also had

children

two

older

insisted

that

children who were

the

agreement not to claim any assets the Respondent

Petitioner

of

sign

an

then owned if the

parties divorced in the future. The Respondent stated that he thought
the request was dumb. The Petitioner,
called an attorney,

to appease the two children,

but, when informed

of

the cost of preparing

a

prenuptial agreement, elected to write out a one paragraph statement
which she and the Respondent signed which is Respondent's exhibit 1.
There was no discussion or disclosure of what each party owned. The
testimony

of

the

Petitioner,

which was

not

rebutted,

was

that

the

statement was only to apply to assets owned on the date of marriage and
not to further acquired assets or improvements to those assets.
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Brough Trucking at the time of the trial is $492,000.00. See Exhibit 3
rownsend appraisal.
9.

When the parties started living together and at the beginning

of the marriage, they lived in a home in Duchesne that was owned by the
Respondent. That home was subject to a substantial mortgage on which
$11, 300.00 per month payments were made during

the marriage.

Those

payments were made from earnings from Brough Trucking.
10.

The Petitioner, with her own labor and the assistance of her

son, remodeled the Duchesne house, including making a room out of the
patio, adding walls and windows, taking out a sliding glass door to open
up an area, painting, installing sheet rock, carpet and siding, and
replacing the old shower with a new bathtub. She also remodeled the
dovmstairs and added a wall, sheet rocked, painted and added carpet
downstairs, put in light fixtures, and did yard work.
11.

Shortly after the parties married in September of 1998, the

Respondent's

son, Bryan, age 14, came to live with the parties. He

wanted to go to school in Roosevelt.

Just prior to the parties starting

to live together, the Respondent had purchased a shop m
Drillers Inc. to use for Brough Trucking.
needed repairs.

Roosevelt from

That shop was dirty and

The parties decided to construct living quarters m

the

Roosevelt shop so that they could move to Roosevelt.
12.

The Petitioner, primarily by herself, but with assistance of

her children and the Respondent's children, built a bedroom, bathroom

0U0O84

,,( ....

™

11Vln3

area

UP3tairS

tile work and carpet.

in the

"ooseveit1 shop including sheet rock,

Downstairs, she put in 2 bedrooms,

a

kitchen!

cxeaned the shop and added floor tiles to the shop. Carpets were addec
to all living areas and an office was constructed downstairs.
13. in August of i 9 9 9 , the Respondent's youngest daughter, Amanda,
age 12, came to live with the parties. The parties and the children
moved from Duchesne and started living in the Roosevelt shop.
14.

The parties then started looking for a more suitable home or

property on which to construct a home. The Petitioner looked at many
properties hut did not find anything acceptable to both parties, m the
summer of 2000, the parties were talking to a Clare Duncan who said he
had some acreage for sale. The parties went and looked at the property
approximately
SSO.000.00.

acres

18

near

Ne ola,

Utah,

and

m a de

an

offer

of

That offer was accepted and ' the transaction closed on

August 3, 2000.

The parties paid $20,000 down and jointly signed a note

for the balance of Wo,000.00. The property was deeded jointly to the
parties. The $20.000.00 down payment was paid from Brough Trucking

ju st

as all other bills were paid from Brough Trucking.
15.

The parties then took plans and hired a general contract
or.

Construction on the home started in early
responsible for coordinating the work.
-it. on a

daily

basis.

m

2 ooi.

The Petitioner

She went to the construction

addition

to

coordinating

with

contractors, she picked up materials and also worked on the home
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of the living quarters, the maintaining of the home and family and also
woirlced at Brough Trucking. The parties seldom took salaries from the
business. W2 records show the Petitioner was only paid $3,360 in 1999,
$10,640.00 in 2000, $8,880 in 2001, $7,680.00 in 2002 and $6,876.00 in1
20O3 .

Both

parties

maintained

Petitioner deposited her checks

separate

checking

in her account and

accounts.

The

then used those

monies on the home, the family, and expenses for both her children and
the

Respondent's

children.

Respondent

deposited

his

monies

in his

account and used those to pay child support and legal fees in the early
part of the marriage and for personal and family expenses during the
marriage.

Since the parties took minimal salaries, almost all living

expenses,

food,

remodeling

of

utilities,

the

shop

and

transportation,
Duchesne

house,

housing

(including

the

payments

and

mortgage

building of the home) were paid with checks or credit cards from Brough
Trucking.

i

20 . The Respondent claimed that he should have credit against the
value of the home for premarital assets that were sold.

However, the

evidence did not support that claim. He was unable to trace those assets
and monies .

The evidence showed that monies from the sale of assets

were used for purposes other than the home including paying operating
expenses of Brough Trucking when the Respondent had a broken leg.
21.

Respondent claimed that the money from the sale of the Bandana

Ranch was used for the down payment of the 18 acres in Neola where the

0 u 0^0 8 7

*• b u C n ^

* «

was bu.lt.

Secondly,

First, that property M s

t h e 18 a c r e s

ln Neola clos£d

Ranch was not sold until August
went into was used to pay
22.

24

^

on

, 2000

^
and

^
the

Afferent li.ing

many

^ ^ ^

paid for

^
^

^

the

^
^

^
^

^

^

^
^

and personal

^

^

Respondent clawed the raoney fro. the sale of the Duchesne

shop should be a credit. He sold that shop on May 3,

1999.

The

down

payment of $28,983 was two years before thP hn m o
y

*> oerore the home was constructed and the

monies went into the genera! account at

NJ

Trucking

and was spent

£or

expenses of N J T r u c k i n g . T h e b a l a n c e Q f ^
^
^
^
^
apparently received in 2000 (a year before tua v,
ia year before the home was constructed) and
also went into the Brough Trucking general account anr1
33
i*j. account and was used for
Brough Trucking expenses.
23.
m

Respondent also claims a credit of S30, 000 for a rig he sold

,une 2000 and other equipment he sold in 2 ooo.

Again,

those sales

occurred well before the construction of the ho.e, those monres went
into the general account at Brough Trucking and they were spent before
the land was bought or the home was constructed,
2,.

Respondent also makes a claim for the

the sale of the Ouchesne home
substantaally

improVed

ln

April

and modeled

$ 2 ,, 7 0 2 .oo

2002.

That

^

receded from
^

^

by the Petitioner and marltal

™ 1 E S " S r e ^ ^ t D P a y m O T t 9 ^ « * '««» » the property. There was
no S ho„ l n g where that raoney was deposited and no showing it „ a s u s e d on
the Neola Home.
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Cl Li L; ;; j /

did the cooking, cleaning and laundry.

$he also paid some of their

expenses from her bank account.
29.

Shortly after Amanda turned 18, she and the Petitioner had an

axgwient . The Respondent then told the Petitioner to vacate the home.
The Petitioner vacated the home on August 1, 2005, taking very f e

w

personal items with her. She came back the next day and loaded s
items into a horse trailer.

ome
The Respondent, however, took back the

horse trailer with most of the items.
30.

The personal property is all used property and has minimal

value. The values listed by the Respondent; are either new values, or
exaggerated.
31.

After

the

parties

separated,

the

employment as a laborer with Stance Insulation.
with her mother.

Petitioner

obtained

She presently resides

she has purchased a used' trailer she is setting up

next to her mother. Her present net monthly income is $1,656.00 and her
i

expenses are $1,695.00 per month.
32.

The Respondent has continued t o r e s i d e i n t h e home and operate

Brough Trucking and continues to pay h i s p e r s o n a l expenses thru Brough
Trucking.
33.

P e t i t i o n e r has incurred l e g a l fees and c o s t s m t h i s matter.

The a f f i d a v i t

of the P e t i t i o n e r ' s a t t o r n e y shows t h a t she had incurred

$15,391.53 i n fees t h r u J u l y 2, 2008.
an a d d i t i o n a l

^o hours

He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had incurred

xn p r e p a r a t i o n p r r o f

to t r i a l

at

$175.00

p e r
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6.

The Duchesne house was subject td a mortgage when the parties

married which mortgage was paid from earnings during the marriage. The
home was alsp

remodeled

and

improved

by ( the Petitioner

during

the

marriage. The monies from the sale of thq house were deposited in a
general

account

expenses.

which

was

spent

for

general living and business
i
There was no tracing or showing that the monies from the sale

i

I

of the Duchesne house went into the Neola house. In addition, those
monies became marital assets because of the* use of earnings during the
s
marriage

to pay

the mortgage

and

taxes

£nd

the

remodeling

by

the

Petitioner.
7.
The Bandana Ranch property was ij>eing purchased during the
i

marriage with earnings from the marriage, the money from the sale of

I
that property did not go to the down payment on the Neola property, as
claimed by the Respondent, but was spent 6n general expenses. There
should be no credit against marital assets given for those monies.
8.

The

Respondent

also

claimed

credit

for

a

rig

and

oth^r

property he asserted that he sold and used %he proceeds to pay on the
Neola house. The Respondent originally denied having any documents t(o
support

his

claim

of

premarital

assets.

Shortly

before

trial, hfe

provided some documents and tried to introduce additional documents atp
trial which the Court refused to receive because they had not be timely
disclosed. There was evidence of $30,000.00 from a rig. There was noj
evidence showing that those monies went into the home, but rather those

fxirxds went into the Brough Trucking account and were spent on BrougH
Trucking? expenses.2
9.

The Neola home was purchased [jointly by the parties and

remains titled in both parties' names. The Petitioner was the primary
i

!

person involved i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h a t home, i n c l u d i n g doing much
of t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n h e r s e l f . The monies f o r , t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the home
came from earnings i n Brough Trucking, fronji P e t i t i o n e r ' s account where
she deposited her s a l a r y and from t h e Respondent's

account where he

deposited h i s s a l a r y . I t i s a m a r i t a l asset 1 .
I

10 . The Petitioner was actively involved in the expansion of
Brough Trucking, she remodeled two living quarters and built the Neola

I

home, she raised the Respondent's two childrjen thru their teenage years
and she was the person doing the cleaning and meals. The Respondent's
i

position, that all property was premarital 'and that Petitioner should
i

get no interest in it, would leave the Petitioner, at age 55, with
nothing. The small wage she was paid results in less social security
when she reaches retirement age than if she' had been working for full
wages. Fairness and equity require that shd receive one half of the
value of the Neola home and Brough Trucking (less $44,000. 00) .3 Brough
2

Dunn v Dunn 802 P. 2d 1314 (Ut.App. 1990') pre marital assets
that have been consumed, commingled etc loss'their separate
status.
I
3

Hoaue v. Hogue, 831 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah Ct. App . 1992); Burke v.
Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). See alsio Haumont v. Haumont, 793

IWM95

i

. uiA-iJl

Trucking has a value of $492,000.00 less $44,000.00 and the house has a
value of $325,000.00. Therefore, the Respondent, if he wants to retain
ownership of the home and Brough Trucking, should be ordered to pay to
i

the

Petitioner

the

sum

of

$386,500.00.

In

the

alternative,

the
I
Petitioner should be awarded the Neola homeland property with a value of
i

$325,000.00

and

the

Respondent

awarded! Brough

Trucking

and

the

Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner the difference of $61,500.00 and to
refinance the $160,000.00 debt to remove tljie home and Petitioner from
liability on that loan.
11.

The Petitioner should also be awarded the vehicle she drives,

subject to the remaining debt on it as of the date the decree is signed
I
and the personal property in her possession;and the property listed on
i

Exhibit

24.

Respondent

should

be

awarded

the

remaining

personal

property, the horse trailer and the vehicle Jhe drives.
12.

Petitioner waived her claim to alimony as her income presently

meets her expenses. However, her income is not sufficient to pay her
legal fees and costs. The financial declaration received by the Court
seems to be accurate and the expenses listed thereon are reasonable.

P,2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Barber v. barber, 792 P. 2d 134, lie
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Oliekan v. Oliekan, 200JS UT App 405, ^20; Dunn V.
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1321 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990!) (using marital funds t|o
make installment payments on separate property changes it to marital
property); and Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2Id 304 (Utah 1988) (listing
many factors the court considers).
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I,

Cheree B r o t h e r s o n ,

am e m p l o y e d b y t h e o f f i c e
!

of ALLRED &

.

McCLELLAN, P. C. attorneys for Petitioner helrein and hereby certify
that I served the attached FINDINGS OF FACT\ AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAWJ
i
i

on Respondent by

placing a true and correct copy thereon in an

envelope addressed to:
RANDALL GAITHER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
159 WEST 3 00 SOUTH BROADWAY #105
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101
i

1

and deposited the same, sealed, with first,class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States mail at Rooseivelt, Utah, on the 7th
day of August, 2008.

CHEREE BROTHERSON
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C1ARK B ALLRED - 0 055
CIARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113
klLiRED 6c McCLELLAN , P . C .
Attorneys for Petitioner
12 North 300 East (123-14)
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Telephone:
(435)722-3928
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT

KATHRYN C. BROUGH,

)
)

Petitioner,
vs.
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,
Respondent.

DECREE OFl DIVORCE

)
)
)

Civil No.

)

Judge John R. Anderson

0540000084

The above case came before the Court for trial on July 9,
2008.

The Court has entered an order divorcing the parties and

took the remaining

issues under advisement.

entered its Findings

of Fact and Conclusions

The

Court has now

of

Law and based

thereon,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECRjEED :
1.

Respondent, if he wants to retain ^ownership of the home

and Brough Trucking and Crane Service Inc. '(Brough Trucking), is
ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $386,500.00 within 90
days of the entry of this decree. He is td notify^ Petitioner's

0UUD99

ubu;;til

-^9-3

counsel w i t h i n

15

days

of

entry

of

^

^

^

^

^

^

^

^

retain both assets.
2.

If the Respondent does not elect to retain ownership of

* . ho„e and Brough Trucking as provided above, then the Petitioner
» warded the

K e o l a home

and property, the Respondent is awarded

Brougr, Trucking and the Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner
*1, SOO .00 for the difference in the value within so days of entry
of the decree.
3.

Respondent is ordered to refinance the SISO.OOO debt to

remove the home and Petxtioner from liability on that loan.
4•

The Petitioner is awarded the vehicle she drives (subject

to the r e i n i n g debt on it as of the date this decree

18

signed)

the personal property in her possession and ,he property listed on
Exhibit 24.
5-

Respondent is awarded the remaining

personal

property

the horse trailer and the vehicle he drives.
6.

Nexther party is awarded alimony.

Respondent is ordered to pay to Pet it nor, -u
pciy co Petitioner the amount she
has incurred in leaaT fooo =„,*
legal fees and costs m
this matter.
The
7.

$15.3,1.53 set forth on the affidavit s u b ^ t e d as Exhibrt 4
hours at

$17S.0O

p e r h o u r f o r p r e p a r a t i o n a n d s h o u r s at

10

?17S.00

I) U L M ^ °

per hour for trial are awarded and ordered

to be paid.

In

addition, the Petitioner's counsel shall 'submit a supplemental
affidavit for the time spent on post-trial ;matters . If Respondent
objects to the reasonableness of that amount, he shall file a
l

motion with the Court setting forth those objections and the Court
will set for hearing those objections.
8.

Respondent is ordered to pay the posts of the appraisal

performed by Brad Townsend.
9.

Each party is ordered to execute and deliver, without

delay, any titles or other documents which a;re presented to either
one by the other and which are necessary to e'ffectuate the transfer
of property as has been hereinbefore set fotfth.
DATED this

day of August, 2008.
BY THE COURT:

John R. ^nderson
D i s t r i c t t Court Judge

3
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EXHIBIT TWO

000103

UUU443

RANDALL GA1THER
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AJT LAW
I 159 West 300 South '
The Broadway Lofts, #105
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84161
TELEPHONE: (801)531-199^
FACSIMILE: (801)672-1162'

.

Email: lostcanyon@msn.com

August 8, 2008
Duchesne County - Roosevelt
Attn Judge Anderson
255 South State
P.O. Box 1286
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Re:

Kakhryn C. Brough v. Richard James Brough
(Cise No. 054000084)

Dear Judge Anderson,
Enclosed please find an priginal and courtesy copy of the Respondent's Post-trial
Proposed Findings of Fact and [Conclusions of Law & Memorandum.. This document was
faxed and mailed today to Attojrney for the Petitioner, Clark Allred. Also enclosed is a
disk with the Findings of Fact iin Wordperfect and Word foninjat if the Court would like to
use a potion of the document in preparation of any final Orders. Thank you for your time.
ly yours,

JNDAEL GAITHER
Attorney at Law

RG/ac
f
cc C Allred
/
J Brough *

UUU'-i
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LAND ALL GAITHER #1141,'
Attorney for the Respondent !
159 West 300 South Broadway j#l05
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)531-1990

OV THE EIGHT DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT! DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
KATHRYN C. BROUGH,

RESPONDENT'S POST-TRIAL
PROPOSED BINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSION OF LAW &
MEMORANDUM

Petitioner,
vs,

i

Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON

RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,

Case No. 054000084

Respondent.

PROPOSED FINDINGS OP J ^ £ T
1. The Petitioner and Rejpondent were married on Julyl14, 1998 and seven years
later on August 30, 2005, the Pejitioner filed for divorce in S p e n d i n g action. The
parties separated on August 1, 2<fo05.

'.

2. The Petitioner had beef, married and divorced four previous times before ,h,s
marriage and had a child from a [elationship with another individual prior to the firs,
marriage. The Petitioner was 54lyears old at time of trial and Was 45 years old at the ome

Uo>_V'i
0uui05

-n

* • » she had three c h | I d r e n , a „ o f age> ^

8

3. At the time of the majriage the Respondent
B
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• ,.

ha! a high sch
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^

^
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^
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^
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^
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^ ^
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—1-^dtheagreemen,

'

•

!

was 50 years old. Mr.

* —

toman

P a i , i M e S W e d thM

Physical ^

R

^

" "

i

wj(h R e s p M t a |

° ° ' ^ueiion and after serving time in the M •
8 m e m 16 M a n n
I
f
« started working

~ ' 0 r l ° ,WS '
as sole shareholder.2,

aa™, *

-

no

4

w,oh Was ineo.ora.ed
U

wth the i n d e n t

_

t e d

^

. W e r n e r ,

"

'

~ ! e s , assets or m o ne y of the

^ ™ P e r * i e s of the Respond, ; , . ^ e s D
, ,
Respondent's Exhibit

t

Z

^

^

0

r

k

* H P " * ™ - was mos,,v

laborer. She testified that she m
fc^d
' 1 ' ' ^ f *BfU1" S h e « ^ K * as a
fourth h
after being hired on as a shoD h a n d l e ilk
u
"sbapd in 1993 at har Z
T
December I, , 997 in h i s $ £ £ £ £ £ " £ ^ T ' " " ^ i n ^
4 I w T
'
RtSt m e t
not have a truck and only an interelt nendL
^
Mr. Brough the 2 ™
^
h"*a„d. At triai,the
^ i o ^ t ^ Z X T u T ^ T ^ ^ Z F *
quarters ms.de toe residence as an L p l o y e T
* " J ° b TOS '° * O T k "> &mg up the Hvtg
had four cMdr^wM, Ms
faSt^'*'?,'"
" " " t * w i t h *« Respondent He
Respondent's Exhibit 1,, the c o J ^ ^ ^ J T ! ^ B r ° U g h i n W '
owner of stoek. Respondent's Exhibit 32 S e a t e d thai T
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"* C™ S™«- ' -
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5. The Respondent agreid in the premarital agreement ithat the Petitioner would not
fee; responsible for debts occurring from the listed properties and agreed to assume all
business delts. 4 (See Respondent's Exhibit 1)
6 Prior to the marriage, [the Petitioner was the bookKeejper and receptionist at N. J,
Trucking, Inc. She was an hourly employee at N. J. Truckingjin 1993 for two years until
1995. The Petitioner was awar^ of the type of business owned by the Respondent and
that the Respondent was the sold shareholder.
7 The Petitioner did not!introduce any evidence or facts at trial to show that the
premiptial agreement was signed on the basis of any claim of fraud or duress.
I

i

8. After the marriage, thi Petitioner maintained separate financial accounts in her
name only at Zions Bank and Mpuntain America Credit Union! She deposited the funds
v/hich she received from employment at Brough Trucking and jCrane Service, Inc. into
!

i

i

i

!

her separate accounts. The Petitioner also deposited the funds she received from a
i

premarital settlement as her sepajrate property which she used to pay of her premarital
Tn relation to Respondent' Exhibit One, the Petitioner described business using "Inc."
and she knew it was a corporation yhen she typed up the agreement! She was aware that Mr.
Brough owned 100% of the shares and she was never issued anv shares of the corporation.
Concerning Respondent's Exhibit One, Kathy Brough stated at trial, "The fact is 1
don't v/ant and didn't want anything Jim had prior..." In relation to [Respondent's Exhibit One
the Petitioner said during cross examination that she was aware the business using "Inc" and she
knew it was a corporation when shd typed up the agreement. She was aware that Mr Brough
owned 100% of the shares and she was never issued any shares of the corporation.

0G0i07
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debts. 1 he Petitioner had separate four or five credit cards in her name. The Petitioner
had $3,000.00 in her separate accounts at the time of separation with the Respondent in
2O05.
9. After the marriage, thfc Respondent, Richard James Brough, maintained
separate, personal checking accounts in his name at Wells Fargo Bank and Mountain
America Credit Union.
10. The Petitioner and Rjespondent resided together prior to signing the premarital
agreement.
11. The Petitioner testified that she did not nave a motor vehicle prior to the
marriage. After, the Petitioner rleceived a settlement from her fourth husband which she
used the money to pay separate £>re-martial debts for her credit.cards.
12. The parties maintained separate accounts until separation and never comingled any funds which they received separately during the marriage in any jointi

checking or joint-savijtigs account.
13. The Petitioner never introduced any checks in evidence which proved any
i

expenditures which she actually |made to construct the residence in Neola, Utah that was
jointly titled in both parties nam£s.
14. The Petitioner spent ^noney on temporary landscaping at a local nursery for the
Neola residence which was not

cost to build and construct the residence.

15. The W-2s of the Petitioner which were received as Respondent's Exhibit Ten

\jv^

OiiulOS

o

state yearly income as a corporate employee of Brough Trucking and Crane Service Inc.
as follows:

-

'1

•—r

1

YEAR

i

2000

j

$10,640.00

|

2001

|

$8,880.00

1

2002

$7,680.00

j

|

2003

$6,876.00

|

|

2004

$10,588.50

1

2005 (year of separati k>

$4,765.60

TOTAL WAG^S, TIPS, OTHER COMP. |

i

16. The Petitioner kept ttfack of her hours worked as an employee during the time
she was employed by N.J. Trucking Inc. and/or Brough Tructdhg and Crane Service, Inc.
i
I
In the last part of her employment, a time-card system was implemented to keep track of
her hours as an employee. The petitioner never received any cneck for dividends or the
distribution of income. (See Respondent's Exhibit 18.)
17. Prior to the marriage] the Respondent, Mr. Brough, pwned a single family

j
residence at 19487 East River Rjoad, Duchesne County, Utah which was sold after the
marriage for approximately $114^,000.00.
18. The Respondent received a check of $24,702.84 which was deposited in his
account to construct the house iri Neola, Utah. (Respondent's Ejxhibit 15c and 35)
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19. In relation to the Duchesne procertv theR M „ A '
! ne property, the Respondent received a favorable tax
- r e s , and placed a

fct

^

on hjs

^

^

EaSt

River Road , D u c h e s n e ^
U ( a h ,o f m a n c e
was paid when the residence wa^s sold.
20. Prior t 0 the m a r n a g ^
- r r e d .0 as the j.andana ^

h

M

,

,

,

soM

^ ^

busjnes| equipmem

B r o u g h o w M d fiw

whlch

^

^

^

^

^ j

^
^

^

^

^

^

^^

^

Si 8,521.51. (Respondent's Exhibit 35)
2'. The Innds

from t h e

ja,e

Qf s e p a r a ( e p r o p e r t y w r e ) n t e n d e d

purchase .he real property for ,hfe r e s i d e n c e

fa

^

^ ^

^

^

^

UM

received the same month
"

-

Whe

" thC C ' 0 S i n ^ t 0 0 k P ' a « <f> ^ purchase of the property!

(Respondent's Exhibit 31)
22. Prior to the m arria g j , the NX Trucking I n c . o w n e f certain l i e n
^
free
,nc, u d i n g o i , d e r r i c k s ^

Mr

fiough

^

,

the

wh;ch

^

^

^

e,uipme„t a„d proceeds were 4ectly used to pay for construe on costs of the Neola
residence. (Respondent's Exhibit 15c and 39)
23. The Respondent a, a| , i m e s

is

fte s o l e

i !
0 W M r rf

J

^

^

^

Brough Trucking and Crane Service Inc and ». aii .
.1
( ico. Inc. and at all relevant fntes he held 100% of stock
in the corporation.
24. Prior in the ! 9 9 , s , t r j e

Respondem

^

.^

^

^

fa

^

^

Utah and made a business decision

to move his residence and jhe shop to the Roosevelt
area of Duchesne County, State 0f Utah.
!

\j
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t-rae-oard on May 8, 2005. (Respondent's Exhibit 18)
27. The Petitioner, exciufhng the pickup truck, had S3 4 29.00 more i„ J o m t
Person, proper, than a c q u i r e d , u r m g ^ ^

^ ^ ^

^

^

fiuled to adequately itemize the personal property.
-OnOetober15,2o08!aloanfrom2ionsbankmth^ountof$i6oooooo

"°

M n e d usms Neola

"

***- - —

debts of Brough Trucking a n d

Cfme
5

'

- M was used t0 pay business
" d ' h e ' W a t t o n has paid all of the

payments on the business loan. ,
» • The $260,000.00 loari was for . business pm>ose

^

.
ien Mr. Brough was laid
Mr

Respondent's Exhibit 9 ts the amortizatio„ schedule of the loan.
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^

up with a broken foot and the company was having difficulty operating. The Petitioner

i

I

signed the loan because she wa|s on the title to the property, j
i

30. The Respondent shduld be ordered to assume that loan and refinance the loan
i

j

i

I

within a reasonable time and to!hold the Petitioner harmless ftom that loan on the Neola
icsidence because the loan is a liability of the business.

j

31. At trial, the Respondent introduced exhibits which (indicated that the computer
!

contested in pretrial issues was burchased by a check from the!business. (Respondent's
Exhibit 22) The Petitioner to th^ judgment should pay the costb of copying the disk due to
j

i

the fact that the Respondent claimed was not a business asset ill the amount of $322.50.

i

|

(See Respondent's Exhibit 37) |
t

32. For the Tax year 2007, Brough Trucking & Crane Service, Inc. had one full

1

'

time employee, Doris Hyatt, a secretary.
33. For the year 2007, M(r, Brough's income from the business operation was

:

i

$61,370.00 and he personally pajid the income taxes on 100 % 6f the business income
based upon the Subchapter election filed by the business.

I

!

34. The Petitioner signed) a corrective deed changing thf title on the "Ballard" also
referred to as the "Pine Tech" property to reflect the intent of the parties that the
1

I

acquisition of that property was by Brough Trucking & Crane Service, Inc. (Respondent's

I

I

Exhibit 13) The Ballard property is a joint venture with Byron pibson and the trucking
i
i

company. The business venture commenced when the business istarted acquiring property

U b -w -l o <

OGuilZ

in20O4. The 80 acres in Ballajd is not maritaJ property and is subject to the prenuptial
agreement.
35, The Respondent, wilth the assistance of his daughters, assembled an accurate
accounting of substantially all of the costs to build the Neola residence which was not
contested by the Petitioner at trial. The source of funds was segregated as to each
checking account in which either the business or Mr. Brough personal account deposited
funds which were used to pay ttjie construction of the residency. 6 The Respondent aJso
traced the source of funds into tfie checking accounts set forth Jin Exhibit 15 by deposit
slips and other business records)7 (See Respondent's Exhibit l£)
36. The Petitioner contributed personal assistance, timfe and effort in building the
Neola Residence but did not contribute fluids. The Petitioner cfid not prove at trial any

6

Mr. Bough testified that Kathy Brough was never a s i g n a l on his personal checking
8
account identified in the accounting of Respondent's Exhibit 15.
7

Exhibit 15c and Exhibit 2\9 were identified at trial as deposit slips and other
memorandum corroborating the separate funds property deposited irito the separate accounts
These deposits include:
a. $30,000.00 from the sale bf the Duchesne Property from the buyers of $30 000 00
(See also Respondent's Exhibit 31):
'
b. A deposit on 05/01/2002 for sale of $10,810.82 for Jim's House (in Petitioner'
handwriting).
c. A deposit of$54,000.00 dn 05/01/2000 that was deposited (into the NJ truckin
account
d $50,000.00 for the sale of used oil field equipment owned for 15 years
e$30,000.00 from Chotaw for a Derrick purchased from the (business.
f. $5,000 Sale of used oil field equipment by cashier's check.
g, A deposit of $3,000 for oilfield equipment sold.
h A cashier's check in the amount of $30,0000 to Brough Tracking on 05/17/2001

0u0il3
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monelary amounts contributed to the construction of the residence of any separate funds.
3 7. As set forth in Respondent's Exhibit 15(a), (b) and| (c)the costs paid by the
business or Mr. Brough from a personal fund to construct Neojla residence are as follows:
I. Brough Trucking & Crane Service Inc.
(Checking laccount)
ii. N. J. Truckingj(checking account)
iii. Jim Brough, (personal checking account)
TOTAL

$166,373.89
$86,559.12
$73318.10
$326,251.11

38. The premarital and separate property of the Respondent was used to construct
the Nfeola residence and the totall costs and expenses contributed by the Respondent from
his premarital or separate funds lexceeds the present market Value of the Neola residence.
39. The Petitioner is noi [entitled to alimony and she admitted during her
deposition that she resided with iNed Ross prior to this trial and she was self sufficient
and could pay her expenses.
40. A.fter the marriage, the Petitioner continued to receive an income from Brough
Trucking and Crane Service Inc.* which she deposited in her separate accounts at Zions
Bank and Mountain America Credit Union.
41. The Petitioner testified at trial that she was financially able to make at least
$7,000.00 in payments prior to tljie time of trial to her attorney. In addition, after the time
of separation, the Petitioner was jaot paying rent since March 2007 and she was buying a
double wide trailer for $10,000.0,0 to place free of charge on hef Mother's property.
42. The Petitioner's attorney was accepting monthly payments on the continuing

10

000114

obligation for attorney's fees afld he Petitioner is able to contijnue to pay for her obligatior
for attorney's fees from her pre'sent income.
43. The Respondent incprred $3,798.75 to Randall Gkither, Attorney at Law, for
reasonable attorney's fees and qosts necessary to provide documents, other information
and to coordinate with the two appraisers concerning the business appraisals retained by
the Petitioner by Court order. (Respondent's Exhibit 28)
44, The Respondent's business incurred $8,672.08 in Expenses as set forth in
Respondent's Exhibit 8 which sets forth the expenses of Amaijda Hansen and/or Kristy B.
Claybum, employees of Brough Trucking and Crane Service Ihc. in assembling material
and assisting in Court ordered appraisals of the business equipment. This is an
unnecessary costs which is a facjtor in requiring the Petitioner t!o assume and pay her own
attorney's fees and costs.
45. The expert witness, $rad Townsend, was selected by the Petitioner and her
attorney to act as her expert durijng trial. The appraiser in his report stated that he was
unable to determine a value for N.J. Trucking, Inc. at the time (bf the marriage.
(Respondents Exhibit 40) Brad Townsend's total bill was $12,j707.00 and he testified that
he had been paid by Mr. Bough for a retainer on October 26, 2Q07 for $2,500.00 and
received a check on August 24, 2007 in the amount of $2,918.C|5. In June 2008 Mr.
Brough paid $1,500.00 for the appraisal by equipment appraiser, Ron Liese.8
8

On August 6, 2008, counsel for the Respondent recived an invoice for $7,563.46 from
Norman, Townsend &Johnson,LLC.
11
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46. The appraiser, Brad Townsend, did not find that there was any good will over
the basic value of the equipmerit after receiving extensive accounting information and
financial information supplied tjo him by the Respondent.9
47. The expert, Brad Tolwnsend, testified that there was no enhanced value of the
income stream of the business in excess of the amount to pay for the services of the
owner/proprietor in providing services in the business.
48. The basis for valuation was the value of the sale ofjthe equipment which was
an enhanced book value based Upon an equipment appraisal b^ Ron Liese. Mr. Liese was
retained only after the appraisaljby Brad Townsend which used traditional techniques for
economic valuation of a small business and indicated that there was no value in the
business except the value in thejused equipment and assets.
49. Irregardless of the prenuptial agreement, the value jof the business does not
exceed the value of the services !pf Mr. Brough and would not be subject to any

9

Brad Townsend testified that Mr. Brough made all payments even though retained by
Kathy Brough. Information came through Respondent's information. He indicated that the
returns on investment by net income had lower value than value of tangible assets which sit idle.
He indicated that in May 2008 he reached a determination after reviewing the books that there
was no good will in business over (tangible value of the assets. He indicated that income stream
fair return for value of owner for fafir salary for his work effort no additional return on assets
base. Brad Townsend's opinion of ^ fair salary for Mr. Brough including quantify generated
income, adjusted for the payment o{f directly out of business for personal expenditures:
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

$15,000
$57,000
$40,000
$ 25,000
$53,000
12
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ii stribution in these proceedings.10
50. At the trial, the Petitioner did not object to the specific accounting set forth in
Respondent's Exhibit 15 which demonstrated that the costs ofbuilding the Neola
residence came from either the premarital business assets oftrfe Respondent or from the
Respondent's separate property,1 in his personal checking account.
51. Based upon the appraisals received concerning the real property, the Court
finds that the Neola Residence was valued at the time of separation and at the time of trial
ai approximately $320,000.00 which was less than costs contributed to build and
construct the residence by Mr. Brough.
52. The Petitioner never .accounted for the value of any! joint personal property and
only testified as to the lists prepared by the Respondent. Based upon the evidence at trial
and the fact that the Petitioner was allowed by the Respondent,to use a horse trailer to
make several trips to remove personal property when she separated, each party should be
found to have in their possession at the time of trial an equal arhount of joint marital
property.
53. As to attorney's fees,) the Petitioner incurred a substantial amount of attorney's
e

es in relation to her claims asserted at trial concerning her clajim to the business and the

Respondent prevailed on the issue of a valid prenuptial agreement.
the • H'
° a n b e n ° g ° 0 d Wil1 i n a b u s i n e s s t n a t is dependent for its existence upon
individual who conducts the enterprise and would vanish wfere the individual to die,
ire or quit work." Stevens vs. Stevens, 754 P.2d at 956 (citing Jackson v. Caldwell, 18
Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667, 670 (11966)).
13
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54. The Petitioner testified that at the time of trial she was residing with her
mctherrent free and had the ability to save sufficient funds tojpurchase a new residence
for herself and the sum of $7,0()0.00 would have been sufficient but for the business
claim in these divorce proceedings.
55. The Petitioner was employed and her monthly inccjme at the time of trial
exceeded her expenses.

PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. In considering the equitable factors traditionally used by the courts in
distributing property in a divorcfe proceedings, the Court has taken into account the
relevant facts that both parties Were married and divorced multjiple times prior to this
marriage, both parties had children from prior marriages, the advanced age of the parties
at the time of marriage, and the position of each party prior toflhemarriage. In light of
the marriage of six years prior to separation, where no children! were born and in which
the couple was married later in life, the court should attempt tojrestore the parties to their
premarital status.
2. The notarized prenuptfal agreement dated July 9, 199J8 is a valid and
enforceable contract.
3. Under the prenuptial agreement, the ownership interest of Richard James
Brough of N.J. Trucking Inc. which was changed by name only! to Brough Trucking and

14
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Crane Service, Inc. during the rparriage is not subject to distribution during these divorce
proceedings to the Petitioner based upon terms of the prenupti'al agreement.
4. Further, even if the business interest was subject to distribution, the Petitioner
failed to show by adequate evidence that there was any good vWll or enhanced value to the
business after the marriage over and above the value of the senvices of Mr. Brough,
5. The income, profits, sind the liability including the loan to Zions Bank secured
by the Neola residence, of the business are excluded from distribution to the Petitioner by
the prenuptial agreement. The Respondent should be ordered to refinance the loan on the
Neola residence within a reasoniable period of time and the Petitioner should be held
harmless therefrom,
6. The property in Ballard, Utah is a business asset owr)Led by Brough Trucking
and Crane Service, Inc. as was demonstrated when a Corrected Deed was voluntarily
signed and acknowledged by the Petitioner placing the property in the name of the
business entity. Therefore, the property is within the scope of the premarital agreement.
7. During the course of t^e marriage the parties acquired certain personal effects
such as recreational vehicles, telbvision sets and furniture which were intended to be
joint-marital purchases by the parties and the jointly purchasedlproperty are not included
within the terms of the prenuptial agreement.
8. The property in Neola, Utah was placed in joint names and therefore the
Petitioner has a legal interest by virtue of in the Deed which w$s executed after the

15
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in arriage which indicated a joinjt-marital interest in the real property.
9. The residence in Neola, Utah was purchased and constructed us'
lng the

Premaritaj

and separate funds of the Respondent as accounted for in Respondent'* n .
Exhibit 15.
was no proof at trial that there was any enhanced or increased value over

There

of constructing the residence by the Respondent's separate funds Th
' ' nerefore > *e Neola
residence should be awarded to the Respondent free and clear of an
y clai
ms by the
Petitioner and the Petitioner shojuld be required to execute all necess
a i y docui
nents to
transfer that interest.
10. Based upon the reservation of the allocation of costs hv *u
°y the court, the
Petitioner should be required to pay all of the costs and expenses '
£
d in these divn
ce
proceedings to determine valuation of Brough Trucking and Cfa c .
erVlCe Ir
> *c. to
reimburse the Respondent for al| out of pocket costs made nrinfc. * •
Pr"*'o,na,inrelat.o
valuating the assets of the corporation and hold him harmless the
11. It is equitable under Hhe facts and circumstances of fk
e

case that each
assume and pay their own attorney's fees and costs, excent th ,*»
" Party
Ptthe
Petiti 0ner s h Q u
responsible for the amount of $3,798.75 in appraisal oreani™gm2a

tafeesto

Gaither, Attorney at Law, and the Respondent is entitled to a J ' d
Sment i n ^
12. The Respondent's business incurred $8 67? n» •
' ,UK l n Sensesa a , 0
„

«S Set

Exhibit 8 the Itemization of expenses of Amanda Hansen and/ '
employees of Brough Trucking 4nd Crane Service Inc. in ass
•

am

ount

f}wL

in

'
ateria

ayburn

'

l and
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assisting in Court ordered appraisals and this is a factor in determining that the Petitioner
pa^y for her own attorney's fees ;and costs. The Respondent prevailed on the execution of
the premarital agreement and thjis is a factor in requiring the Petitioner to pay her own
attorney's fees and costs.
13. The costs and expenses of the valuation by the expejrt, Brad Townsend, were
unnecessary in light of the fact that any value that he found was based upon the
equipment appraisal by a third party and using the Property Tax Assessment from public
records.
14. It is equitable to require the Petitioner, in light of the prenuptial agreement to
assume and pay any of the costs; of the appraisal, which she requested including the two
business appraisals and a Judgement shall be entered requiring! the Petitioner to reimburse
all of the costs of the Respondent which has paid to Brad Townsend and Ron Liese.
15. It is equitable that each party assume and pay the costs of the real estate
appraisals of the Neola, Utah property which was received intb evidence and no
judgement should be awarded for those costs.
16. It is equitable in light of the Court*s consideration Qf the evidence that each
party should be awarded the personal property presently in their possession.
17. The Petitioner should be ordered to assume and pay! the debt owed on the 2001
Blue Dodge pickup truck in the amount of $4,557.14 as of June 10, 2008 to Mountain
America Credit Union, (Respondent's Exhibit 14)

17

000121

0u

^ -1-

• 8. The Respondent'. premarita, assets were not co-raing,ed w i ( h

^

proper, and he maintained theh, as separate entities, exeep, ft* t h e N e o ] a J

*

v*,ch has no vaiue over and above the premarita, and separate assets traced

^
y lnto

he constru ction of the residence.
19. The Respondent should be awarded a Judgment in f h.
gnient m the amount 0 f
casts ,n reiaUon to the business asset, the computer, taken by the P e t l t i o n e r
20. Tne Respondent should be awarded all costs to be

$322

s ^ J ^
P St

Judgment Affidavit.

°
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fatness obiiga,io„s upon divorce The sne.T
'""
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•
specific naming of the (,„„•
consideration of the hold harness from h •
" ^ *e
eSS fr0m b u s i
"«s debts reinforces th, , f
* "" «
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1 * * , rnc, the Cass Store d
"
W PerS na
properties of the Respondent.
° ' ° r famiI *

^
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In Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 161 Utah Adv. Rep. (Ct App 1991) the
Court stated the facts as follows;
The Rudmans were marrlied on April 18, 1981. Both palrties had previously been
married and divorced. At the time of the marriage, Mrsj Rudman had been
receiving $1,100 per mopth in permanent alimony frorrj her former husband. Part
of Mr. Rudman's premarital property included several rhovie theaters in three
states, two condominiums, and a cabin. Prior to the marriage, Mrs. Rudman's
counsel prepared a prenijptial agreement, which the parkies signed on April 15,
1981. The agreement stajted that each party relinquished all claims and interest to
property the other had aqquired prior to the marriage a4d that such property could
not be deemed a marital asset following the marriage, t h e agreement was "not
intended and does not apply to any property which is accumulated by the parties
either individually or joihtly following the marriage of jthe parties."
The court found that Mrj. Rudman's premarital asset*; were not commingled
with marital property, land that he maintained themj as separate entities,
including those that were improved through expansion or remodeling. Thus,
under the parties' prenupjtial agreement, the loan receivables were properly
characterized as premarital assets, as were the condominiums and the cabin.
Mrs. Rudman contends the trial court erred in interpreting the prenuptial
agreement. She argues tljiat the agreement specifies that any interest and
appreciation accruing to [premarital property after the marriage becomes marital
property. Mrs. Rudman also claims the court abused! its discretion in failing to
find that she contributed labor and/or assets to his premarital property, thus
converting it to marital property, Specifically, she cljaims the court abused its
discretion by failing to find that she assisted Mr. Rudmjan in the operation of his
business by helping to "remodel, clean, vacuum, paint,|run errands, make and hang
drapes, purchase and prepare food... and work as a ticket taker," thus converting
those businesses to marital property. She claims the cojjrt abused its discretion in
failing to find that she irhproved and furnished the condominiums and the cabin,
resulting in those propeitties becoming commingled intp the marital estate. She also
claims the court abused its discretion in finding that lo^ns made to various
business entities operating Mr. Rudman's theaters were due to Mr. Rudman alone,
rather than to the marital estate. Mrs. Rudman claims that improper exclusion and
improper valuation of this property reduced the marital estate by $472,589.

19
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In Rudman, the trial court found that a fair reading of the agreement clearly
separated premarital property from property accumulated after the marriage. The trial
court also found that, under the agreement, any premarital property, together with any
interest or increase, would remain the property of the owner, ahd any property acquired
after the marriage would be marital, "less that amount utilized (for its acquisition that can
be traced to a point prior to the iinarriage.n The Court of appealjs stated:
We find no error in the trial court's legal interpretation of the document. Under the
terms of the prenuptial agreement, where each party relinquished all rights to
previously acquired property of the other party, he or she would also have no right
to any increase in value or additional earnings that mighlt accrue to that property.
Likewise, any property acquired by the parties after the marriage would accrue
earnings into the marital estate. Additionally, if any amq>unts used to acquire
property during the marriage could be traced to premarital property, those amounts
would remain the separate property of that individual Thus, to preserve the
premarital integrity of an asset that has been arguably commingled with property
acquired after the marriage, that asset, or its severable part, must be traced to its
original source.

In Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving Co. v, Blomquist, 112 P.2d 1382 (Utah
1989) the Court indicated that a resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent is
permissible only if the contract document appears to express the parties1 agreement
incompletely or if it is ambiguous in expressing that agreement. Here, the Petitioner's
comment that about what Mr. Brough's description of the premarital agreement was is
irrelevant.
The Respondent respectfully submits that the premarital agreement should be
enforced in these proceedings.
20
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POINT II
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE ANY CO-MINGLING OF SEPARATE
PROPERTY.

In Utah, marital property is ordinarily divided equally between the divorcing
spouses and separate property, which may include premarital assets, inheritances, or
similar assets, will be awarded to the acquiring spouse. Olsen y. Ohen> 169 P.3d 765
Utah App. 2007) In the recent decision in Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476,
20O8 UT App 11 (Utah App. 01/10/2008), the Court stated:
The Utah Supreme Couft has determined that when .one party in a divorce
proceeding uses separate property to purchase a marital home, that party is
entitled to the equity in the home that resulted from his or her investment. See
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987) (upholding trial court's
ruling that the wife should receive credit for her inheritejd separate property that
she invested in the partie^ home during the marriage). Bjut [t]he rule that property
acquired by gift or inheritance by one spouse should be ^warded to that spouse . . .
does not apply when the property thus acquired is consuhied, such as when a gift
or an inheritance of money is used for family purposes; ivhen the property
completely loses its identity and is not traceable because! it is commingled with
other property . .. ; or whfen the acquiring spouse places !title in their joint names in
such a manner as to evidence an intent to make it marital property. Mortensen v.
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304J307 (Utah 1988) (citations omjitted).
The trial court treated the $81,000 of equity in the Family Home as Wife's separate
property to compensate her for the $90,000 of her inheritance used to improve that
asset, Although we are unable to evaluate the overall proiperty settlement because
of the lack of findings on value, the recognition of Wife's separate property interest
in the improvements to the Family Home was within the!trial court's broad
discretion.

In Cox v. Cox 877 P.2d 1262 (Ut Ct. App 1994), the Court recognized equitable factors
21
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relevant to equitable factors to this proceedings. The Court stated:
Where the marriage is of short duration, where no children were born and
where the couple was married later in life, a trial cojurt may properly attempt
to restore the parties to; their premarital status. See,je.g,, Georgedes v.
Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44,:45 (Utah 1981) (trial court dicj not abuse discretion to put
parties to short second marriage back into sole ownership of premarital properties);
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980} (where husband was 73
and wife was 68 at time <&f marriage, and where marriage was short, trial court did
not abuse discretion in awarding premarital home to wife even though she deeded
it in joint tenancy to husband).
In addition, a trial court ijiay properly consider other factors relating to distribution
of premarital property including the amount and kind o£ property to be divided;
whether the property was acquired before or during the jmarriage; the source of the
property; the health of the parties; the parties' standard 6f living, respective
financial conditions, needs, and earning capacity; the diiration of the marriage; the
children of the marriage, the parties' ages at time of the marriage and of divorce;
[and] what the parties gave up by the marriage. Hogue % Hogue, 831 P.2d 120,
122 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Burke v. Burke, 733 Piid 133, 135 (Utah 1987)).

In Cox, the Wife claimed, the trial court erred in finding ithat appreciation on the
house was not due to her remodeling efforts. The Court affirmed the trial court in its
memorandum decision which determined that once Husband's and Wife's expenditures
were deducted from the $105,000.00 value of the house, the residence had not materially
appreciated.
As to the scope of the agreement, in Berman v, German 749 P,2d 1271,(Ct
App. 1988) the Court of Appeals stated:
i

Plaintiff argues that the antenuptial agreement only concerned the defendant's
business assets, not the ho.use, because the only asset specifically mentioned in the
agreement was the billiard business. Defendant argues that the agreement means
exactly what it says and exempts " real and personal property," including the
22
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house, from inclusion in the marital estate. The house should have been preserved
as the separate property of defendant. We find the trial court erred when it did not
include the house in the antenuptial agreement.
At trial, the Petitioner testified that the parties kqpt their finances
"separate". However, in the closing arguments at trial, the attorney for the Petitioner
claimed that there was some type of a "marital pot" implying that there had been some comingling of funds during the course of the marriage and the court should in some manner
limit the premarital contract.
However, an objective review of the evidence will show that each party maintained
separate checking accounts and credit cards. For example, the Petitioner indicated that
after the marriage she received some separate money from a prior divorce which she
placed in here separate checking account and paid personal expenses on her separate
credit cards from her personal account. The evidence concerning the fact that she kept
hours, received W2 forms and received corporate checks and deposited those checks into
her separate checking account prove the opposite of co-minglirig of funds by the parties.
Mr. Brough sold business assets and property he owned prior to the marriage and placed
them in separate checking accounts.
In relation to the evidence of landscaping and doing some work on the Neoia
residence, see Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 329 (Utah App.2007), the court stated:
Husband next argues that the trial court misunderstood or misapplied
the law in determining that the appreciation on the real property was Wife's
separate property, as opposed to marital property subject to an equal
division among the parties. Husband does not dispute th&t the real property
23
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was purchased from Wife's premarital funds and, thus, >vas initially Wife's
separate property. Nor does he dispute that any appreciation on Wife's
separate property would also be considered Wife's separate property.
Husband appears to argue, however, that events within the marriage
converted this separate property into marital property.
Premarital property loses its separate identity and becomes a part of
the marital estate if "(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense
contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property,
thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been
consumed or its identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where
the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the other
spouse." Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405,^20, 147 P.3d 464 (quoting
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988)).
We are not persuaded by Husband's arguments that his purported
efforts-including doing some tile work in the home andj "supervising"
landscaping and home theater installation-were sufficidnt to obtain an
equitable interest in the home. Instead, we agree with tlje trial court that
"[Wife] kept the asset separate" and that the facts do not support a finding
that "[Husband] made any contribution to the house" otfyer than possibly a
monetary contribution toward landscaping and tile—a portion of the one
deposit made into Wife's separate account-for which the court ordered
reimbursement to Husband.

The Petitioner did not prove the separate property has been consumed or its
identity lost through commingling or exchanges.

POINT III

EACH PARTY SHOULD ASSUME AND PAY THEIR OWN ATTORNEYS FEES
AND THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PAY AND REIMBURSE
THE COSTS OF THE EXPERTS.
From the commencement of this action, the Respondent has been faced with an
24
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expensive appraisal process. When the report was finished right before tr"
lal

> ^ e expert
witness fees totaled approximately $17,000.00. These pretrial costs were i
because the Petitioner choose litigation to disregard her signed agreement
substantial business interest in the business, going to far as to obtain an T D ^
n l
K-O as to
business.

a
the

At trial, the expert Brad Townsend indicated that there was not « «,
r
.
Efficient g r o u n d s
A
u
to determine any enhanced value of the corporation during the mania e
"etitiorier
who was familiar with the one man business, chose to litieate at ^ .
S eat great cost to attempt
obtain an interest subject to that agreement when she should h™. u
known there W a s n o
value to distribute. A graphic example of this point is the fact that
brote his foot the business had to borrow funds on the Neola resid
Since the Petitioner drastically increased the costs and PV n 0
Expenses of this legal action
by making a claim for a substantial portion of the Respondents u •
P
' S b U 8 l n e s s and business
assets. The Petitioner should be pay the costs. Concerning th*.** • .
g
adm,mstra
« ° n of j u s t i c e
in all divorce cases, it is not sound policy to allow with a party th •
a S l g n e d a re
. u u
P marital
agreement to require the other spouse to advance substantial co
s a
nd expenses to the
allow the spouse to attempt to "swing for the fence" The R
espondent prevailed on the
business issues and the Petitioner should pay for the pvn^o- ;.
expensive litigation costs of
ot her
experts.
nerown
The Respondent respectfully submits that in this sDecitt •
P l l l c Nation the factors
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require the Petitioner pay her own attorneys fees as well as the costs of the attempt to
prove a business interest. The Court should take into account tie fact that Mr, Brough
was required to pay extra business costs, lose of time to coordinate the appraisal, expend
employee expenses, accounting fees and substantial attorneys fees. These costs accrued
up until the expert announced his decision on the day before trial that there was no
goodwill, no enhanced value or value over the return of Mr. Brough for his services and
expertise. In light of the valid prenuptial agreement it is equitable that the Petitioner
reimburse the Respondent for any attorney's fees and costs, including mailing costs,
i

incurred in preparing and organizing documents and information delivered to the experts
for appraisals of the business of $3,798.75. The Respondent should be awarded of all
costs of this action.

DATED this 8th day of August, 2008.

ILL GAITJ
Attorney for th^Respondent
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FAX/MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF tAW AND
MEMORANDUM was faxed and mailed to:

CLARK B.ALLRED
.
ALLRED & MCCLELLAN, P.C.
/
72 NORTH 300 EAST
si _ Q
ROOSEVELT, UTAH 84066
7(k^
FAX: (435) 722-3928

_

^

^

DATED this 2)
7_) _ day
day of
of AMSh
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ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
72 North 300 East (123-14)
Roosevelt, Utah 84 06 6
Telephone: (435) 722-3928
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

KATHRYN C. BROUGH,
Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO:
1. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
2. OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
3. MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER
4. MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGEMENT

vs.
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,
Respondent

Civil No. 054000084 DA
Judge John R. Anderson

Petitioner submits the following memorandum in opposition to the
following motions submitted by Respondent:
1.

Motion for New Trial

2.

Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

3.

Motion for Relief from Judgement and Order

4.

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgement

Petitioner is submitting one memorandum rather than a separate
memorandum for each motion since the arguments and issues raised in

000133

ULu501

each motion are essentially the same, and multiple memoranda would,
therefore, be duplicative.
BACKGROUND
Trial was held in this case on July 9, 2008. Petitioner and her
witnesses testified that, during the marriage, she remodeled the
Duchesne house, built living quarters in the Roosevelt shop where the
parties lived, supervised the construction of the Neola house and
completed

the

construction

when

the

Respondent

ran

off

the

contractor, raised the Respondent's two teenage children, prepared
the meals and cared for' the home and also worked in the business
helping enhance its growth and prosperity. She cosigned on loans and
put what money she had into the properties. That evidence was not
rebutted. Respondent

claimed all the assets were his premarital

assets or were acquired with premarital assets. However, the evidence
showed that there was debt on premarital assets such as the Duchesne
home and the Bandana Ranch property which debt was paid with marital
funds, that any monies from the sale of assets were commingled and
used to pay operating expenses, that numerous assets had been added
to Brough Trucking and the nature of the business had changed thru
the efforts of both parties, and that assets such as the Ballard
property and the Neola home were jointly acquired and jointly titled.
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Respondent was unable to trace any alleged premarital monies or
assets to present assets.
Both parties submitted pretrial briefs and both parties argued
the case at the conclusion of the trial. Petitioner's position was
that assets had been acquired during the marriage and/or improved,
changed
equally.

and enhanced
Respondent's

during

the marriage

position

was

that,

and

should

despite

be

the

divided

years

of

marriage, the raising of his children and the Petitioner's working to
improve and enhance assets, everything belonged to him and Petitioner
should get nothing and, in fact, should pay for the costs of the
appraisals and Respondent's costs and fees incurred in responding to
discovery.
The Court took the case under advisement and asked each party to
submit, by August 8th, proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law and a decree of divorce for the Court's consideration. Both
parties submitted

their versions prior to or on August

8th. The

Court, apparently after reviewing those documents and doing such
additional research and analysis as it felt proper, agreed that the
Petitioner's proposed documents were consistent with the evidence and
the law and signed them on August 28, 2008.
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1.
The procedure of having each party submit proposed
findings and a decree is customary practice in Utah courts
and was appropriate.
Respondent's primary complaint is that the Court did not adopt
his proposed findings and decree. As pointed out in State v. James,
858 P. 2d 1012, 1015

(Utah Ct. App. 1993), where the court signed

findings prepared by the state, "the trial court may request counsel
to submit proposed findings."1 Those findings will be affirmed unless
the

record

deliberate
authority

shows
and

"'that

consider

omitted).

the

trial

the merits

Unless

the

judge
of

record

failed

to

adequately

case 7 ". Jd.

the
shows

"that

the

(Quoted
findings

[signed by the court] don't reflect the judge's view, the appellate
court

'must

assume

that

he

found

them

satisfactory

in

all

particulars.'" Id. (Quoted authority omitted). "Findings prepared by
counsel for a prevailing party and adopted verbatim by a trial court
are considered to be those of the trial court and may not be rejected
out-of-hand, but they will stand if supported by evidence." Id.
In Automatic Control Products v. Tel-Tech, 780 P.2d 1258 (Utah
1989) , the trial judge, at the conclusion of the trial, took the case
under advisement, allowed both parties to submit memoranda and later

i

See also Whitear v. Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 982, 986 (Utah
1998) (stating that it is common practice in Utah for the trial
court to have counsel submit proposed findings).
4
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requested

both parties

conclusions

of

law.

to submit proposed

The

court

signed

findings

the

of

defendant's

fact

and

proposed

documents and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that the court had
mechanically adopted the findings prepared by counsel for Tel-Tech.
The appellate court ruled that

"there is no indication from the

record here that the trial judge failed to adequately deliberate and
consider the merits of the case." Id. at 1260. The plaintiff also
complained (as Respondent does in this case) that it was not notified
of the court having signed the findings. The appellate court rejected
that argument, stating:
Nor was there any error in the failure of the trial court
to notify ACP's counsel promptly after he had signed his
findings of fact and conclusions of law and the judgment.
Our rules do not require the court to give notice but put
the burden on counsel to check periodically with the clerk
of the court as to the date of entry of the findings and
judgment so that post-trial motions may be timely filed.
Id.
2 . The evidence fully supports the Findings of Fact signed
by the Court.
Respondent also alleges that certain findings are not supported
by

the

evidence.

The

following

are

the

findings

challenged

by

Respondent and the name of the witness(es) whose testimony supports
those findings.
Finding No. 5 is supported by the unchallenged testimony of
Petitioner.
5
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Finding No. 8 is supported by the testimony of Petitioner,
Respondent and Brad Townsend, as well as numerous exhibits relating
to

the

checking

accounts,

the

appraisal

and

the

loan

for

the

$160,000.00.
Finding No. 12 is supported by the testimony of Petitioner and
her son and was not challenged.
Finding No. 14 is supported by the testimony of Petitioner and
Respondent and by exhibits including the deed, closing statement and
check.
Finding No. 18 is supported by the appraisal by Mr. Barneck, the
deed and the testimony of both Petitioner and Respondent.
Finding No. 2 0 is supported by the testimony of Respondent,
especially on cross-examination, and the exhibits demonstrating that
the monies from the sale of assets went to pay operating costs, not
to acquire the home or other assets.
Finding No. 21 is supported by the exhibits regarding the sale
of the Bandana Ranch, the documents regarding the purchase of the
Neola property and the cross-examination testimony of Respondent.
Finding No. 22 is supported is supported by the testimony of
Respondent on cross-examination and the exhibits regarding the sale
of the Duchesne shop and the checking account records.

6
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Finding No. 23 is supported by the documents regarding the sale
of the rig, the documents regarding the construction of the home and
the checking account and the testimony of the parties.
Finding No. 24 is supported by the testimony of Petitioner, the
testimony of Respondent and the documents regarding the sale of the
home.
Finding No. 33 is supported by the affidavit of fees and the
testimony

at the trial by counsel

for Petitioner which was not

rebutted.
Finding No. 34 is supported by the testimony of Petitioner and
her financial statement exhibit.
Finding No. 35 is supported by the testimony of Respondent and
the pleadings.
3.

The award of fees is supported by the evidence.

Respondent

also

complains

about

the

Court's

awarding to

Petitioner her attorney fees incurred. Primarily, he contends that
the Court did not deduct fees she had managed to pay on her bill.

In

making that complaint, Respondent misunderstands or ignores the law
on this issue.

The trial court has discretion as to whether to award

fees and the amount of fees.

Arnold v. Arnold, 2008 UT App 17, Ijll.

The Court should make findings on the financial need of the receiving
spouse, the ability to pay by the payor spouse and the reasonableness

7

of the fees. Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, flO. There is no
requirement that the Court deduct fees a party may have paid. In this
case, the Court made findings on those required issues. See findings
of fact 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35 and conclusions of law 12 and 13.
4. Respondent's claims of prejudice, that the judgment is
excessive, that the Court did not address the prenuptial
agreement and did not make findings on separate property is
without merit and not supported by any facts, the law or
the findings signed by the Court.
Respondent also alleges that the Court's decision was under the
influence of prejudice and the award was excessive. He makes that
assertion without any sustaining facts. The Court rejected his greedy
and unsupported position that he was entitled to everything, despite
the parties' years of marriage, the Petitioner's years of work to
improve the Duchesne house and the Roosevelt shop and to build the
Neola

property,

the

Petitioner's

raising

of

his

children,

the

Petitioner's providing of cooking, cleaning and housekeeping, the
Petitioner's

working

in the

trucking

business,

the

Petitioner's

acquiring debt personally and putting her own funds into the home,
and the joint titling of assets. Respondent was unable to trace any
of his alleged premarital properties and the documents were contrary
to his position. The facts and the law fully support the Court's
decision to divide equally the assets acquired or enhanced during
this marriage.
8
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Respondent also makes the bold unsupported assertions that the
Court did not address the prenuptial agreement and his claims to
separate property. The findings of fact, the conclusions of law and
decree address each of those issues in detail, and those findings are
fully supported by the evidence. The Respondent's claims are without
merit.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that the Court deny the
post-trial motions submitted by Respondent.
DATED this

0^>^day of September^008 .
ALLREl/& MCCLELLAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner

9
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I, Carrie Weight, am employed by the office of ALLRED &
McCLELLAN, P. C. attorneys for Petitioner herein and hereby certify
that I served the attached RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS TO
SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES on Respondent by placing a
true and correct copy thereon in an envelope addressed to:
RANDALL GAITHER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
159 WEST 3 00 SOUTH BROADWAY #105
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States mail at Roosevelt, Utah, on the
day of September, 2008.

Carrie Weight
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DUCHESNE COUNTY; SEPTEMBER 25, 2 005
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON
(Transcriber's note: Speaker identification
may not be accurate with audio recordings)
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

We're on the record.

This is Brough vs,

Brough.
Gentlemen, I thought probably the thing to do to
expedite this, I understood there was some questions about my
handling the case.

I had asked each of you to prepare

findings, conclusions, and a decree and then I was going to
look them over and decide which one that I would sign and
that's all I did.

I didn't intend to write another decision or

make any amendments.

I furnished to you notes, findings of

fact, conclusions and a decree which I dictated to my secretary
in Vernal the day after this trial and if you'll read through
those there are some holes that are missing but basically you
can get the concept of what my thinking was.

If you read that

and go through that, you'll see that Mr. Allred's findings and
conclusions pretty much paralleled my own thinking and that's
the road that I took and that's why I executed his documents.
Now at this point I guess we better hear from counsel
and see if I can satisfy your questions.
Mr. Gaither?
MR. GAITHER:

Your Honor, I've seen this document
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(inaudible) went into the clerk's office and asked for the file
and so I've read and looked at this and I would submit there's
a substantial difference between Mr. Allred's and the Court's
findings and this does, I would submit support our position
that the judgment and decree should be set aside as being
mechanically adopted and if that was the Court's intention, as
I put in my affidavit, I had no idea that it was going to be, you were going to accept one or accept the other.
THE COURT:
MR. GAITHER:

I've never-

I thought I was pretty clear on that.
No, I don't - I guess the evidence

which shows what my position was is that I sent over a disk and
a letter saying if you need to use this because a lot of courts
do that, they'll take some findings from one party and some
from the other party and put it together.

So I was assuming it

was suppose to be we were going to state the case in the light
most favorable to each party and then the Court equitably
weighs it and issues a ruling and there was an indication that
the Court was going to issue a ruling.

So I was - I did not

submit it on that basis and I would submit that in light of the
confusion that's happened in this case, I received no notice —
THE COURT:
MR. GAITHER:
THE COURT:

Notice of what?
Well, there was no ruling.
After the trial I indicated that I wanted

you to prepare findings, conclusions and a decree and I could
pick one or the other or make one up somewhere in between.
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I

thought I was pretty clear on that.
MR. GAITHER:

I think - I listened to the tape, it

says you prepare proposed findings.

I don't think there was

language of decree as to my recollection but I didn't prepare a
decree because the decree I prepared was the Court indicated,
well, the parties are divorced so I prepared a decree of
divorce which was never entered and the parties aren't divorced
as they sit here today even though that should have been
entered about a month ago.

So there's been some substantial

procedural problems.
THE COURT:

Let's see if we can fix them today.

MR. GAITHER:

Well, I would like to and I would think

that the first step if I could and - can I make a suggestion?
THE COURT:

Sure.

MR. GAITHER:

That the divorce decree be set aside,

the one that was entered on September the 4th and that —
THE COURT:

I thought you told me the parties weren't

divorced?
MR. GAITHER:

You didn't divorce the parties, that

was a partial decree.
THE COURT:
MR. GAITHER:

Okay.
So I would suggest first is there is

sitting in the file and unsigned divorce decree which
bifurcates the issues, divorces the parties, reserves the
property issues and then we could set this for a hearing and
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then I would be happy to address these proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law of the - the rules provide that the
Court can consider those issues.

But the problem with the

divorce decree is it's putting a lot of pressure on my client.
He's down to 60 days to come up with over $300,000 and the way
that's drafted, he's had to make a contested election because
the way that counsel prepared it they only had 15 days from
that date.

So it's been very difficult for him to do that.

And one of the things, if the Court adopts some
findings, as far as the mechanics of the decree, it's my
position that this was done by petitioner's counsel for
petitioner's benefit and placed my client in a very difficult
situation and if the decree is set aside, I understand which
way the Court is leaning.

I believe that there are some errors

that can be shown to the Court and there's a ruling here, I
mean, as I read this one —
THE COURT:

Please understand that isn't a ruling,

that's just some notes to —
MR. GAITHER:
THE COURT:

Some notes, right.
- solidify my thinking from the day after

the trial.
MR. GAITHER:

I understand that and what I would

propose is that I be able to file some - we have a hearing on
the objections that I've made to the decree and to the findings
and I will try on behalf of my client to take this new tact of
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saying, okay, well, we're going to try - instead of trying to
object to everything, find the best shot that he has to try to
convince the Court of the equities of the situation which I
didn't do in the last one, and maybe we can do in the next one
and then the Court can then - I'll submit a proposed decree on
the property issue which I've never done and I'd like to be
able to produce something that would separate the house from
the business so that's it's possible he could do a partial
settlement of the house as opposed to the business, try to keep
those separate.

So I would move the Court to grant the Motion

to Set Aside the Decree of Divorce entered on September 4 and
set this matter for further hearing and I've got my calendar.
THE COURT:

Okay, the way this would normally work I

suppose would be after we hear from Mr. Allred, let me give it
some thought.

Let me find the decree you're talking about.

Was that the one Allred prepared?
MR. GAITHER:
THE COURT:
MR. GAITHER:

Yes, it was the one What's the date on that?
It's signed on August 29, entered on

September 4th.
THE COURT:

It's come to my attention also that the

personal property items from the evidence that I heard, there
wasn't too big of a dispute about those and I was going to
order that the parties either get those settled on their own or
go to mediation.

As I recall Mrs. Brough wasn't claiming a
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substantial amount of personal property.
MR. ALLRED:
something like that.

That was, I think Exhibit 24 or
Most of the stuff she had before they got

married.
THE COURT: Okay, I want to hear from Mr. Allred.
MR. ALLRED:

Your Honor, at the conclusion of the

trial, the Court indicated it was going to take the matter
under advisement.

Counsel for the respondent asked if the

parties could get divorced while it was under advisement and
the Court indicated, yes, and bifurcated it.

So I agree - and

Mr. Gaither did send shortly after the trial a proposed decree
to the Court.

I saw it, did not object to it.

All it did was

divorce the parties and the paperwork I prepared at the other
request made by the Court was that the parties submit by the
8th of August proposed findings, conclusions, I understood a
decree.

I drafted those shortly after the trial and submitted

those as requested by the Court as to counsel for the
respondent and the decree I furnished did indicate that the
Court had already entered an order divorcing the parties but
that's not been signed.

That probably needs to be done that

they need to get divorced.
I see no basis for the Court to set aside what has
happened here or to have more hearings.

We had a full date

trial, both parties submitted briefs before the trial that went
to their issues and then we had the trial and then the Court
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indicated what it wanted and it was my understanding, it's not
the first time the Court has asked for proposed decrees nad
findings or orders and findings and sometimes the Court will
agree with one or the other or do something in between and so I
drafted it so that I thought it was consistent with the
testimony, much of which was undisputed.
I've just barely seen what the Court has handed out
but just going through that quickly, it seems very consistent
with exactly what was drafted here.

Basically what we have

here is that the respondent says everything is mine, petitioner
doesn't get anything and not only that she ought to pay my fees
and costs.

Our position has been they'd been married 10 years,

my client remodeled his Duchesne house, she remodeled the
Roosevelt shops, she constructed the Neola home, she worked in
the trucking business as they built that up and was making
about $170,000 some odd when they married and was making
$800,000 when they separated and had significant more assets
and a name change and change of business.
in the increase and that.

So she was involved

She raised two of his children, did

all the homemaking, put whatever money she had into this family
and into the assets —
THE COURT:

Mr. Gaither, let me ask you a question.

Are the parties divorced or not?
MR. GAITHER:
THE COURT:

No.
You prepared a bifurcated decree
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divorcing them and Mr. Allred says he approved it and I don't
see it in the file.

So what —

MR. GAITHER:
a few minutes ago.

It's in the file.

It's there, I saw it

It's just not signed.

THE COURT:
MR. GAITHER:
THE COURT:

It's not been signed?
It's unsigned.
Okay, well that's an oversight on my part

probably.
MR. ALLRED:

It just needs to be done.

It's not a

big deal.
The facts again - all that was undisputed and I think
both the Court felt that as I look what the Court did here and
the documents I've put forth shows that and it's very
consistent with the case law.

There's a ton of cases that say

when parties work like that jointly even though he may have
kept the title in his name and other things, it becomes marital
property and all those are footnoted in the findings.
The argument, well, the Court can't mechanically
adopt the findings which is really the basis of the motions by
the respondent is the case law says that he has the burden to
show that the Court did that and the Court has pretty well made
it clear right here now that that didn't happen.

The Court

actually drafted out its thoughts the day after and I'm sure
read all the documents carefully and adopted those that were
consistent with the facts of what the Court decided.
8
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The respondent's got the burden and I don't think
there's anything to show that.

The findings that he listed as

not being supported, in the memo I've submitted went through
and listed the exhibits and the witnesses to support those
findings.

A lot of the findings that he objected to were his

own client's testimony on cross examination where he conceded
that, you know, they intermingled funds and they spent monies
for various things and monies he claimed for premarital things
were actually two years before the house was built or anything
like that and had been used in the business for other reasons.
A lot of the monies were used to support the family and support
the business for the year plus that he had a broken leg.
I don't see any reason for the Court to change
anything the Court has done.

I'd ask the Court just to sign

the bifurcated decree so they're divorced and be done with it.
I really object to counsel's new suggestion is that he be given
time to write some more motions and have another argument.
It's just time to move forward.

I don't know if the Court has

any question for me but what the Court has done is fully
supportable and very consistent with the facts and the law in
this case.

Thanks, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. GAITHER:

objections.

Okay.

Anything else, Mr. Gaither?

Your Honor, I haven't argued all the

That would take at least an hour, an hour and a

half but if you look at the finding, the potential finding, you
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indicated N.L. Trucking was worth $200,000 as of the date of
the marriage.

That hasn't been backed out of Mr. Allred's, so

there's a $200,000 difference between the decree you signed and
this document and so there is a substantial difference, it's
not the same and this document talks about the house value of
$312,000 where Mr. Allred took his $325,000 appraisal and
didn't take into - this is what I expected - a usual balancing
of the case and then —
THE COURT:
MR. GAITHER:
THE COURT:

I thought there was - there is a substantial difference.
- I thought you guys stipulated on the

value of the house?
MR. GAITHER:
THE COURT:
MR. GAITHER:

No.
Was there opposing There's two appraisals, one for $305

and that's why the day after you took the $305 and the $325 and
you split it down the middle which was a balancing and
equitable consideration of the case that I expected in ruling
that never came and now that we have this, Your Honor, I
suppose we need to have this marked as an exhibit.

I think

that in light of the problems that exist I would ask the Court
to just set aside the divorce decree.
divorce decree are very difficult.

The mechanics of the

It says my client has got

to come up with $385,000 which doesn't give him the value of
his premarital property and he's got to come up with that in 60
10
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days from now essentially because a month has gone by in a
financial market that's very difficult for him to borrow money
and at the very minimum there should be some equitable
situation and if the Court entered the findings, we should at
least have some input in the decree under Rule 7, that talks
about decrees, we're able to see that and what the Court did
here was adopt Mr. Allred's in total, his mechanical approach
which just favored his client and put the clamps on my client
in a very difficult situation and so I would request that there
be a hearing on my motion for a new trial, especially in light
of the fact that we've just seen this situation.

I think that

the rule for a new trial provide that the Court in an equitable
consideration like this can amend the findings but I would
submit that these are, by mechanically adopting and I found
cases that support my position, mechanically adopting one side
or the other in any civil case is in error and by doing it in a
divorce where there's got to be weighing and balancing on each
issue, on attorney's fees issues, on the house, on the business
and what's happened here is we've got the argumentative
position of counsel which the Court is adopting and I don't
believe that that's been fair.

It doesn't have the - I can

indicate to my client it does not have the appearance of
fairness and we would ask that the decree be set aside and so
there be no final judgment and order.

Otherwise we're in

another mess because we've got a final judgment and order that
11
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requires an election.

He's been forced to make that election

under protest but the time is running and so if we set this for
30 days down the road to give us a change to show the Court the
errors, there's also an error about the liabilities.

This

$160,000 that's owed on the house was never on the business and
if she's going to get the business, then she gets half that
$160,000 debt.

That's another $80,000.

So there's a $280,000

swing that the Court has never really considered but if we come
back in a month and then the Court denies it then he's without setting aside the divorce decree, he's still under the
gun, he's facing the gun of having to come up with $385,000
within 30 days and that's not fair.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I guess the parties having been

heard, let me indicate that when I reviewed both of your
proposed findings and conclusions I did not mechanically adopt
Allred's findings but they were consistent with my own
thinking.

The only reason I show you those notes from my

dictation the day after trial was just to show you where I was
and what I was thinking.

If Allred's findings vary somewhat

from those notes, that's fine.

When I reviewed his I totally

agreed with what he put down and how it was presented.

I'm

sorry that the time frames are not consistent with what's going
on.

I expect the attorneys could work something out on that,

given the situation that's before us but I'm not going to set
aside the findings and conclusions and the decree.

I will sign
12
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the decree divorcing the parties.

They will divorced today as

soon as my clerk enters it and I'm not going to - you know, if
you want to make a motion for a new trial I'll hear that but
I'm not going to set this aside and allow you to reargue the
case.

We already did that.
MR. GAITHER:

Your Honor, first order of business is

we need to make these findings I've been handed as part of the
record in this case.
THE COURT:

I don't know.

I guess I have no

objection to that but it wasn't intended to be part of the
court file when I prepared it.

So with that having been said,

if you want to make it an exhibit you're welcome to do that.
MR. GAITHER:
exhibit then.

All right, I'd like to make this an

At this time I'd offer Defendant's Exhibit 1

pending motion for a new trial.
THE COURT:

I'll receive it.

(Defendant's Exhibit 1 received)
MR. ALLRED:

And I just want to (inaudible) I assume

the record has the Court's comments on the purpose of that?
THE COURT:

Yeah.

I don't want the record that goes

to the Court of Appeals to have anyone say that this is a
proposed ruling.

All it is is a matter of formulation of

present thought impressions the day after the trial and I
dictated those in some hurry and I didn't intend them to be
actual final conclusions of decree.

I just wanted to recall in
13
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my own mi nd what I was thinking and I only offer this Exhibit 1
I I a • r j i ig r e^ r j evie d the c o n c ep t o f th a t

a s e / i d e i i c e c f 11 1 a f

Exhibit. 1 and reading Mr. Allred'' s pleadings that he filed, I
found them to bo consistent in 1erms of my thinking and
weighing

I h<

jm I. i o.

" >, 1 ,jnrpr

v

i " ,• << >

mnfusf^d

about my ruling and why 1 did it, that's why 1 did it.
ME. GAITHER:
not t T \\r

f

Well, Your Honor, you've just - that's

that' s i 10 t: correct

between those two.

Tl lere i s <\ >. 'fu i , i n n i 11 i f f e n n c r

In the one that ynn

indicated you said the

] -jsiness was worth $200,000 before the marriage.
cidid it was - didn't account tor I I M L
$200,000 difference.

i, n ,111111

Hi

Allred

1I1 11 " < 1

So for the Court to state that they are

essr»mt i,j 1 1 ' l lie same is not a correct statement and —
THE COURT:
in f r o n t o f m e .

Maybe it isn' t :

I d:i dn' t he iv« > 1 .1 le 1 "c score]

I'm just g o i n g o f f t h e t o p of m y h e a d .

M R , i;MTHF,P*

And 1 hm*. f i h d

,i M o t i o n f-n

1 New

T r i a l a n d is t h e C o u r t d e n y i n g t h e M o t i o n for a N e w Liial.
THE COURT:

Y e s , I wid 1.

Mil- , 1 lAITUEb ,

ml 1

Iht

tt ilnnyinn tin' M o t i o n to

Amend and Correct the findings of tact?
THE COURT.

„ j , I thought I was pretty clear on

t t ia1 :.

MR. GAITHER:

And let me make sure what other motions

I have pending.
THE COURT:

I' 11 give yoi 1 tl le address of tl le C01 irt of
14
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Appeals if you want.
MR. GAITHER:

I know the address.

I have a notice of

appeal right here, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. GAITHER:

All right, I filed objections to

findings of fact and conclusions of law and I've supported
those with a memorandum.

I prepared this (inaudible) with oral

argument.
THE COURT:

Yeah, I've read those.

MR. GAITHER:
THE COURT:

All right.

Is the Court denying those?

Yes.

MR. GAITHER:
THE COURT:

I filed a Motion for a New Trial.
Denied.

MR. GAITHER:

I'm filing a Motion to Alter and Amend

the Judgment?
THE COURT:

Denied.

MR. GAITHER:

Filed a Motion to - well, to Stay the

Proposed Judgement and Order?
THE COURT:

That was on the basis of what?

MR. GAITHER:

!

That was on the basis that the 15 days

in the decree would run before today and it was just a matter
of simple accommodation of a party - the Court did sign it so
my client had to file a notice of election under protest.

So I

guess that one would be moot because counsel does acknowledge
that (inaudible) received a notice of election.
15
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•.• M R . A L L R E D :
MR. ^AITIlEf"
his

No, havon't

seen if.

i .-in . klivrr.'l tli. I,M1I,\-

, f rO.ec.fi .JI b>

office?
MR. BROUGH:

Got a r e c e i p t . •

MR. A L L R E D :

(I: laudi 1 : ] e) .

MR. GAITHER:
MR. .ALLRED:
nob

What's

that?

I've b e e n in my office all m o r n i n g ,

; / :. ,
MR. GAITHER:
MR. R R O U G H :
MR. ,, 1 L R h L>:

THE C O U R T :
MR. A L L R E D :

N o , It jas a

:r Friday.

We got a r e c e i p t .
L g c L ( J na< ] d i \ I e j

1 i di i • t r e c e i v e 11 ia t

I guess But I'] ] get a copy of i t.

MR. G A I T H E R :

W h a t ' s that?

THE C O U R T :

i ., , i'1

MR. A L L R E D :

;• k ','r~

i1

i, A .?

It w o u l d be m o o t .

If he wants to appeal

then he can file a new m o t i o n to stay b a s e d on t h a t .
MR
thei i

GAITI IEI :,: \ h 0 1 , 1 .1 I ;

: ic

:i t \ JOI; .] di i' t 1 e r i, :>i >t

I,r d ask the Cour t to give us u n t i l today as far as

filing the e l e c t i o n and —
-.-.-..

(:i i I a u d i b 1 e) c o p ^ (i n a i i d i b 1 e)

seen it but MR.. G A I T H E R :

I p r e p a r e d and m y client has elected

Option. I under M r . A l l r e d ' s d e c r e e .

.-•
16
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THE COURT:

What is the purpose of that?

How does

that help your client?
MR. GAITHER:

Your Honor, the decree that Mr. Allred

prepared which you adopted says that he has to give notice to
keep his business by paying an amount of money in 90 days and
he has to do that 15 days from the date of the divorce decree
which is the 4th and he did that prior to the —
THE COURT:

I think in all fairness -

MR. ALLRED:

That's not what it says.

He was given

the option to either, if he wanted to keep the house and pay
her some money for it or if he didn't she could have the house
THE COURT:

Did he have to do that within 15 days?

MR. GAITHER:

That's what the decree said and so I

filed a motion to stay that until today and then when I didn't
get any ruling any on that my client, I prepared a notice of
election on a date on September 11th and it was delivered on
the 12 th .
THE COURT:

Let's see if we can solve that.

It

seemed to me because of the numbers involved here and the
gravity of the - not the gravity but the short time frame, I
would offer on my own at this time to extend that deadline.

If

it was up today, I'll extend it another 21 days.
MR. GAITHER:

All right, so he had 90 days from the

date of the election.
MR. ALLRED:

That's fine too.
17
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MR. G A I T H E R :

A n d I w o u l d ask t h a t order be p r e p a r e d .

MR. A L L R E D :

M o t i o n for N e w T r i a l , O b j e c t i o n to

F i n d i n g s and M o t i o n for Relief —
MP. CAfTHEF;

N.itn-n

'f I V l i ^ f

f, om J u d g m e n t and

Order and I've supplied the reasons for that and the m e m o r a n d u m
and I w o u l d add to that the ruling, the - I w o u l d add to that
t h e E x 1 1 i b i t 1 11: I a t' s 1: E 31 I r e c e :i i;; r e d i i I t : e v :i d e n c e t o d a y,
THE C O U R T :

Okay.

I don't know h o w that's

different

from the o t h e r m o t i o n s you've filed and that I've denied.

Tell

me h o w j t/s differer it.
MR. GAITHER:
THE C O U R T :
MR.

CA1TJJEP

What/s

that?

Tell me how that's d i f f e r e n t .
Thjt

i:

djLteien

I

"'",

I hat

that i n c o r p o r a t e s the p r o c e d u r a l issues that w e r e raised about
i he C• :>i 1r: t i I :»t :i s sI ii n g a ri 11 i ng

about no not i ce of the Cour 1:' s

d e c i s i o n e v e r b e i n g m a i l e d to m y o lit ice.

I

il < JJI urp >i J1 < b

the C o u r t ' s m a k i n g a m e c h a n i c a l a d o p t i o n of p l e a d i n g s

prepared

I i ^ !:: 1 I e p e t :i t :i o i I e r' s a 1 1 o r n e y a i I d a b a n d o n i n g - there is a
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o b j e c t i o n which I've m a d e ana the Court
seen, that the Court has a b a n d o n e d - L^'s
we• re >

•

:

mai

nas

:u: p o s i t i o n and
n,:r

nr.cr va.s

a b a n d o n e d his c o n s t i t u t i o n a l duties as a juacc rj•} -\. . .- * •

1:1: i e

p e t i t i o n e r in a divorce p r o c e e d i n o to : repare findings wh.ch a
Court a d o p t s with pi' p» r juJi ' io

. '

, .18

difficult position here.

Your Honor made statements from the

bench and I'm not able to cross examine the Court but I would
submit that the Court by its indications and the mistakes that
have been made in this case, is a proceedings fraught with
error, fraught with mistakes, not giving adequate notice to an
attorney and not giving adequate notice that the Court was
going to essentially a flip of a coin of findings of fact and
conclusions of law —
THE COURT:
Gaither.

I resent some of your language here, Mr.

You're getting awfully close to pissing me off.

Now

I don't know - I always give notice to counsel.
MR. GAITHER:

Your Honor, the findings say that

you're going to issue a ruling.

There's never been a ruling to

this minute issued by Your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. GAITHER:

I thought I was That is as far as a practicing

attorney, that's very disrespectful that I'm telling my client
oh, we're going to get a ruling and we don't get anything.
THE COURT:

Well here's the thing.

I heard this

case, I was attentive, I submitted my thinking with that little
note that's been marked Exhibit 1 and as I recall, your
proposed findings said, well, your guy got everything and she
didn't get anything and I thought that was a ridiculous
position for you to take.

When I looked at Allred's

conclusions and findings, I did not just mechanically adopt
19
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those

I reviewed those, they squared with my thinka ng and I
'( 1 1 1 i( i r i : a s i d e .

s i :j" i • ::: :I 1 1 i e i i: i. a: 1 i I n: i 1 : I: :j o :i i 1 g I >

': ' i • I :j i i < E s s

we're really done here except for you to file your appeal.
MR. GAITHER:
goi i I• g

And I've cfot it riqht here but I'm

to ai Isv, :

•

n

Honor, in preparing the

findings of fact is 1 got a CD from the Court and my findings
are prepared objectively based upe:~ th~ evidence and you're
t i<;1 " , " I 1 prepared rhem in my - --• *"-' - favor on aJ 1 the
issues because the usual procedure as I set forth in my
affidavit is that's uhe way div *---.'

. •

parti es g:i e

their position and then the Court has the obligation to make an
equitable decision based upon it'F a divorce proceeding and
THF '^OHPT
MR. GAITHER:
THE COURT:
MR. GAITHER:

<

f J

t 1 it '

" .» "

'" " ' "

h

d.

And I think you didn't.
Okay.

That's where we disagree.

I o) ] i::i :jl: il

I. I: I

• : i il 1 f. i .3 e : : 1: Jc :»1 i, .e of

A p p e a 1 , You r Honor ?
THE COURT:
MK. iiA.LTHER:

You can do that on your way out I quoss.
Now as far as the Motion to

I II be

filing a Motion to Stay Execution for a stay of the judgment on
appeal.
THE COURT:

A:.J 1 Li:.:.k 'hat M i . Allied can either

agree, disagree or make you post a bond.

I th i nk we're done

here, counsel.
'"•'.MR. ALLRED:

If the Court would like 1/11 prepare an

order that denies the motions and extends that 21 days from
today and 90 days from the election.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. GAITHER:

I appreciate -

Well I -

MR. ALLRED:

(inaudible) on the record.

You

indicated your would like an order?
MR. GAITHER:

Yes and I would like to be served a

copy of that and I would —
MR. ALLRED:

I will.

MR. GAITHER:

— like an opportunity to respond to

that.
THE COURT:

To what?

MR. GAITHER:
THE COURT:

To his proposed order.
As to what we've done here today?

MR. GAITHER:
MR. ALLRED:
THE COURT:
said.

I'd like the rules to be followed.
I will mail a copy.
I guess now I'm tracking with what you

If you'll help me, direct me to the decree divorcing the

parties I'll sign it now.
that?

Is that - can you give me a date on

You said you saw it in the file.
MR. GAITHER:

There's two files.

Does the Court have

two files there?
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. GAITHER:

It might be in the other one.

loose in the other file.

It's

It was right below those proposed
21
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findings that you had —
• ... . :
recall.

(11 1 a. i i d i t J e) f i r s t p a r t o f An g u s t i f I

No wait, it was in middle of July, we tried this the

9zh of July, wasn't i t?
I J J tel ] y oi i wi lat

THE COURT:

find it and bring it up here and I'M 1 sign it.
MR. GAITHER:

There's a yellow folder, Your Honor.
t h e r e 11: i a t s a y s s i g n

. I: > o i i J : o ] :: c i I 11 I e r e , 11 I e r e'" s s o m e 1:
on there.

It's right there.
MR. ALLRED:

This document here, Your Honor, says

(inaudible).
THE COURT:

Do we need to formally deal with the

3 s i i E :> f t h e p e r s o n a ] p r o p e r t y ?
MR. GAITHER:
^.on't

want

: iofjted

In i

delegated
xt's

to

get
Ii I

that

totally

into

Your H o n e ,
contempt

bu T

'In i i I i i in l u ' l o d

finding

unfair

to

the

and w e ' r e

(Wlif r. t-iUpun tin

.• ' s my p o c . : .
tha*~

you

f i '- I u if ^ ,

attorney

ior

going

take

liL.ai.ijj'1

II

to

!

arbitrarily

furnishings

and

the petitioner
an

and

appeal.

i iiiii'ludt i I)
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Respondent's Exhibit Number Eight
Itemization of expenses of Amanda Hansen and/or Kristy B. Clayburn, employees of
Brough Trucking and Crane Service Inc. in assembling material and assisting in Court
ordered appraisals.

Hrs Employee's
Name

Description

Rate

Amount

12

Amanda Hansen

12 hrs. x 26 days x 13.00

338.00

$4,056.00

J

12

Kristy Clayburn

12 hrs. x 26 days x 13.00

338.00

$4,056.00

1

6

Amanda Hansen

Appraisal photos and tour
of shop & office

13.00

$78.00

6

Kristy Clayburn

File adjustment overlook
of shop & office

13.00

$78.00

4

Amanda Hansen

Photo file folder

13.00

$52.00

4

Kristy Clayburn

Premarital house finance
breakdown

13.00

$52.00

7

Amanda Hansen

Fuel for errands

42.86

$300.08

51

TOTAL(s)

$8,672.08
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1

T?«

,-Ac-.
\ \^

e

BROUGH TRUCKING
Date:
05-16-01
05-25-01
05-29-05
06-03-01
06-05-01
06-21-05
06-21-05
07-05-01
07-05-01
07-11-01
07-12-01
07-16-01
07-26-01
08-07-01
08-07-01
08-10-01
08-13-01
08-13-01
08-13-01
08-16-01
08-17-01
08-17-01
08-27-01
08-27-01
09-05-01
09-07-01
09-07-01
09-10-01
09-13-01
09-13-01
09-13-01
09-14-01
09-17-01
09-18-01
09-21-01
09-25-01
09-25-01
09-26-01
09-26-01
09-26-01
09-27-01
09-28-01
10-08-01
10-08-01
10-08-01
10-11-01
10-11-01
10-11-01

Name

Ck#

Stewarts
Duncan
Bircheil
Wade Huxford

CC
1523
1537
1541
CC
1585
1586
1618
1619

•cr/»

1

ivieiabasa
IFA
Allreds
Basin Builder
Brett Rasmussen
Duncan
Lowes
Lowes
Lowes
Lowes
Sears
Western Farm
Duncan
Swains Elec
George Kenedy
Esquire Estate
Woody Stone
Rick Shivers
IFA
Basin Builders
George Kenedy
Roofing World
Reciept
Sears
Longs Plumbing
Wade Huxford
Wyatt Huxford
Lowes
Duncan
Economy Floor
AMSO
B & B Rental
Lowes
B Brothers
Anderson Lum Rec
Tom Montoya
Lowes
BlueBell Store
IFA
Jones Paint
Basin Builders

, ,,
1669
1697
1698
cc
1701
1735
1703
1737
1738
1740
1743
1744
1769
1773
1781
1786
CC
CC
'803
7

)
t

;
1816
1819
1828
1829
1831
1829
1848
1849
1851
1866
1876
1867

Amoun'
$351.14
$579.98
$1582
$500
$38.99
$579.98
$426.20
$10000
$219.28
$164.10
$63.66
$7000
$579.98
$1712.92
$280.50
$2041
$267.53
$1500
$78.74
$579.98
$2000
$3000
$778.74
$1941.71
$620
$54.42
$14.81
$3032
$119.91
$39.02
$1261.35
$3000
$1150.
$50
$1622.97
$579.98
$4000
$3187.69
$1761.84
$1202.58
$1761.84
$1405.69
$50.
$382.22
$3835.18
$441.96
$134.77
$94.20
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Discrip

Well
Fence
Supply
Land
Supply
Labor & Supply
Supply
Land Scape
Supply

Labor & Supply
vVood & Supply
Wood & Supply
Supply
Wood & Supply
Appliance
Irrigation Pipe
Land

Elect
Fire Place
Supply
Fire Place

Sheet Rock
Supply
Supply
Fire Place
Supply

Supply
Appliances
Plumbing

Fence
Labor
Supply
Land
Flooring
Windows
Sheet Rock
Supply

Labor
Supply
Labor
Supply

Tin
Supply
Paint
Supply

Deposits
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07-28-03
08-25-03
09-29-03
10 28-03
10-20-08
11-24-03
12-22-03
01-21-04
02-27-04
03-15-04
04-19-04
04-26-04
06-14-04
07-08-04
08-09-04

09-08-04
10-06-04
11-22-04
11-22-04
12-09-04
12-20-04
01-05-05
02-09-05
03-04-05
03-21-05
04-22-05
04-22-05
05-19-05
06-01-05
06-28-05
07-26-05
08-11-05

08-29-05

Duncan
D.-Duncan
Duncan
Nielsons
Duncan
Duncan
Duncan
Duncan
Duncan
Duncan
Duncan
Duncan
Duncan
Duncan
Duncan
Duncan
Duncan
Leon Ross
Leon Ross
Duncan
Duncan
Duncan
Duncan
Desert Splash
Duncan
Basin Builders
Harward Irr
Harward Irr
Duncan
Hank Hansen
Hank Hansen
Basin Builder

3250
3314
3357
3419
4242
3417
3544
3602
3676
3716
3808
3810
3930
3963
4053
4117
4209
4316
4335
4363
4404
4439
4518
4580
4633
7693
4700
4752
4806
4873
4946
4968
5003

$579.98
$579.98
$579.98
$579.98
$1500
$579.98
$579.98
$579.98
$579.98
$579.98
$579.98
$579.98
$579.98
$579.98
$579.98
$579.98
$579.98
$579.98
$3648.75
$3648.75
$579.98
$579.98
$579.98
$579.98
$3871.10
$579.68
$402.78
$1000
$1240.73
$579.98
$112
$178.50
$1435.27
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Land
Land
Land
Land
Insert
Land
Land
Land
Land
Land
Land
Land
Land
Land
Land
Land
Land
Land
Second Well
Second Well
Land
Land
Land
Land
Pool
Land
Deck
Pipe For Well
Pipe For Well
Land
Labor Deck
Labor Deck
Decking

N. J Trucking
Discrip

Deposits

Date

Name

ck#

08-30-00

Farm & Title

279334

$20,105.

Land

$20,105

08-04-00

DOWR

15929

$75.00

Permits

$75.00

12-19-00
08-14-00
01-22-01
02-15-01

Berry Birchell
Frontier Lum
Duncan
Byron Gibson

1230
15964
1284
1313

$1120.
$1500.
$579.98
$250.00

Well
Logs
Land
Perk Test

02-21-01
02-02-05
03-01-01
03-06-01
03-19-01
03-21-01
03-21-01
03-23-01
03-28-01
04-10-01
04-16-01
04-17-01
04-17-01
04-20-01
04-20-01
04-30-01
05-03-01
05-04-01

Sid Scholes
Duncan
Duchesene County
Byron Gibson
Byron Gibson
Moon Lake
Moon Lake
Kielabasa
Duncan
Christensen
Duncan
Wimelson
Kielabsa
Stripper Oper
National Farm
Frontier Lum
Wimelson
BigT

$178.50
$579.98
$1287.84
$3000.
$1000.
$2433
$811
$15000
$579.98
$800.
$579.98
$142.97
$20000
$2677.50
$269.
$8434.39
$173.
$5000.

Blue Prints
Land
< Permits
Dirt Work
Dirt Work
' Electric
\ Electric
Labor & Supply
Land
;Labor
\ Land
Labor & Supply
Labor & Supply
iLabor
Supply
Logs
Labor
Furnace

1331
1332
1345
1347
1372
EFT
1374
cash ck
1398
1415
1451
1452
575013
2319
1461
1474
1477
1479

Amount

0GUJ.71

$1500.

Jims Personal
Date •:
4/26/2001
775/2001
9/29/2001
10/3/2001
10/10/2001
10/19/2001
12/27/2001
1/11/2001
4/4/2002
9/27/2002

Nai i le:
Frontier LUM.
Kielbasa
Kielbasa
Blue Bell Store
Kielbasa
Lamar Long
Kielbasa
Lamar Long
Barry Birchell
Montgomery

c •in :: i
119
123
134
136
137
14 4
1 19
15 I
1 39
III31:

i| !l i il ount:
8000
15000
25000
5000
10,000.00
2455
5000
113.5
700
' 9.6

Discrip:
',
Logs
Labor & Supply
Labor & Supply
Tin Roof
Labor & Supply
Plumbing
Labor & Suppl)
Plumbing
Labor
Pipe Fei i ::e ;

••)
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FILED
DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNt COON rY, U i w

AUG \ \ 2008
RANDALL GAITHER #1141
Attorney for the Respondent
159 West 300 South Broadway #105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)531-1990

JOANNE McKEE, CLERK^

IN THE EIGHT DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

KATHRYN C. BROUGH,

Petitioner,

RESPONDENT'S POST-TRIAL
BINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSION OF LAW &
MEMORANDUM
Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON

vs.

4-..
Case No. 054000084

./(

RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,
Respondent.

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Petitioner and Respondent were married on July 14, 1998 and seven years
later on August 30, 2005, the Petitioner filed for divorce in thi s pending action. The
parties separated on August 1, 2005.
2. The Petitioner had been married and divorced four previous times before this
marriage and had a child from a relationship with another individual prior to the first
marriage. The Petitioner was 54 years old at time of trial and ivas 45 years old at the time

„ Ooub^
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of marriage. The Petitioner's first 1 i lan iage was wl lei 1 si le \< /4s se v enteen yeai s of age,
During her life she had three children, all of age, and no children with Respondent. 1
3. At the time of the marriage the Respondent was 50 years old. VB:

l l i L . . S'Jii'.

in the trucking i: du

i>

a^unoi, aiu: .iiLcr serving UI..L
R L " N P I ^ i1

>'

1 1 1

l i

! V.

>

larines started working

* r -M't- d

17 years prior to this marriage in 1982 as a corporate business entity with the Respondent
as sole shareholder/

agreement which had been typed by the Petitioner. ! he Petitioner contacted an attorney
first and then in an effort to save costs typed the agreement. In that agreement, the
Petitioner stated that she hem m- wann to any personal properties, assets or money of the
R espoi ident,

v < • r :!; Sei \ ice, Ii :ic ) tl: le Glass

Store, or any personal or family properties of the Respondent. !(See Responds

1

At trial the Petitioner testified that the type of work she had performed was mostly
physical labor, with some secretarial experience. At the time of thef trial, she said she works as a
laborer, She testified that she met Mr. Brough and her fourth husbind in 1993 at bar. Some time
after being hired on as a shop hand and laborer the Petitioner moved in with Mr. Brough in
December 1, 1997 in his Duchesne residence. When she first met lJ4r. Brough, the Petitioner did
not have a truck and only an interest pending in relation to divorce proceeding with her fourth
husband. At trial, the Petitioner acknowledged her first job was to jwork on fixing up the living
quarters inside the residence as an employee.
!

f\ Ir. Brough had been married two times prior to the mai ma:ge with the Respond;;. :.
had four children with his first wife and he was divorced form Nancy Brough in 1993.
Respondent's Exhibit 11, the corporate return for 2007 lists Richard J. Brough as the 100%
ing and Crane Service, Inc.
owner of stock. Respondent's Exhibit 32 indicated that Brough TrUckin;
was in good standing with the State of Utah as of the date of trial

•, A
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5. The Respondent agreed in the premarital agreement that the Petitioner would not
be responsible for debts occurring from the listed properties aijid agreed to assume all
business debts.4 (See Respondent's Exhibit 1)
6. Prior to the marriage, the Petitioner was the bookkeeper and receptionist at N. J
Trucking, Inc. She was an hourly employee at N. J. Trucking] in 1993 for two years until
1995. The Petitioner was aware of the type of business owneld by the Respondent and
that the Respondent was the sole shareholder.
7. The Petitioner did not introduce any evidence or facts at trial to show that the
prenuptial agreement was signed on the basis of any claim of fraud or duress.
8. After the marriage, the Petitioner maintained separate financial accounts in her
name only at Zions Bank and Mountain America Credit Unioit. She deposited the funds
which she received from employment at Brough Trucking an4 Crane Service, Inc. into
her separate accounts. The Petitioner also deposited the fund^ she received from a
premarital settlement as her separate property which she used (to pay of her premarital
3

In relation to Respondent's Exhibit One, the Petitioner described business using "Inc."
and she knew it was a corporation when she typed up the agreement. She was aware that Mr.
Brough owned 100% of the shares and she was never issued any sbjares of the corporation.
Concerning Respondent's Exhibit One, Kathy Brough stated at trial, "The fact is I
don't want and didn't want anything Jim had prior..." In relation t|o Respondent's Exhibit One
the Petitioner said during cross examination that she was aware the business using "Inc" and she
knew it was a corporation when she typed up the agreement. She wfas aware that Mr. Brough
owned 100% of the shares and she was never issued any shares of jhe corporation.
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debts. The Petitioner had separate four or five credit cards in her name. The Petitioner
had $3,000.00 in her separate accounts at the time of separation with the Respondent in
2005.

9. After the marriage, the Respondent, Richard James JBrough, maintained
separate, personal checking accounts in his name at Wells Far!feo Bank and Mountain
America Credit Union.
10. The Petitioner and Respondent resided together prior to signing the premarital
agreement.
11. The Petitioner testified that she did not have a motor vehicle prior to the
marriage. After, the Petitioner received a settlement from her fourth husband which she
used the money to pay separate pre-martial debts for her credit cards.
12. The parties maintained separate accounts until separation and never co
mingled any funds which they received separately during the jnarriage in any jointchecking or joint-savings account.
13. The Petitioner never introduced any checks in evidence which proved any
expenditures which she actually made to construct the residence in Neola, Utah that was
jointly titled in both parties names.
14. The Petitioner spent money on temporary landscaping at a local nursery for the
Neola residence which was not a cost to build and construct the residence.
15. The W-2s of the Petitioner which were received a$ Respondent's Exhibit Ten

0u0i?6
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state yearly income as a corporate employee of Brough Trucking and Crane Service Inc
as

follows:

I

YEAR

TOTAL WAGES, TIPS, OTHER COMP.

2000

$10,640.00

2001

$8,880.00

2002

$7,680.00

2003

$6,876.00

2004

$10,588.50

2005 (year of separation)

$4,765.60

16. The Petitioner kept track of her hours worked as ah employee during the time
she was employed by N J. Trucking Inc. and/or Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc.
In the last part of her employment, a time-card system was implemented to keep track of
her hours as an employee. The Petitioner never received any check for dividends or the
distribution of income. (See Respondent's Exhibit 18.)
17. Prior to the marriage, the Respondent, Mr. Brough , owned a single family
residence at 19487 East River Road, Duchesne County, Utah which was sold after the
marriage for approximately $114,000.00.
18. The Respondent received a check of $24,702.84 vyhich was deposited in his
j

5

account to construct the house in Neola, Utah. (Respondent si Exhibit 15c and 35)
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[ 9. In relation to the Duchesne property, the Responds;nt received a favorable tax
interest and placed a first mortgage on his premarital residence which he owned 19487
East River Road in Duchesne County, Utah to finance business equipment and that note
was paid when the residence was sold.
20. Prior to the marriage, Mr. Brough owned five acr^s near Fruitland, Utah
referred to as the "Bandana Ranch", which he sold after the njiarriage and received
$18,521.51. (Respondent's Exhibit 35)
21. The funds from the sale of separate property were intended for and used to
purchase the real property for the residence in Neola, Utah an(d received the same month
as when the closing took place on the purchase of the property. (Respondent's Exliibit 31)
22. Prior to the marriage, the N.J. Trucking Inc. owned certain lien free business
assets including oil derricks and rigs. Mr. Bough sold the assets which included oil field
!

equipment and proceeds were directly used to pay for construction costs of the Neola
residence. (Respondent's Exhibit 15c and 39)
23. The Respondent at all times is the sole owner oft he business known as
Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. and at all relevant tjmes he held 100% of stock
in the corporation.
24. Prior in the 1990's, the Respondent had a residence and shop in Duchesne
Utah and made a business decision to move his residence anjd the shop to the Roosevelt
area of Duchesne County, State of Utah.

0u0i78

»•

OUUO^-T

25. Around the time the new shop in Roosevelt, Utah jwas opened, the Petitioner
contacted the Respondent concerning employment. The Respondent indicated that the
business had a secretary and bookkeeper. The Petitioner has hired to work in cleaning,
l

constructing and helping to build and organize the shop, as w^ll as other maintenance and
|

cleaning projects at the business at an hourly rate of employment.
26. The Petitioner was compensated for her work on an hourly basis when she
commenced maintenance work and construction work at the s|iop. She continued to keep
her hours and receive income for the work in assisting to construct the residence and
business which continued through the course of the business ijntil the time she quit
working for Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. by writing the word "Quit" on her
time-card on May 8, 2005. (Respondent's Exhibit 18)
27. The Petitioner, excluding the pickup truck, had $3,1829.00 more in joint
personal property than acquired during the marriage to the Respondent. The Petitioner
failed to adequately itemize the personal property.
28. On October 15, 2008, a loan from Zions bank in th amount of $160,000.00
was obtained using the Neola Residence as collateral. The lo^n was used to pay business
debts of Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. and the corporation has paid all of the
payments on the business loan.5
29. The $160,000.00 loan was for a business purpose vi^hen Mr. Brough was laid

Respondent's Exhibit 9 is the amortization schedule cbf the loan.
7
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up with a broken foot and the company was having difficulty joperating. The Petitioner
signed the loan because she was on the title to the property.
30. The Respondent should be ordered to assume that loan and refinance the loan
within a reasonable time and to hold the Petitioner harmless ffom that loan on the Neola
residence because the loan is a liability of the business.
31. At trial, the Respondent introduced exhibits which! indicated that the computer
contested in pretrial issues was purchased by a check from the business. (Respondent's
Exhibit 22) The Petitioner to the judgment should pay the costs of copying the disk due to
the fact that the Respondent claimed was not a business asset in the amount of $322.50.
(See Respondent's Exhibit 37)
32. For the Tax year 2007, Brough Trucking & Crane Service, Inc. had one full
time employee, Doris Hyatt, a secretary.
33. For the year 2007, Mr. Brough's income from the business operation was
$61,370.00 and he personally paid the income taxes on 100 % of the business income
based upon the Subchapter election filed by the business.
34. The Petitioner signed a corrective deed changing the title on the "Ballard'5 also
referred to as the "Pine Tech" property to reflect the intent of tjhe parties that the
•

•

•

I

acquisition of that property was by Brough Trucking & Crane jService, Inc. (Respondent's
Exhibit 13) The Ballard property is a joint venture with Byrorj Gibson and the trucking
company. The business venture commenced when the businesi started acquiring property

000x80
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in 2004. The 80 acres in Ballard is not marital property and i£ subject to the prenuptial
I

agreement.

j

35. The Respondent, with the assistance of his daughters, assembled an accurate
accounting of substantially all of the costs to build the Neola Residence which was not
contested by the Petitioner at trial. The source of funds was Segregated as to each
checking account in which either the business or Mr. Brough personal account deposited
funds which were used to pay the construction of the residence.6 The Respondent also
j

i

traced the source of funds into the checking accounts set forthj in Exhibit 15 by deposit
slips and other business records.7 (See Respondent's Exhibit 1| 5)
36. The Petitioner contributed personal assistance, tinie and effort in building the
Neola Residence but did not contribute funds. The Petitioner (did not prove at trial any

6

Mr. Bough testified that Kathy Brough was never a sign^or on his personal checking
account identified in the accounting of Respondent's Exhibit 15. i
7

Exhibit 15c and Exhibit 39 were identified at trial as deposit slips and other
memorandum corroborating the separate funds property deposited jjnto the separate accounts.
These deposits include:
j
a. $30,000.00 from the sale of the Duchesne Property from ^he buyers of $30,000.00.
(See also Respondent's Exhibit 31)
!
b. A deposit on 05/01/2002 for sale of $10,810.82 for Jim'i House (in Petitioner's
handwriting).
!
c. A deposit of $54,000.00 on 05/01/2000 that was deposited into the NJ trucking
account.
j
d. $50,000.00 for the sale of used oil field equipment owne<ji for 15 years,
e.$30,000.00 from Chotaw for a Derrick purchased from the business.
f. $5,000 Sale of used oil field equipment by cashier's check.
g. A deposit of $3,000 for oilfield equipment sold,
h. A cashier's check in the amount of $30,0000 to Brough Trucking on 05/17/2001
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monetary amounts contributed to the construction of the residence of any separate funds.
37. As set forth in Respondent's Exhibit 15(a), (b) an<ji (c)the costs paid by the
|

•!

business or Mr. Brough from a personal fund to construct Neola residence are as follows:
I. Brough Trucking & Crane Service Inc.
(Checking account)
ii. N. J. Trucking (checking account)
iii. Jim Brough, (personal checking account)
TOTAL

$166,373.89
$86,559.12
$73318.10
$326,251.11

38. The premarital and separate property of the Respondent was used to construct
the Neola residence and the total costs and expenses contributed by the Respondent from
his premarital or separate funds exceeds the present market value of the Neola residence.
i

39. The Petitioner is not entitled to alimony and she admitted during her
deposition that she resided with Ned Ross prior to this trial anjd she was self sufficient
and could pay her expenses.
40. After the marriage, the Petitioner continued to receive an income from Brough
Trucking and Crane Service Inc. which she deposited in her separate accounts at Zions
Bank and Mountain America Credit Union.
41. The Petitioner testified at trial that she was financially able to make at least
i

$7,000.00 in payments prior to the time of trial to her attorneyj. In addition, after the time
|

of separation, the Petitioner was not paying rent since March 2007 and she was buying a
i

double wide trailer for $10,000.00 to place free of charge on l^er Mother's property.
!
!

42. The Petitioner's attorney was accepting monthly payments on the continuing

10
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obligation for attorney's fees and he Petitioner is able to continue to pay for her obligation
for attorney's fees from her present income.
43. The Respondent incurred $3,798.75 to Randall Cjaither, Attorney at Law, for
'.

i

reasonable attorney's fees and costs necessary to provide docjiments, other information
and to coordinate with the two appraisers concerning the busijness appraisals retained by
the Petitioner by Court order. (Respondent's Exhibit 28)
44. The Respondent's business incurred $8,672.08 in expenses as set forth in
Respondent's Exhibit 8 which sets forth the expenses of Amahda Hansen and/or Kristy B
Clayburn, employees of Brought Trucking and Crane Service nc. in assembling material
and assisting in Court ordered appraisals of the business equipment. This is an
unnecessary costs which is a factor in requiring the Petitioner |to assume and pay her own
attorney's fees and costs.
45. The expert witness, Brad Townsend, was selected by the Petitioner and her
attorney to act as her expert during trial. The appraiser in his report stated that he was
unable to determine a value for N.J. Trucking, Inc. at the time of the marriage.
(Respondents Exhibit 40) Brad Townsend's total bill was $12,707.00 and he testified that
he had been paid by Mr. Bough for a retainer on October 26, 2007 for $2,500.00 and
I
received a check on August 24, 2007 in the amount of $2,918]05. In June 2008 Mr.
i
•

•

I

Brough paid $1,500.00 for the appraisal by equipment appraiser, Ron Liese.8
8

On August 6, 2008, counsel for the Respondent recived an invoice for $7,563.46 from
Norman, Townsend &Johnson,LLC.
11
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46. The appraiser, Brad Townsend, did not find that tjhere was any good will over
the basic value of the equipment after receiving extensive accounting information and
financial information supplied to him by the Respondent.9
47. The expert, Brad Townsend, testified that there w^s no enhanced value of the
income stream of the business in excess of the amount to pay I for the services of the
owner/proprietor in providing services in the business.
48. The basis for valuation was the value of the sale of the equipment which was
an enhanced book value based upon an equipment appraisaltyyRon Liese. Mr. Liese was
retained only after the appraisal by Brad Townsend which us^d traditional techniques for
economic valuation of a small business and indicated that thefe was no value in the
business except the value in the used equipment and assets.
49. Irregardless of the prenuptial agreement, the valui of the business does not
exceed the value of the services of Mr. Brough and would not; be subject to any

9

Brad Townsend testified that Mr. Brough made all payments even though retained by
Kathy Brough. Information came through Respondent's informatic|n. He indicated that the
returns on investment by net income had lower value than value ofjtangible assets which sit idle.
He indicated that in May 2008 he reached a determination after reviewing the books that there
was no good will in business over tangible value of the assets. Hei indicated that income stream
fair return for value of owner for fair salary for his work effort no Additional return on assets
base. Brad Townsend's opinion of a fair salary for Mr. Brough including quantify generated
income, adjusted for the payment of directly out of business for personal expenditures:
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

$15,000
$57,000
$40,000
$25,000
$53,000
12
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distribution in these proceedings. 10
50. At the trial, the Petitioner did not object to the sp1 icific accounting set forth in
Respondent's Exhibit 15 which demonstrated that the costs Of building the Neola
residence came from either the premarital business assets of '^he Respondent or from the
i

Respondent's separate property in his personal checking accbunt.
51. Based upon the appraisals received concerning the real property, the Court
finds that the Neola Residence was valued at the time of separation and at the time of trial
at approximately $320,000.00 which was less than costs contributed to build and
construct the residence by Mr. Brough.
52. The Petitioner never accounted for the value of ariy joint personal property and
only testified as to the lists prepared by the Respondent. Bas^d upon the evidence at trial
and the fact that the Petitioner was allowed by the Respondeat to use a horse trailer to
make several trips to remove personal property when she separated, each party should be
found to have in their possession at the time of trial an equal Amount of joint marital
property.

.|

53. As to attorney's fees, the Petitioner incurred a substantial amount of attorney's
j

fees in relation to her claims asserted at trial concerning her c|aim to the business and the
Respondent prevailed on the issue of a valid prenuptial agreement.
10

There can be no good will in a business that is dependent for its existence upon
the individual who conducts the enterprise and would vanish yvere the individual to die,
retire or quit work." Stevens vs. Stevens, 754 P.2d at 956 (citiijig Jackson v. Caldwell, 18
Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667, 670 (1966)).
13

0UUI85

UG0337

54. The Petitioner testified that at the time of trial she jwas residing with her
mother rent free and had the ability to save sufficient funds toj purchase a new residence
for herself and the sum of $7,000.00 would have been sufficient but for the business
claim in these divorce proceedings.
55. The Petitioner was employed and her monthly income at the time of trial
exceeded her expenses.

PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OFUAW
1. In considering the equitable factors traditionally usdd by the courts in
distributing property in a divorce proceedings, the Court has tjtken into account the
relevant facts that both parties were married and divorced multiple times prior to this
marriage, both parties had children from prior marriages, the Advanced age of the parties
at the time of marriage, and the position of each party prior to the marriage. In light of
the marriage of six years prior to separation, where no childreji were born and in which
the couple was married later in life, the court should attempt t<j) restore the parties to their
premarital status.
2. The notarized prenuptial agreement dated July 9, 19J98 is a valid and
enforceable contract.
3. Under the prenuptial agreement, the ownership interest of Richard James
Brough of N.J. Trucking Inc. which was changed by name only to Brough Trucking and
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Crane Service, Inc. during the marriage is not subject to distribution during these divorce
proceedings to the Petitioner based upon terms of the prenuptjial agreement.
4. Further, even if the business interest was subject to| distribution, the Petitioner
l

failed to show by adequate evidence that there was any good will or enhanced value to the
business after the marriage over and above the value of the sejrvices of Mr. Brough.
5. The income, profits, and the liability including the oan to Zions Bank secured
by the Neola residence, of the business are excluded from distribution to the Petitioner by
i
the prenuptial agreement. The Respondent should be ordered to refinance the loan on the
Neola residence within a reasonable period of time and the Petitioner should be held
harmless therefrom.
6. The property in Ballard, Utah is a business asset ovlned by Brough Trucking
and Crane Service, Inc. as was demonstrated when a Corrected Deed was voluntarily
signed and acknowledged by the Petitioner placing the property in the name of the
business entity. Therefore, the,property is within the scope o the premarital agreement.
7. During the course of the marriage the parties acquiijed certain personal effects
such as recreational vehicles, television sets and furniture which were intended to be
i

|

joint-marital purchases by the parties and the jointly purchased property are not included
within the terms of the prenuptial agreement.
8. The property in Neola, Utah was placed in joint names and therefore the
Petitioner has a legal interest by virtue of in the Deed which was executed after the
15
f '-
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marriage which indicated a joint-marital interest in the real property.
9. The residence in Neola, Utah was purchased and constructed using the premarital
and separate funds of the Respondent as accounted for in Respondent's Exhibit 15. There
:

!
i

was no proof at trial that there was any enhanced or increased value over and above cost
of constructing the residence by the Respondent's separate fijnds. Therefore, the Neola
!
i

residence should be awarded to the Respondent free and cleaij of any claims by the
Petitioner and the Petitioner should be required to execute all necessary documents to
transfer that interest.
10. Based upon the reservation of the allocation of cosjts by the court, the
Petitioner should be required to pay all of the costs and expenjses incurred in these divorce
proceedings to determine valuation of Brough Trucking and Cfrane Service, Inc. to
reimburse the Respondent for all out of pocket costs made pribr to trial in relation to
|

valuating the assets of the corporation and hold him harmless [therefrom.
j

11. It is equitable under the facts and circumstances off the case that each party
assume and pay their own attorney's fees and costs, except th$ Petitioner should be
responsible for the amount of $3,798.75 in appraisal organization fees to Randall
Gaither, Attorney at Law, and the Respondent is entitled to a judgment in that amount.
12. The Respondent's business incurred $8,672.08 in Expenses as set forth in
Exhibit 8 the Itemization of expenses of Amanda Hansen and/or Kristy B. Clayburn,
employees of Brough Trucking and Crane Service Inc. in assembling material and
16
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assisting in Court ordered appraisals and this is a factor in deljermining that the Petitioner
pay for her own attorney's fees and costs. The Respondent prevailed on the execution of
the premarital agreement and this is a factor in requiring the petitioner to pay her own
attorney's fees and costs.

t

'

13. The costs and expenses of the valuation by the expert, Brad Townsend, were
unnecessary in light of the fact that any value that he found was based upon the
equipment appraisal by a third party and using the Property Tax Assessment from public

i

records.

I

i
|

14. It is equitable to require the Petitioner, in light of ijhe prenuptial agreement to
assume and pay any of the costs of the appraisal, which she requested including the two
business appraisals and a Judgement shall be entered requiring the Petitioner to reimburse
all of the costs of the Respondent which has paid to Brad ToWnsend and Ron Liese.
15. It is equitable that each party assume and pay the costs of the real estate
appraisals of the Neola, Utah property which was received irito evidence and no
i

!

judgement should be awarded for those costs.

j

16. It is equitable in light of the Court's consideration of the evidence that each
party should be awarded the personal property presently in their possession.
17. The Petitioner should be ordered to assume and pay the debt owed on the 2001
•I
j

Blue Dodge pickup truck in the amount of $4,557.14 as of Julie 10, 2008 to Mountain
America Credit Union. (Respondent's Exhibit 14)
17
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18. The Respondent's premarital assets were not co-mingled with marital
property, and he maintained them as separate entities, exceptjfor the Neola Residence
which has no value over and above the premarital and separate assets traced directly into
the construction of the residence.
19. The Respondent should be awarded a Judgment iri the amount of $322.50 for
costs in relation to the business asset, the computer, taken by the Petitioner.
20. The Respondent should be awarded all costs to bej submitted by a post
Judgment Affidavit.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

POINT I
THE NOTARIZED PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT IS ENFORCEABLE IN THESE
PROCEEDINGS.
j
Utah Code Annotated § 30-8-3(1953) states that "A premarital agreement must be
in writing and signed by both parties. It is enforceable without consideration." In this
matter there is adequate consideration in that the Petitioner w&s to be held harmless from
business obligations upon divorce. The specific naming of the business and the
j

consideration of the hold harmless from business debts reinforces the enforcement of the
of the agreement as to N. J. Trucking Inc., the Glass Store and any personal or family
properties of the Respondent.
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In Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 161 Utah Adv. ftep. (Ct App 1991) the
Court stated the facts as follows:

I

The Rudmans were married on April 18, 1981. Both parties had previously been
married and divorced. At the time of the marriage, Mrs. Rudman had been
receiving $1,100 per month in permanent alimony froiin her former husband. Part
of Mr. Rudman's premarital property included several jmovie theaters in three
states, two condominiums, and a cabin. Prior to the marriage, Mrs. Rudman's
counsel prepared a prenuptial agreement, which the parties signed on April 15,
1981. The agreement stated that each party relinquished all claims and interest to
property the other had acquired prior to the marriage and that such property could
not be deemed a marital asset following the marriage. The agreement was "not
intended and does not apply to any property which is accumulated by the parties
either individually or jointly following the marriage oil the parties."
The court found that Mr. Rudmanfs premarital assets were not commingled
with marital property, and that he maintained theiji as separate entities,
including those that were improved through expansion or remodeling. Thus,
under the parties' prenuptial agreement, the loan receivables were properly
characterized as premarital assets, as were the condominiums and the cabin.
Mrs. Rudman contends the trial court erred in interpreting the prenuptial
agreement. She argues that the agreement specifies that any interest and
appreciation accruing to premarital property after the ljnarriage becomes marital
property. Mrs. Rudman also claims the court abused its discretion in failing to
find that she contributed labor and/or assets to his premarital property, thus
converting it to marital property. Specifically, she claims the court abused its
discretion by failing to find that she assisted Mr. Rudman in the operation of his
business by helping to "remodel, clean, vacuum, paint; run errands, make and hang
drapes, purchase and prepare food... and work as a ticlfet taker," thus converting
those businesses to marital property. She claims the c0urt abused its discretion in
failing to find that she improved and furnished the condominiums and the cabin,
resulting in those properties becoming commingled into the marital estate. She also
claims the court abused its discretion in finding that ldans made to various
business entities operating Mr. Rudman's theaters were due to Mr. Rudman alone,
rather than to the marital estate. Mrs. Rudman claims that improper exclusion and
improper valuation of this property reduced the marital estate by $472,589.
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In Rudntan, the trial court found that a fair reading of jthe agreement clearly
separated premarital property from property accumulated aft^r the marriage. The trial
court also found that, under the agreement, any premarital property, together with any
interest or increase, would remain the property of the owner, and any property/ acquired
after the marriage would be marital, "less that amount utilized for its acquisition that can
be traced to a point prior to the marriage." The Court of appeals stated:
!
|

We find no error in the trial court's legal interpretation; of the document. Under the
terms of the prenuptial agreement, where each party relinquished all rights to
previously acquired property of the other party, he or she would also have no right
to any increase in value or additional earnings that migjht accrue to that property.
Likewise, any property acquired by the parties after th£ marriage would accrue
earnings into the marital estate. Additionally, if any amounts used to acquire
property during the marriage could be traced to premarital property, those amounts
would remain the separate property of that individual. Thus, to preserve the
premarital integrity of an asset that has been arguably Commingled with property
acquired after the marriage, that asset, or its severable part, must be traced to its
original source.

In Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving Co. v. Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382 (Utah
i

1989) the Court indicated that a resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent is
permissible only if the contract document appears to express the parties' agreement
incompletely or if it is ambiguous in expressing that agreement. Here, the Petitioner's
comment that about what Mr. Brough's description of the premarital agreement was is
i

irrelevant.

|

The Respondent respectfully submits that the premarital agreement should be
J
!

enforced in these proceedings.
20
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POINT II
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE ANY CO-MINGLING OF SEPARATE
PROPERTY.

In Utah, marital property is ordinarily divided equally between the divorcing
I
spouses and separate property, which may include premarital:assets, inheritances, or
similar assets, will be awarded to the acquiring spouse. Olseri v. Olseny 169 P.3d 765
Utah App. 2007) In the recent decision in Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476,
1

i

•

i

2008 UT App 11 (Utah App. 01/10/2008), the Court stated: .;
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that wheh one party in a divorce
proceeding uses separate property to purchase a marital home, that party is
entitled to the equity in the home that resulted front his or her investment. See
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah J987) (upholding trial court's
ruling that the wife should receive credit for her inherited separate property that
she invested in the parties' home during the marriage). But [t]he rule that property
acquired by gift or inheritance by one spouse should b$ awarded to that spouse . . .
does not apply when the property thus acquired is consjumed, such as when a gift
or an inheritance of money is used for family purposes! when the property
completely loses its identity and is not traceable because it is commingled with
other property . . . ; or when the acquiring spouse placejs title in their joint names in
such a manner as to evidence an intent to make it marital property. Mortensen v.
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307 (Utah 1988) (citations ohiitted).
The trial court treated the $81,000 of equity in the Famjily Home as Wife's separate
property to compensate her for the $90,000 of her inheritance used to improve that
asset. Although we are unable to evaluate the overall pfoperty settlement because
of the lack of findings on value, the recognition of Wife's separate property interest
in the improvements to the Family Home was within the trial court's broad
discretion.
i

In Cox v. Cox 877 P.2d 1262 (Ut Ct. App 1994), the Court recognized equitable factors
21
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relevant to equitable factors to this proceedings. The Court stated:
Where the marriage is of short duration, where no children were born and
where the couple was married later in life, a trial court may properly attempt
to restore the parties to their premarital status. See, e.g., Georgedes v.
Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44, 45 (Utah 1981) (trial court d^d not abuse discretion to put
parties to short second marriage back into sole ownership of premarital properties);
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 198(1)) (where husband was 73
and wife was 68 at time of marriage, and where marriage was short, trial court did
not abuse discretion in awarding premarital home to wife even though she deeded
it in joint tenancy to husband).
!
In addition, atrial court may properly consider other factors relating to distribution
of premarital property including the amount and kind of property to be divided;
whether the property was acquired before or during the marriage; the source of the
property; the health of the parties; the parties' standard! of living, respective
financial conditions, needs, and earning capacity; the cfuration of the marriage; the
children of the marriage, the parties' ages at time of thd marriage and of divorce;
[and] what the parties gave up by the marriage. Hogue v. Hogue, 831 P.2d 120,
122 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Burke v. Burke, 733 Pi2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987)).

In Cox, the Wife claimed the trial court erred in finding that appreciation on the
house was not due to her remodeling efforts. The Court affirmed the trial court in its
memorandum decision which determined that once Husband's and Wife's expenditures
i
•j

were deducted from the $105,000.00 value of the house, the residence had not materially
i
i

I

appreciated.

j
As to the scope of the agreement, in Berman v. Berman 749 P.2d 1271,(Ct

App. 1988) the Court of Appeals stated:

I
I

. - . . • • .

i

Plaintiff argues that the antenuptial agreement only concerned the defendant's
business assets, not the house, because the only asset specifically mentioned in the
agreement was the billiard business. Defendant argues that the agreement means
exactly what it says and exempts " real and personal property," including the
22
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house, from inclusion in the marital estate. The house: should have been preserved
as the separate property of defendant We find the trial court erred when it did not
include the house in the antenuptial agreement.
|
j

At trial, the Petitioner testified that the parties kjept their finances
"separate". However, in the closing arguments at trial, the attorney for the Petitioner
claimed that there was some type of a "marital pot" implying-that there had been some comingling of funds during the course of the marriage and the cjourt should in some manner
limit the premarital contract.
However, an objective review of the evidence will shojw that each party maintained
separate checking accounts and credit cards. For example, thp Petitioner indicated that
after the marriage she received some separate money from a $rior divorce which she
placed in here separate checking account and paid personal expenses on her separate
credit cards from her personal account. The evidence concerning the fact that she kept
hours, received W2 forms and received corporate checks and jdeposited those checks into
l

her separate checking account prove the opposite of co-mingl^ng of funds by the parties.
i

Mr. Brough sold business assets and property he owned prior jto the marriage and placed
them in separate checking accounts.
|

In relation to the evidence of landscaping and doing so|me work on the Neola
i

i
residence, see Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 329 (Utah |App.2007), the court stated:
Husband next argues that the trial court misunderstood or misapplied
the law in determining that the appreciation on the real property was Wife's
separate property, as opposed to marital property subject to an equal
division among the parties. Husband does not dispute that the real property
23
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was purchased from Wife's premarital funds and, thus, was initially Wife's
separate property. Nor does he dispute that any appreciation on Wife's
separate property would also be considered Wife's separate property.
Husband appears to argue, however, that events within the marriage
converted this separate property into marital property.;
Premarital property loses its separate identity ind becomes a part of
the marital estate if "(1) the other spouse has by his or; her efforts or expense
contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property,
thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been
consumed or its identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where
the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the other
spouse." Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405,1J20, ]47 P.3d 464 (quoting
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988)).
We are not persuaded by Husband's arguments! that his purported
efforts-including doing some tile work in the home arid "supervising"
landscaping and home theater installation-were sufficient to obtain an
equitable interest in the home. Instead, we agree with the trial court that
"[Wife] kept the asset separate" and that the facts do not support a finding
that "[Husband] made any contribution to the house" other than possibly a
monetary contribution toward landscaping and tile—a portion of the one
deposit made into Wife's separate account-for which the court ordered
reimbursement to Husband.
;

The Petitioner did not prove the separate property has been consumed or its
identity lost through commingling or exchanges.

I

POINT III

EACH PARTY SHOULD ASSUME AND PAY THEIR OWN ATTORNEYS FEES
AND THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PAY AND REIMBURSE
THE COSTS OF THE EXPERTS.
I

I
From the commencement of this action, the Respondent has been faced with an
24
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expensive appraisal process. When the report was finished right before trial, the expert
witness fees totaled approximately $17,000.00. These pretrial costs were incurred
because the Petitioner choose litigation to disregard her signed agreement and claimed a
substantial business interest in the business, going to far as to obtain an TRO as to the
business.

j

At trial, the expert Brad Townsend indicated that there; was not sufficient grounds
to determine any enhanced value of the corporation during the marriage. The Petitioner
who was familiar with the one man business, chose to litigate;at great cost to attempt
obtain an interest subject to that agreement when she should Have known there was no
value to distribute. A graphic example of this point is the fact that when Mr. Brough
broke his foot the business had to borrow funds on the Neola residence.
Since the Petitioner drastically increased the costs and expenses of this legal action
by making a claim for a substantial portion of the Respondent's business and business
assets. The Petitioner should be pay the costs. Concerning the administration of justice
in all divorce cases, it is not sound policy to allow with a part)jr that signed a premarital
agreement to require the other spouse to advance substantial costs and expenses to the
allow the spouse to attempt to "swing for the fence'5. The Respondent prevailed on the
business issues and the Petitioner should pay for the expensive litigation costs of her own
experts.

"*,;'•'"

The Respondent respectfully submits that in this specific situation the factors
•

|

.

i
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require the Petitioner pay her own attorneys fees as well as the costs of the attempt to
prove a business interest. The Court should take into accountjthe fact that Mr. Brough
was required to pay extra business costs, lose of time to coordinate the appraisal, expend
employee expenses, accounting fees and substantial attorneys fees. These costs accrued
up until the expert announced his decision on the day before trial that there was no
goodwill, no enhanced value or value over the return of Mr. Brough for his services and
expertise. In light of the valid prenuptial agreement it is equitable that the Petitioner
reimburse the Respondent for any attorney's fees and costs, including mailing costs,
incurred in preparing and organizing documents and information delivered to the experts
for appraisals of the business of $3,798.75. The Respondent should be awarded of all
costs of this action.

I '

DATED this 8th day of August, 2008.

KNDALL GAITI
Attorney for th^Respondent
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FAX/MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing iRESPONDENT'S
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
MEMORANDUM was faxed and mailed to:
CLARK B. ALLRED
ALLRED & MCCLELLAN, P.C.
72 NORTH 300 EAST
ROOSEVELT, UTAH 84066
FAX: (435) 722-3928

*

DATED this T)

day of

AMS£'•2008.

flAA
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EIGHTH DISTRICT CT-ROOSEVELT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KATHRYN C BROUGH,
Petitioner,

MINUTES
BENCH TRIAL

vs .

Case No: 054000084 DA

RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,
Respondent

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

JOHN R. ANDERSON
July 9, 20 0 8

brigittt

PRESENT
Petitioner's Attorney. CLARK B ALLRED
Petitioner(s): KATHRYN C BROUGH
Attorney for the Respondent: RANDALL T GAITHER
Respondent(s): RICHARD JAMES BROUGH
Audio
Tape Number:
cdl3 8roos
Tape Count: 9:05:04

TRIAL
TAPE: cdl3 8roos

COUNT: 9:05:04

In chambers: Counsel state their witness and exhibit objections.
One witness, Brad Townsend, will testify by phone at 1:30 today.
COUNT: 9:20
Open Court: opening statements are made. Mr. Allred offers exhibit
1 and 3, these are received. Jake Welborn and Jared Jensen are
sworn in and testify. Kathy Brough testifies. Respondent's exhibit
1 is offered and received. Plaintiff's exhibits 27, 23,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 20, 21, 22, 14, 15, 16, 18, 17, 24,
25, 2, and 5 are offered and received. Mr. Gaither gives cross
examination. Respondent's exhibits 6, 10, 15, 18, 22, 26, and 32
are offered and received. Witnesses are excused.
COUNT: 1:27
in chambers. Brad Townsend is present by phone. Mr. Allred and Mr.
Gaither are present. Mr. Townsend is sworn in and testifies.
COUNT: 2:10
back in open court: Mr. Allred proffers affidavit for attorney's

(JOT280
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Case No: 054000084
Jul 09, 2008
Date :
fees. Plaintiff's exhibit 4 is offered and received, Plaintiff
rests.
COUNT: 2:11:4
Mr. Gaither calls Richard James Brough (Jim) to the stand.
Respondent's exhibits 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 18, 19 is withdrawn, 20 through 25 are received, Exhibits 28,
with objection, 29, 30, 31 through 40, 41 withdrawn.
Mr. Allred gives cross examination. Exhibit 27, 28, and 2 9 are
offered and received. Kathy Brough is called back to the stand for
rebuttal. 4:56:25/ closing arguments are given. The Court will
need to read some case law and then will make a writ ten
ruling. Each attorney is to prepare a findings and conclusion and
decree and submit these to the Court. The Court hear s jurisdiction
and grounds and grants the divorce. Mr. Gaither is t o prepare the
divorce decree. Counsel is to have findings and
conclusions in the mail by August 8th.
Trial End: 5:31:45
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CLARK B ALLRED - 0055
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113
ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
72 North 300 East (123-14)
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Telephone:
(435) 722-3928

p\

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

KATHRYN C. BROUGH,

)
)

Petitioner,

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF
DECREE OF DIVORCE

)

vs.

) Civil No.

RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,

054000084 DA

)

Respondent

) Judge John R. Anderson

Please take notice that the Court entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce in the above captioned
matter on September 4, 2008.
I
DATED this 4th day of September, 2008
ALLRED
Attorneys for Petit-i
By:
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I, Cheree Brotherson, am employed by the office of ALLRED &
McCLELLAN, P. C. attorneys for Petitioner herein and hereby certify
that I served the attached NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DECREE OF DIVORCE on
Respondent by

placing a true and correct

copy

thereon in an

envelope addressed to:
RANDALL GAITHER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
15 9 WEST 3 00 SOUTH BROADWAY #105
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101

and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States mail at Roosevelt, Utah, on the 4th
day of September, 2008.

CHEREE BROTHERSON
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EIGHTH DISTRICT CT-ROOSEVELT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KATHRYN C BROUGH,
Petitioner,

MINUTES
MOTIONS HEARING

vs.

Case No: 054000084 DA

RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,
Respondent.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

JOHN R. ANDERSON
September 25, 2008

brigittt

PRESENT
Petitioner's Attorney: CLARK B ALLRED
Petitioner(s): KATHRYN C BROUGH
Attorney for the Respondent: RANDALL T GAITHER
Respondent(s): RICHARD JAMES BROUGH
Audio
Tape Number:
cdl41roos
Tape Count: 3:21:23

HEARING
TAPE: cdl41roos
COUNT: 3:21:23
The Court reviews the file with counsel. Mr. Gaither asks that the
divorce decree be set aside and enter a bifurcated decree of
divorce. Mr. Gaither and Mr. Allred both address the issue of the
findings and decree that have been entered.
The Court denies the motion to set aside the findings and decree,
but the Court will sign the divorce decree, to be final upon entry
into the record. Exhibit 1 is offered and received. The Court
denies Mr. Gaithers motions. The motion to stay the proposed
new judgment and order is moot. Mr. Allred is to prepare the
order.
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RANDALL GAITHER #1141
Attorney for the Respondent
159 West 300 South Broadway #105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)531-1990

SEP 2 5 2008

IN THE EIGHT DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

KATHRYN C. BROUGH,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
vs.
Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,
Respondent.

Case No. 054000084

The above entitled matter came for trial on the 9th day of July, 2008 before the

f

Honorable Judge John R. Anderson. Based upon the testimony at trial, the Court enters
the following findings of fact.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Both parties are residence of Duchesne County, State of Utah and have been
residents for more than three months prior to the date of filing of the Complaint for
Divorce.
2. Evidence was offered at trial proving irreconcilable differences between the
1
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parties which the parties are unable to reconcile.
t

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
3. The parties are bona fid residence of Duchesne County, State of Utah and the
Court has legal grounds to enter a Decree of Divorce.
4. All other issues shall be reserved.

DATED this

T1

day of

f\M

. 2008

I/OWN R. ANDERSON
•ISTRICT COURT JUDGE

000206

FAX/MAIL CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was faxed/mailed to:

CLARK B. ALLRED
ALLRED & MCCLELLAN, P.C.
72 NORTH 300 EAST
ROOSEVELT, UTAH 84066
FAX: (435)722-3928

/ 2/
DATED this _J_

day of July, 2008.
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FILED
DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

RANDALL GAITHER #1141
Attorney for the Respondent
159 West 300 South Broadway #105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)531-1990

SEP 2 5 2008
JOANNE McKEE, CLERK
BY
lP>1
DEPUTY

IN THE EIGHT DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

DECREE OF DIVORCE

KATHRYN C. BROUGH,

Petitioner,
vs.

Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON

RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,
Respondent.

Case No. 054000084

The above entitled matter came for trial on the 9th day of July, 2008 before the
Honorable Judge John R. Anderson. Based upon the testimony at trial, the ruling from
the bench awarding the Divorce and good cause appearing:
IT IS HEREBY ORDER, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a Decree of
Divorce is granted in this case to be final upon signing by the Court setting aside,
dissolving and vacating the grounds of matrimony hereto for existing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all property issues and other issues raised at trial
shall be reserved for advisement by the Court.

0U0208
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DATED this

¥? day of^ Juiy, 2008.

'JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
FAX/MAIL CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF
DIVORCE was faxed/mailed to:

CLARK B. ALLRED
ALLRED & MCCLELLAN, P.C.
72 NORTH 300 EAST
ROOSEVELT, UTAH 84066
FAX: (435)722-3928

DATED this

1

day of July, 2008.
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CLARK B ALLRED - 0 0 5 5
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6 1 1 3
ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P . C .
Attorneys for P e t i t i o n e r
72 N o r t h 300 E a s t ( 1 2 3 - 1 4 )
R o o s e v e l t , Utah 84066
Telephone:
(435) 7 2 2 - 3 9 2 8

U Lu

P»* » ^

7

%

tf.

%

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER
(September 25, 2008 hearing)

KATHRYN C. BROUGH,
Petitioner,
vs .
)

) Civil No.

RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,

054000084 DA

)

Judge John R. Anderson

Respondent.

The above captioned matter came before the Court for argument
on the Respondent's Motion for New Trial, Objections to Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Motion for Relief from Judgment and
Order, and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment.
Petitioner

was

present

with

her

attorney,

Clark

Allred.

Respondent was present with his attorney Randall Gaither.

Both

parties have submitted memoranda in support of their positions.
Oral argument was received from counsel.

The Court, on the record

then stated its reasonssand analysis regarding the signing of the
findings of fact and conclusions of law and the issues raised in

000210
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the motions and then denied the motions.

The parties

further

agreed that the objection to supplemental fees was based on the
same reasons as the above listed motions and should also be denied.
The court signed the bifurcated order divorcing the parties.

The

Respondent following the court's ruling filed his notice of appeal.
Based thereon the Court rules as follows:
1.

The Respondent's Motion for New Trial is denied.

2.

The

Respondent's

Objection

to

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law is denied.
3. The Respondent's Motion for Relief from Judgment and Order
is denied.
4.

The Respondent's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is

denied.
5.

The Respondent's Objections to Supplemental Request for

Attorney's Fees is denied and Petitioner is awarded the fees set
forth in her supplemental affidavit.
6.

Respondent is given 21 days from September 25, 2008 to

make the election provided for in paragraph 1 of the Decree of
Divorce signed August 28, 2008 and 90 days from September 25, 2008
to pay the monies ordered in paragraph 1 or 2 of the Decree of
Divorce signed August 28, 2008.

000211

DATED t h i s

d a y of

Octobey^2s008.
BY TRE qfoiF*:

Randall" Gaith
Attorney fojr Respondent
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FILED
DISTRICT COURf
DUCHESNE COUNTY. I T * "
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OCT \h 2008

RANDALL GAITHER #1141
Attorney for the Respondent
159 West 300 South Broadway #105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)531-1990

-v,.

mfen-^r,
8m District Gout

JOANNE McKEE. C
BY
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IN THE EIGHT DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

KATHRYN C. BROUGH,

;>

Petitioner,
vs.

]'
•

RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,
Respondent.

NOTICE OF ELECTION

',
)
.]

Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON

])

Case No. 054000084

TO THE CLERK FOR JUDGE ANDERSON AND THE ATTORNEY FOR THE
PETITIONER:
Subject to all pending Motions, the Respondent hereby elects to pay to the
Petitioner the amount necessary to be awarded the business and residence within ninety

i

(90) days of the entry of the Decree as set forth in Paragraph One of the Decree entered

n

on September 4, 2008 AS MODIFIED ON September 25,2008

4
1

000213

QUO b i b

DATED this

day of October, 2008.

(Randall cQaiiher
RANDALL GAITHER
Attorney for the Respondent

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
ELECTION was emailed, faxed and delivered to:

CLARK B.ALLRED
Allred & McClellan, P.C.
72 North 300 East
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Fax: (435)722-3928
/}

//
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DATED this

13

day of September, 2008.
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THE COURT:

Fourteen will be received.

(Respondent's Exhibit 15 received)
Q

(BY MR. GAITHER)

Now the next one is 15 and that

would be the last one in the Court's courtesy folder and it's
a big thick exhibit.

Looking at the first page of Exhibit

15, do you know who prepared that?
A

My daughters, Christie and Amanda.

Q

And previously we've seen some billing and have

they billed for the time and effort for this?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

Do you know where they obtained the information

about where the costs - what does this document relate to?
A

Mostly the cost of the house.

I think most

everything on here is costs of building the house, putting
everything together and getting ready to move into it.
MR. ALLRED:

Your Honor, counsel - or the witness

indicated he didn't prepare this.

We don't have any

objection to it being received and we've gone through it and
believe that it accurately shows (inaudible) paid in the
business.
MR. GAITHER:
Q

All right, thank you.

(BY MR. GAITHER)

So, there is a folder that

matches all these things up back in your —
A

Yes, sir.

Q

All right, and let's have you go to the last page
175
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1

as far as Brough Trucking and the checks, what is the total

2

amount there?

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. GAITHER:

5

On Page 3, three pages into the

exhibit.

6

Q

7

A

8

Q

9

Where are you at*?

I
(BY MR. GAITHER)

What is the total amount there?

• Looks like $166,373.89.
All right, and then the next page, N.J. Trucking,

is there a separate account for N.J. Trucking?

10

A

Yes, sir.

11

Q

And what is the amount from N.J. Trucking?

12

A

Looks like $86,559.12.

13

Q

All right.

14

I

Now the last page of the summary is to

Jim's personal.

15

A

That's my personal checkbook!

16

Q

And where was that account at?

17

-A

The amount?

18

Q

No, the account, where was the account at?

19

A

Mountain America.

20

Q

And was Kathy a signator on your account?

21

A

No.

22

Q

And at that point in time did she have a Mountain

23

j

I

American Account of her own?

24

A

Yes.

25 I

Q

These are checks that you paid out of your account;
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1

is that correct?

2

A

Yes sir.

3

Q

And what is the total for that amount?

4

A

$73,318.10.

5

Q

Okay, thank you.

Now just a couple of other items.

6

If you could just turn right before 15(c), there's about four

7

or five pages of - if I could just assist you real quick and

8

(inaudible)

9
10

And Your Honor, these are documents that we
delivered at a later time.

11

MR. ALLRED:

12

MR. GAITHER:

13
14

dated (inaudible).
Q

Oh, that's 15(c)?
15(c) yeah.

There should be a letter

Thank you.

(BY MR. GAITHER)

Now, in relation to your personal

15

account, your checking account, have you also, in addition to

16

doing that determined where the deposits were made into the

17

checking accounts where these expenditures came from?

18

A

Yes, sir.

19

Q

And going to that - it looks like there's a

20
21

.

document 4-12-2000, do you see that?
A

That's an N.J. Truckin' deposit slip showing

22

Duchesne land which is Steed's over in Duchesne bought the

23

shop and yard and made a payment of $30,000 that was

24

deposited in N.J. Trucking.

25 I

Q

And then the next page, it looks like Richard J.
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000217

Brough, 5-1-02?
A

That's a deposit that went into my personal - no,

this went into Wells Fargo, looks like my personal Wells
Fargo checking account and her handwritincr savs sale of Jim's
house, $10,810.82.
Q

And her, who are you referring to?

A

Kathy.

Q

So where did you find this at?

A

In the deposit slip books in the office.

Q

Okay.

And let's go over to the next page, N.J.

Trucking, 5-1-2000.
i

A

That's from Duchesne land, the Steed's over in

Duchesne $54,000 went into N.J. Trucking as a deposit slip.
Q

And whose handwriting is that?

A

On the sticky is mine but on the checkstub is hers.

Q

Okay, thank you.

It looks like there's kind of a

poor copy of something that says Mountain America, what's
that referring to?
A
2001.

$50,000 went into a money market account, 5-17This would have been the sale of some used oil field

equipment I had in the yard.
Q

And had you owned that —

A

For about 15 years.

Q

Okay.

Next page, N.J. Trucking, there's one there

for it says Chotah.
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CLARK B ALLRED - 0 055
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113
ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
72 North 300 East (123-14)
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Telephone:
(435) 722-3928
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT

KATHRYN C. BROUGH,
Petitioner,
vs.

)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES

)

RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,
Respondent.

) Civil No.
)

054000084 DA

Judge John R. Anderson

COMES NOW, Clark B Allred, being first duly sworn, deposes and
states that:
1.

I am the attorney for the Petitioner in the above entitled

action. I work for the law firm of Allred & McClellan, P.C.
2.

The law firm was retained by the Petitioner in the above

entitled action pursuant to the terms of a written fee agreement.
3.

I am duly licensed to practice law in the State of Utah.

My bar number is 0055.
4.

From August 22, 2005 through July 2, 2008, Allred &

McClellan, P.C. expended $15,391.53 in legal services and costs to
represent the Petitioner in this case.

000219

5.

The fees and costs incurred by the firm of Allred &

McClellan, P.C., were for the following:
Aug. 22, 2005

Office visit to discuss filing
for a divorce.

.60

$99.00

Aug. 23, 2005

Filing Fee - Petition for Divorce

Aug. 23, 2005

Preparation of Motion for Order
to Show Cause, Order to Show
Cause, Affidavit in Support of
Order to Show Cause, Petition for
Divorce, Summons, correspondence
with Eighth District Court and
preparation of Court Cover Sheet

2.6

$117.00

Aug. 29, 2005

Work on the Petition and the
order to show cause documents

.50

$82.50

Aug. 29, 2005

Revising and editing Summons,
Petition for Divorce, Motion for
Order to Show Cause, Order to
Show Cause and Affidavit in
Support of Order to Show Cause

.40

$18.00

Aug. 30, 2005

Correspondence with and telephone
call to Service Agent,
correspondence with client and
waiting at the Courthouse for a
date for the Order to Show Cause.

1.0

$45.00

Aug. 31, 2005

Preparation of Financial

.40

$18.00

$97.00

Declaration.
Sept. 6, 2005

Correspondence with client

.20

$9.00

Sept. 8, 2005

Office visit and preparing for
OTSC hearing
Revising and editing Financial

.60

$99.00

.30

$13.50

Sept. 9, 2005

Declaration.
Sept. 14, 2005

Service Fee

$37.00

Sept. 15, 2005

Preparation of exhibits for

hearing.

Qub<s20

.40

$18.00

Sept. 27, 2005

Telephone call with Eighth
District Court, preparation of
Default Certificate and Notice of
Hearing

.80

$36.00

Sept. 29, 2005

Correspondence with client

.20

$9.00

Oct. 13, 2005

Preparing for the Court Hearing,
Court Appearance on the Order to
Show Cause and preparing the
orders.

3.5

$577.50

Oct. 13, 2005

Preparation of Exhibits for Order
to Show Cause.

.20

$9.00

Oct. 14, 2005

Researching cases and materials
on prenuptial agreements.

2.3

$184.00

Oct. 14, 2005

Preparation of Scheduling Order
and Order on Order to Show Cause.

1.2

$54.00

Oct. 14, 2005

Preparation of Petitioner's First
Set of Interrogatories and
Request for Production of
Documents.

1.0

$45,00

Oct. 16, 2005

Correspondence with Mary Ann
Hansen and client

.60

$27.00

Oct. 16, 2005

Preparation of Order and
interrogatories for filing with
the opposing counsel.

.20

$9.00

Oct. 17, 2005

Work on the order, scheduling
order and the discovery

.80

$132.00

Oct. 17, 2005

Revising and editing
Interrogatories, scheduling order
and order on order to show cause

.30

$13.50

Oct. 17, 2005

Preparation of Certificate of
Service.

.30

$45.00

Oct. 20, 2005

Preparing summary for Clark
Allred on prenuptial agreement
issues.

.70

$56.00

0uu^21

Oct. 31, 2005

Meeting with client.

.10

$4.50

Nov. 21, 2005

Preparation of correspondence
with opposing counsel.

.40

$18.00

Dec. 14, 2005

Preparation of Answers to
Interrogatories.

3.0

$135.00

Dec. 15, 2005

Work on the response to discovery

.50

$82.50

Dec. 19, 2005

Preparation of Certificate of
Service and revising and editing
of Answers to Interrogatories

.30

$13.50

Dec, 22, 2005

Correspondence with Mary Ann
Hansen

.30

$13.50

Jan. 16, 2006

Preparation of Motion to Compel
Discovery.

.50

$22.50

Jan. 16, 2006

Revising and editing Motion to
Compel Discovery and
correspondence with client.

.40

$18.00

Jan. 19, 2006

Correspondence with client
including all enclosures

.40

$18.00

Jan. 20y 2006

Send Petitioner's Answers to
Respondent's First Set of
Interrogatories and Request for
Production of Documents to
opposing counsel; transmittal of
same to client.

.20

$9.00

Jan. 20, 2006

Going over the information
received thru discovery

1.0

$175.00

Jan. 23, 2006

Discussions with client and
letter to adverse attorney about
the documents provided in
discovery.

.50

$87.50

Jan. 23, 2006

Correspondence with Mary Hansen

.60

$27.00

Jan. 24, 2006

Preparation of Corporate
Information Order Form

.30

$13.50

(Juu<s22

Feb. 16, 2006

Discussions with adverse attorney
about returning the property, the
discovery and alimony.

Feb. 16, 2006

40

$70.00

Meeting with client

.10

$5. 00

Feb. 27, 2006

Going over documents received
thru discovery

1. 0

$175.00

Feb. 27, 2 0 06

Telephone call with client.

.10

Mar. 6, 2006

Meeting with client to go over
responses to discovery, arranging
for an appraiser, calls to obtain
closing documents and arranging
for a mediator.

1 . 0 $175.00

Mar. 7, 2006

Correspondence with Michael
Barneck.

Mar. 15, 2006

Zions Bank - Copies.

May 4, 2 0 06

Telephone calls to set up the
mediation.

60

$4 . 50

$30.00
$15.70

30

$52.50

1.5

$262.50

May 8, 2 0 06

Meeting with client and working
on a mediation brief and
preparing for mediation

May 22, 2 0 06

Correspondence with Craig Snyder
and client. Revising and editing
Mediation Brief.

80

$40.00

June 1, 2006

Meeting with client and preparing
for the mediation hearing.

2.0

$350.00

June 9, 2006

Mediation of the case.

5 . 5

$962 . 50

June 12, 2 0 06

Followup on mediation, calls on
appraising the business and call
to appraiser of the home.

.40

$70.00

June 19, 2006

Work on motion and memorandum to
seek to have the property
appraised.

.60

$105.00

0uU^23

June 19, 2006

Preparation of Motion to Order
Appraisals and Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Order
Appraisals.

1.5

$67.50

s

June 29, 2006

Discussion with new attorney on
appraisals and settlement and
providing copies to new attorney

.40

$70.00

July 5, 2006

Preparation of Notice to Submit

.40

$20.00

July 10, 2006

Discussion with the adverse
attorney and reviewing the
response to the motion

.40

$70.00

July 12, 2006

Correspondence with client

.20

$10.00

July 13, 2006

Work on the reply memorandum

.50

$87.50

July 14, 2006

Preparation of Reply Memorandum
and Affidavit.

1.0

$50.00

July 17, 2 006

Work on the reply memorandum on
the appraiser and request for
ruling.

.50

$87.50

July 18, 2006

Revising and editing Affidavit

.30

$15.00

and meeting with client.
Aug. 2, 2006

Correspondence with client

.... .20

$10.00

Aug. 7, 2006

Correspondence with client

" .20

$10.00

Aug. 10, 2006

Work on the order for appraisal
and discussions with appraiser.
Preparation of Order and

.50

$87.50

.50

$25.00

: .20

$10.00

.50

$87.50

2.5

$437.50

Aug. 10, 2006

correspondence with client
Aug. 14, 2006

Correspondence with client

Aug. 17, 2006

Meeting with client to prepare
for deposition.
Attending the deposition of Kathy
and calls trying to arrange for
the appraisal.

Aug. 18, 2006
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Aug. 23, 2006

Correspondence with Brad Townsend
and correspondence with client.

.70

$35.00

Aug. 23, 2006

Revising and editing
correspondence with Brad Townsend
and preparation of enclosures

.30

$15.00

Aug. 28, 2006

Preparing response to objection

.40

$70.00

to order.
Aug. 28, 2006

Correspondence with client.

.20

$10.00

Aug. 28, 2006

Preparation of Response to

.40

$20.00

Obj ection.
Aug. 29, 2006

Correspondence with client.

.10

$10.00

Aug. 31, 2006

Meeting with client to discuss

.50

$87.50

recent developments.
Sept. 14, 2006

Deposition copy charge

Sept. 21, 2006

Correspondence with client

.20

$10.00

Sept. 28, 2006
Oct. 5, 2006

Correspondence with client
Calls to appraiser and to adverse
attorney about Jim's refusal to
cooperate with appraisers.
Transcribe and send letter to Mr.
Heugley; transmittal letter to
client with copy of same.
Reviewing the settlement letter
and calls with adverse attorney
to set up the appraisal of the
home .

.20
.40

$10.00
$70.00

.50

$25.00

.40

$70.00

Nov. 22, 2006

Reviewing the appraisal and
responding to the settlement
offer.

1.0

$175.00

Nov. 27, 2006

Revising and editing
correspondence with Dusten
Heugley. Telephone call and
meeting with client.

.40

$20.00

Oct. 16, 2006
Oct. 30, 2006

0uG225

$133.40

Dec. 11, 2006

Correspondence with client

Dec. 28, 2006

.20

$10.00

Correspondence with Dusten
Heugley.

.30

$15.00

Jan. 16, 2007

Preparation of Motion for Order
to Show Cause, Order to Show
Cause, and Affidavit in Support
of Order to Show Cause.

.80

$40.00

Jan. 18, 2007

Revising and editing Motion for
Order to Show Cause and Order to
Show Cause.
^

.20

$10.00

Jan. 18, 2007

Correspondence with client

.20

$10.00

Feb. 1, 2007

Correspondence with Mr. Heugley

.50

$25.00

Feb. 12, 2007

Work on a motion to continue
order to show cause hearing.

.50

$87,50

Feb. 12, 2007

Preparation of Motion to Continue
and Order for Continuance.

.60

$30,00

Feb. 12, 2007

Correspondence with Dusten Heugly
and client.

.40

$20.00

Mar. 15, 2007

Work on the affidavit and
memorandum opposing the motion to
release business property.

.50

$87.50

Mar. 15, 2007

Correspondence with client.

.20

$10.00

Mar. 15, 2007

Preparation of Affidavit and ....
Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion of Return of Property.

1.0

$50.00

Mar. 20, 2007

Correspondence with client

.20

$10.00

Mar. 27, 2007

Preparation of Supplemental
Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion for Return of Business
Property.

.40

$20.00

Mar. 29, 2007

Revising and editing Supplemental
Memorandum in Opposition.
Correspondence with client.

.40

$20.00
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*

Apr. 16, 2007

Correspondence with client

.20

$10.00

Apr. 16, 2007

Discussions on providing the
computer for inspection and email
to appraiser on status.

.50

$87.50

Apr. 23, 2007

Correspondence with Dusten
Heugley and telephone call with
client.

.30

$15.00

Apr. 24, 2007

Preparation of Subpoena Duces
Tecum to Mountain America and
Zions First National Bank.

.50

$25.00

Apr. 24, 2007

Correspondence with client

.20

$10.,00

.30

$52.,50

. 30

$ 1 5 . , 00

.10

$ 5 ..00

.40

$ 1 8 ., 0 0

.40

$70.00

Apr. 26, 2 0 07

Preparing a request for the
documents requested by subpoena

Apr. 30, 2007

Correspondence with Mr. Heugley

May 17, 2007

Telephone call with Dustin Heugly

Maiy 3, 2005

Preparation of Motion and Order
for Continuance.
Meeting and arranging with person
to examine the computer,
discussion with client.

June 4, 2007

June 18, 2 0 07

Copies

$ 2 1 . 93

July 11, 2007

Correspondence with Dustin Heugly

.30

$15.,00

Aug. 13, 2007

Finalize and file Objection to
Order to Show Cause; transmittal
to client with copies of same.

.20

$ 1 0 . , 00

Aug. 21, 2007

Efforts to contact adverse
attorney to complete the
appraisal.

.30

$52.50

Aug. 23, 2007

Correspondence with Dustin

.40

$20.00

Heugley

0U0227

Aug. 30, 2007

Discussion with client and
appraiser, attending court on
Order to Show Cause, letter to
adverse counsel on payment.

.50

$87.50

Aug. 30, 2007

Correspondence with Dusten

.30

$15.00

Heugley
Sept. 5, 2007

Correspondence with client

.20

$10.00

Sept. 17, 2007

Meeting with client and potential
witness on assets being hidden
Correspondence with Randall
Gaither and Mr. Townsend.

.50

$87.50

.90

$45.00

Sept. 18, 2007
Sept. 24, 2007

Correspondence with Randall
Gaither; transmittal to client
with same.

.40

$20,00

Oct. 16, 2007

Correspondence with client

.20

$10.00

Oct. 22, 2007

Going over the letter and
determining what we needed and
letter to adverse attorney.

.50

$87.50

Oct. 24, 2007

Correspondence with Randall

.40

$20.00

Gaither.
Nov. 8, 2007

Correspondence with client

.20

$10.00

Nov. 15, 2007

Preparing a response to the
petition to modify.
Preparation of Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion to Bifurcate

.50

$87.50

.40

$20.00

Nov, 15, 2007
Nov. 19, 2007

Revising and editing Memorandum
in Opposition to Motion to
Bifurcate.

.20

$10.00

Nov. 20, 2007

Transmittal letter to client with
copy of Memorandum in Opposition
to Motion to Bifurcate

.20

$10.00

Dec. 3, 2007

Correspondence with client

.20

$10.00

10
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Dec. 27, 2007

Correspondence with Randall
Gaither.

.30

$15.00

Dec. 31, 2007

Telephone call with and

.20

$10.00

correspondence to client.
Jan. 17, 2008

Correspondence with client

.20

$10.00

Jan. 31, 2008

Correspondence with client

.20

$10.00

Feb. 6, 2008
Feb. 7, 2008

Correspondence with client
Reviewing documents received and
preparing for pre trial
conference

.20
1.0

$10.00
$175.00

Feb. 14, 2008

Court appearance for scheduling
conference

.60

$105.00

Feb. 21, 2008

Work on obtaining information on
forgery issues, going over the
property lists provided by
counsel

.50

$87.50

Feb. 25, 2008

Providing information to the
appraiser on forgery claims

.50

$87.50

Feb. 25, 2008

Telephone call with and

.20

$10.00

.20

$10 00

.30

$15 00

.30

$52 50

.20

$10 00

1.
1.55

$262 50

correspondence to client.
Feb. 26, 2008

Correspondence with client

Feb. 27, 2008

Correspondence with Brad Townsend

Mar. 6, 2008

Reviewing the police Reports

Mar. 6, 2 008
Apr. 10, 2008

Correspondence with Brad Townsend
Attempts to contact the appraiser
of the business, calls to Mr.
Gaither, working on stipulation
and beginning work on the witness
and exhibit list.

11
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Apr. 14, 2008

Revising and editing Witness
List. Preparation of Notice of
Deposition. Telephone call with
Court Reporter and correspondence
with client.

.90

$45.00

Apr. 14, 2008

Preparing for depositions and for
trial and setting up the times to
meet with the Appraiser.

2.0

$350.00

Apr. 15, 2008

Correspondence with Court
Reporter and client.

.50

$25.00

Apr. 17, 2008

Correspondence with client

.20

$10.00

Apr. 18, 2008

Travel to Duchesne Court and
researching Jim's prior divorce
file for asset information.

1.3

$130.00

Apr. 21, 2008

Researching Jim's property
interests at Duchesne recorder's
office and online Uintah County
records.

1.3

$130.00

Apr. 29, 2008

Correspondence with client

.20

$10.00

Apr. 30, 2008

Researching whether they can take
a second deposition.

.30

$52.50

May 1, 2008

Correspondence with Randall
Gaither. Revising Stipulation
and Witness and Exhibit Lists.

.20

$10.00

May 5, 2008

Meeting with the appraiser and
going to the various sites,
providing information requested
by appraiser, preparing for the
deposition of Mr. Brough

5.0

$875.00

May 5, 2008

Telephone call with client and
preparation of delivery documents
to Mr. Townsend

1.0

$50.00

May 6, 2008

Delivery expense

12
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$6.04

May 6, 2008

Correspondence with Brad Townsend
and delivery of documents for
mailing.

.50

$25

May 6, 2008

Discussion with the appraiser and
working on a document request.

.50

$87

May 7, 2008

Revising and editing Request for
Production of Documents.
Certificate of Service.

.30

$15

May 8, 2008

Research property values

.30

$15

May 8, 2008

Correspondence with client

.20

$10

May 15, 2008

Responding to the motion for a
protective order and preparing
for the deposition

1.5

$262

May 16, 2008

Finalize the Memorandum Opposing
Motion for Protection Order; copy
to Mr. Gaither and client.

.30

$15

May 16, 2008

Deposition of Jim Brough

3.5

$612

May 19, 2008

Preparation of Certificate of
Service. Revising and editing
Third Request for Production of
Documents.

.40

$20

May 19, 2008

Correspondence with client

.20

$10

May 19, 2 0 08

Work on a request for documents
referred to in the deposition and
beginning work on the trial
memorandum, research update on
the prenuptual agreement.

2.2

$3 85

May 22, 2008

Meeting with client to work on
the exhibit list and to prepare
for trial.

1.0

-$175

May 23, 2008

Trial preparation, organizing the
exhibits.

1.5

$262

13
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May 27, 2008

Review and finalize motion, memo
and notice to submit; Prepare
mailing certificates; Prepared
copies and mail; draft letter to
client.

1.6

$80.00

May 27, 2008

Work on the exhibit and witness
list, going over all proposed
exhibits and working on a trial
memorandum.

2.0

$350.00

May 28, 2008

Witness Fee - Basin Land

$18.50

May 28, 2008

Witness Fee - Farm and Home

$18.50

May 28, 2008

Witness Fee - Express Title

$18.50

May 28, 2008

Witness Fee - Sunrise Title

$18.50

May 28, 2008

Reviewing records that the
recorders office and copying
deeds of sales, reviewing prior
divorce and working on subpoenas
for title companies.

3.5

$612.50

May 28, 2008

Preparation of Subpoena Duces
Tecum and correspondence with
Express Title. Telephone call
with the same.

1.0

$50.00

May 28, 2008

Preparation of Subpoena Duces
Tecum and correspondence with
Sunrise Title. Telephone call
with the same.

1.0

$50.00

May 28, 2008

Preparation of Subpoena Duces
Tecum and correspondence with
Farm and Home Title. Telephone
call with the same.

1.0

$50.00

May 28, 2008

Preparation of Subpoena Duces
Tecum and correspondence with
Basin Land and Title. Telephone
call with the same.

1.0

$50.00

14
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M a y 2 9 , 2 0 08

P r e p a r a t i o n of S u b p o e n a ' s for
service.
Correspondence with
client.

.60

$30.00

June 1 2 , 200i

Reviewing documents received by
s u b p o e n a and w o r k i n g o n the
e x h i b i t list

1.5

$262.50

June 1 2 , 2008

C o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h client

.20

$10.00

June 1 2 , 2008

Correspondence with Randall
G a i t h e r , client and t e l e p h o n e
call w i t h c l i e n t .

.50

$25.00

June 13, 2 001

R e s e a r c h and w o r k i n g o n the t r i a l
memorandum

.50 ' $87.50

June 16, 200!

Ink Spot - Copies

June 16, 200!

S t a t e of U t a h - P r i n c i p l e

June 16, 2 00!

S u n r i s e T i t l e - Copies

June 16, 200!

W o r k o n the w i t n e s s and e x h i b i t
list.

.50

$87.50

June 16, 2 00 8

C o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h client

.20

$10.00

June 16, 2008

R e v i s i n g and e d i t i n g W i t n e s s a n d

.30

$15.00

$22.71
Search

$1. 00
$63.75

Exhibit List,
C o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h client
Preparation of Subpoena's for
Trial

.20

$10.00

1.0

$50.00

June 18, 2 00 8

Correspondence with client

.20

$10.00

June 19, 2 00 8

Witness Fee - Jared Jensen

June 19, 20 0 8

Preparation of Subpoena's for
service.
Telephone call with
service agent.

.30

$15.00

J u n e 2 0 , 2 00 8

Going over exhibit and witness
lists, preparing objections,
preparing for trial and
organizing exhibits.

2.5

$437.50

June 1 7 , 2008
June 1 7 , 200 8

15
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$18.50

June 23, 2008

Correspondence with client.-

.40

$20.00

June 24, 2008

Discussions with appraiser and
working on the exhibits.

1.5

$262.50

June 25, 2008

Discussions with appraiser and
working on exhibits

1.0

$175.00

June 30, 2008

Work on the objection to the
exhibits and witnesses,
discussions with Kathy and
discussion with R. Gaither about
reviewing documents.

1.0

$175,00

July 1, 2008

Work on Affidavit of Attorney
Fees

2.0

$100.00

July 2, 2008

Work on Affidavit of Attorney
Fees

4.0

$200.00

6.

The fees charged are reasonable for legal services in the

7.

The fees set forth herein were reasonable and necessary,

area.

and

were

billed

agreement.

to

the

Petitioner

pursuant

to

a written

fee

The legal work included work by Clark B Allred and Brad

Brotherson and their paralegals, Cheree Brotherson, Carrie Weight
Debbie Reed and Melinda Palmer.

Paralegals are used to reduce the

costs

research,

to

obtaining

the

client

by

and providing

preparation.

doing

information

to

document

the

client

preparation,
and

exhibit

The firm has expended costs for filing fees, service

fees, copies, witness fees and postage in this matter in the amount
of $547.53.

Clark B Allred has expended 73.60 hours at a rate of

$165.00 - $175.00 per hour; Brad Brotherson has expended 2.6 hours
16
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at a rate of $100.00; Melinda Palmer has expended 3.0 hours at a
rate of $80.00 per hour; and the other paralegals have expended
60.40 hours at a rate of $45.00 - $50.00 per hour.
DATED this

da

' (

y of July, 2005.
/ ^

ALLREB Sc\ McCLELLAN, P . C .
Attorney!for Petitioner
By;

STATE OF UTAH
) ss .

COUNTY OF DUCHESNE

)

On the /
day of July, 2008, personally appeared before me
Clark B Allred, signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Notary Public
I

w\TO-p^«f
\ > w / y

My Commission Expire*
' July 28,2010
State of Utah

•
•
•

17
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I, Cheree Brotherson, am employed by the office of ALLRED &
McCLELLAN, P. C. attorneys for Petitioner herein and hereby certify
that I served the attached AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY FEES on Respondent
by fax and by placing

a true and correct

copy

thereon

in an

envelope addressed to:
RANDALL GAITHER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
15 9 WEST 3 00 SOUTH BROADWAY #105
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101
(801)672-1162
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States mail at Roosevelt, Utah, on the 7Lh
day of July, 2008.

CHEREE BROTHERSON

0uu236
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APPELLATE CLERKS OFFICE

EIGHTH DISTRICT CT-ROOSEVELT

Appellate #: A f c W £ -*

BROUGH, KATHRYN C vs. BROUGH, RICHARD JAMES

Document Title

PILED

Cover Sheet
Petition for Divorce
Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause
Motion for Order to Show Cause
Return of Service Summons, Order to Show Cause
Minutes Order to Show Cause
Answer
Answer
Notice of Hearing
Minutes Order to Show Cause
Exhibit List
Certificate of Service
Certificate of Service
Motion to Compel Discovery
Certificate of Service
Certificate of Service
Certificate of Service
Motion to Order Appraisals
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Qrder Appraisals
Respondent's Objection to Petitioner's Motion to Order Appraisals
Notice of Withdrawal
Affidavit in Support of Motion to Order Appraisals
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Order Appraisals
Notice to Submit for Decision
Notice of Substitution of Counsel
Notiqe of Deposition
Request for Oral Argument
Ruling
Order
Objection to Petitioner's Proposed Order Appraisals
Response to Objection to Petitioner's Proposed Order Appraisals
Ruling
Letter of Deposition
Motion for Order to Show Cause
Order to Show Cause
Motion to Continue Order to Show Cause
Order Continuing Order to Show Cause
Minutes Incur Note
Affidavit of Kathy Brough
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Return of Business Property
Motion for Return of Business Property
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Entry Date

mfw 08/30/2005
08/30/2005
08/30/2005
08/30/2005
09/06/2005
09/15/2005
09/27/2005
09/28/2005
09/30/2005
10/13/2005
10/13/2005
10/17/2005
11/28/2005
11/07/2006
01/20/2006
01/24/2006
02/17/2006
06/19/2006
06/19/2006
07/10/2006
07/17/2006
07/18/2006
07/18/2006
07/18/2006
07/25/2006
08/07/2006
08/07/2006
€8/08/2006
08/21/2006
08/28/2006
08/29/2006
09/28/2006
11/06/2006
01/18/2007
01/22/2007
02/12/2007
02/15/2007.
02/15/2007
03/20/2007
03/20/2007
03/22/2007

ige Number
Page
1
2-4
5-7
8-9
10-14
15
16-18
19-20
21-22
23
24
25
26
27-39
40
41
42
43-45
46-50
51-78
79-80
81-83
84-87
88-90
91-92
93-94
95
96-97
98-100
101-105
106-108
109-110
111
112-114
115-117
118-120
121-1.22
123
124-127
128-131
132-136
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APPELLATE CLERKS OFFICE

EIGHTH DISTRICT CT-ROOSEVELT

Appellate #:

BROUGH, KATHRYN C vs. BROUGH, RICHARD JAMES

Document Title
Affidavit of Respondent in Support of Motion for Return of Business Property
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Return of Business
Property
Order
Notice of OTSC for Dismissal
Objection to Order to Show Cause for Dismissal
Appearance of Counsel
Motion to Allow Substitution of Counsel
Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel
Order
Memorandum in Support of "Motion to Bifurcate Proceedings andtoTEriter a
Decree of Divorce
Motion to Bifurcate Proceedings and to Enter a Decree of Divorce
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Bifurcate Proceedings and to Enter a
Decree of Divorce
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Bifurcate Proceedings and to Enter a
Decree of Divorce
Notice to Submit
Ruling
Request for Scheduling Conference
Notice of Telephone Schedule Conference
Minutes Telephonic Scheduling Conference
Notice of Bench Trial
Notice of Deposition
Notice of Deposition
Certificate of Service
Stipulation Witness and Exhibit Lists
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Protective Order and Objection to
Petitioner's Request for Production of Documents
Certificate of Service
Motion for Protective Order
Objection to Petitioner's Request for Production of Documents
Reply Memorandum to Motion for Protective Order
Motion for Protective Order Concerning Request for Discovery Received on May
21,2008
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Protective Order Concerning Request
for Discovery Received on May 21, 2008
Motion to Strike Reply Memorandum
Notice to Submit for Decision
Ruling and Order
Respondent's Witness List and Exhibit List
Petitioner's Witness and Exhibit List
Respondent's Supplemental Witness List
Jan 13,2009
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Entry Date
03/22/2007
03/29/2007

Page Number
137-139
140-143

04/12/2007
07/31/2007
08/13/2007
09/05/2007
09/05/2007
09/10/2007
09/13/2007
10731/2007

144-145
146-148
149-151
152-153
154-155
156
157-158
"159-T6T

10/31/2007
11/19/2007

162-164
165-167

12/05/2007

168-170

12/05/2007
12/27/2007
01/16/2008
01/23/2008
02/14/2008
02/14/2008
04/16/2008
04/29/2008
05/08/2008
05/13/2008
05/19/2008

171-173
174-175
176-177
178-180
181
182-184
185-187
188-189
190
191-192
193-208

05/20/2008
05/20/2008
05/20/2008
05/21/2008
05/23/2008

209
210-212
213-215
216-227
228-237

05/28/2008

238-245

05/28/2008
05/28/2008
06/13/2008
06/16/2008
06/17/2008
06/24/2008

246-248
249-251
252-255
256-262
263-268
269-270
12:58 PM

03/20/09

13:14 FAX 8015783999

Case: 054000084

©004

APPELLATE CLERKS OFFICE
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Appellate #:

BROUGH, KATHRYN C vs. BROUGH, RICHARD JAMES

Document Title
Return of Service Subpoena
Objection to Part of Respondent's Witnesses and Exhibits
Certificate of Service
Motion for to Allow Appraiser, Brad Townsend, Appear by Telephone
Motion for Telephone Conference Hearing on Pretrial Issues

Motion to Continue
Trial Memorandum
Request to Supplement Request for Production of Documents
Respondent's Trial Memorandum
Mini itAQ R<annh Trial

Exhibit List
Request for CD Recording
Respondent's Post-Trial Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Memorandum
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Decree of Divorce
Notice of Entry of Decree of Divorce
Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements
Supplemental Affidavit of Attorney's Fees
Notice of Law and Motion hearing
Motion to Continue
Memorandum in Support of Pending Motions
Motion to Stay Judgment and Request to Submit
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law
Motion for Relief From Judgment and Order
Affidavit of Randall Gaither, Attorney for Respondent in Support of New Trial
Motion for New Trial
Notice of Hearing
Response to Motion to Continue Hearing
Objections to Supplemental Request for Attorney Fees
Response to Respondent's Objections to Supplemental Request for Attorneys
Fees
Memorandum Withdrawing Motion to Continue
(Proposed) Order Staying Judgment (unsigned)
Memorandum in Opposition to: 1. Motion for New Trial 2. Objections to Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law 3. Motion for Relief from Judgment and Order 4,
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
Exhibit List
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Decree of Divorce
Minutes Moutons Hearing
0 U0 L3H
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06/24/2008
06/30/2008
07/07/2008
07/07/2008
07/07/2008
07/07/2008
07/07/2008
07/08/2008
07/09/2008
n7/no/9nnR

271-273
274-278
279-280
281-283
284-286
287-289
290-300
301-302
303-314

07/09/2008
07/16/2008
08/11/2008

317-320
321-322
323-349

09/04/2008
09/04/2008
"09705/2008
09/09/2008
09/09/2008
09/09/2000
09/11/2008
09/12/2008
09/12/2008
09/12/2008
09/12/2008
09/12/2008
09/12/2008
09/12/2008
09/12/2008
09/16/2008
09/18/2008
09/22/2008

350-367

SIK-fVlfi

368-371

P

~~~" 372-373 ~ ~ ^
374-376
377-380
381-383
384-386
387-397
398-400
401-406
407-410
411-413
414-473
474-478
479-480
481-483
484-485
486-488

09/22/2008
09/25/2008
09/25/2008

489-490
491-492
493-502

09/25/2008
09/25/2008
09/25/2008
09/25/2008

503
504-506
507-508
509
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Document Title

Entry Date

Page Number

Notice of Appeal

09/25/2008

510-511

Utah Court of Appeals Notice of Filing Appeal

10/03/2008

512

Request for Transcript

10/03/2008

513-514

Notice of Election

10/14/2008

515-516

Order

10/14/2008

517-519

Notice of Election

10/16/2008

520-521

Supplemental Request for Transcript

11/04/2008

524-523

Motion for Stay Pending Review - GAITHER, RANDALL T

12/01/2008

524-526

Amended Motion for Stay Pending Review and to Approve Undertakings of Real
Property - GAITHER, RANDALL T

12/03/2008

527-529

Memorandum in Support of Undertaking of Real Property and Supersedeas Bond

12/03/2008

530-545

Declaration of the Respondent Richard J Brough

12/03/2008

546-549

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Stay Pending Review

12/05/2008

550-552

Undertaking of Real Property and Supersedeas Bond (parcel one)

12/10/2008

553-557

Undertaking of Real Property and Supersedeas Bond (parcel two)

12/10/2008

558-562

Reply Memorandum

12/10/2008

563-565

Notice of Filing of Executed Undertakings

12/10/2008

566-567

Reply Memorandum

12/11/2008

568-570

Notice of Filing of Executed Undertakings

12/11/2008

571-572

Undertaking of Real Property and Supersedeas Bond (parcel one)

12/11/2008

573-577

Undertaking of Real Property and Supersedeas Bond (parcel two)

12/11/2008

578-582

Memorandum in Response to Amended Motion for Stay Pending Review and To
Approve Undertakings of Real Property

12/17/2008

583-586

Memorandum and Reply to Response to Amended Motion for Stay Pending
Review

12/29/2008

587-590

Supplemental Declaration of the Respondent Richard Brough in Support of Motion
to Stay Judgment on Appeal
Notice to Submit for Decision
Notice of Filing Completed Transcript
Transcript - Bench Trial 7-9-2008
Transcript - Motion Hearing 9-25-2008

12/29/2008

591-593

01/07/2009

594-596

01/13/2009

597
598
599
600

Transcript - Motion Hearing 10-13-2005

01/13/2009
01/13/2009
01/13/2009
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